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This dissertation examines the nature of legality (i.e. the quality of being law) and provides a 
unique understanding of legal normativity.  As I will use the term, ‘legal normativity’ refers 
broadly to the relationship between legality and reasons for action.    
Explanations of legal normativity can be grouped into two categories, one consisting of legal 
positivist interpretations and the other consisting of anti-positivist interpretations.  There are 
several core theses comprising legal positivism; among these, I am primarily concerned with the 
separability thesis, which affirms that identifying law does not necessarily involve moral 
judgments or evaluations.  The anti-positivist thesis denies the separability thesis.  Although 
explanations of legal normativity often assert either the separability thesis or the anti-positivist 
thesis, it is, I will argue, possible to plausibly explain the phenomena without asserting one or the 
other.  I will attempt to provide such an explanation in the form of (what I will call) the 
‘acceptance model’ of legal normativity.  The acceptance model responds to the contention that, 
while existing legal positivist theories (e.g. those presented by HLA Hart, Joseph Raz, and Scott 
Shapiro) are inadequate to account for legal normativity (or at least face significant difficulties in 
doing so), anti-positivist theories (e.g. those of Immanuel Kant, Ronald Dworkin, and Nigel 
Simmonds) are unnecessary to account for legal normativity.   
The acceptance model explains legal normativity as consisting of at least two layers.  First, a 
legal system, where satisfying Hartian requirements and exhibiting (to some extent) each of Lon 
Fuller’s precepts of legality, necessarily provides (1) officials with choices entailed by their 
official roles, and (2) certain subjects with several choices that may be protected by a right to 
2 
bodily integrity.  The provision by a legal system of these choices represents a prima facie reason 
for conforming with legal directives to an extent necessary to establish efficacy.  This is because, 
per Hart, a legal system exists only if efficacious, i.e. only if its directives are sufficiently 
conformed with.  I will refer to such conformity as ‘efficacious conformity.’  The prima facie 
reason to efficaciously conform, then, is to facilitate the existence of the legal system so that it 
can provide the aforementioned choices to officials and subjects.  This prima facie reason to 
efficaciously conform is a reason that applies to those legal directives-- regardless of their 
content-- that must be conformed with in order to facilitate efficacy.   
Second, the reason for efficacious conformity, manifested by the provision of these choices, is 
‘had’ by officials and certain subjects because this reason counts as such from the perspective of 
the practical reasoning of officials and certain subjects.  This reason counts as such from the 
perspective of the practical reasoning of officials and certain subjects because of (what I will 
call) the implied point of view.  An official or subject adopts the implied point of view when, in 
executing his role as official or by making a choice provided by law, he exercises for any reason 
his capacity to choose.  By exercising for any reason his capacity to choose in execution of his 
role, or by making a choice provided by law, an official or subject treats as true the proposition 
that the legal system provides choices with which to satisfy reasons (i.e. whatever reasons an 
official has for executing his role, or that a subject has for making a choice provided by law).  As 
a result, officials and certain subjects ought to treat as true the proposition that there is a prima 
facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  The prima facie reason to 
efficaciously conform is to facilitate the legal system, which exists only if efficacious, so that it 
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This dissertation examines the nature of legality (i.e. the quality of being law) and thereby 
provides a unique (although perhaps not comprehensive)1 understanding of legal normativity.  
Beginning with the assumption that a legal system exists only if sufficiently satisfying Hartian 
requirements and Fuller’s precepts of legality, the analysis leads to the acceptance model, which 
represents a new understanding of the normativity of law.  As I will use the term, the normativity 
of law (or legal normativity) refers broadly to the relationship between legality and reasons for 
action. 
Explanations of legal normativity can be grouped into two categories, one consisting of legal 
positivist accounts and the other consisting of anti-positivist accounts.  There are several core 
theses comprising legal positivism; among these, of primary concern in this work is the 
separability thesis, which affirms that identifying law does not necessarily involve moral 
judgments or evaluations.  Anti-positivism (as I will use the term) denies the separability thesis, 
and so affirms that identifying law necessarily involves moral judgments or evaluations.  
Although explanations of legal normativity often assert either the separability thesis or the anti-
positivist thesis, it is, I will argue, possible to plausibly explain the phenomena without asserting 
one or the other.  I will attempt to provide such an explanation in the form of the acceptance 
model of legal normativity.   
This dissertation suggests that, while certain legal positivist theories (e.g. those presented by 
Hart, Raz, and Shapiro) are inadequate to account for legal normativity (or at least face 
significant difficulties in doing so), anti-positivist theories (e.g. those of Kant, Dworkin, and 
Simmonds) are unnecessary to account for legal normativity.  Of course, one might say that, if a 
given anti-positivist account of legal normativity is correct and sufficient as an explanation, then 
any account that I offer will also be unnecessary.  This is true; however, I believe there is good 
reason to prioritize searching for an explanation of legal normativity premised on something 
 
1 The explanation to be presented represents (I hope to show) an important conception of legal 
normativity, but it does not preclude the possibility of other theories that may supplement it. 
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other than moral facts.  This is because the conclusion-- that legal validity necessarily depends 
on moral facts-- is highly contentious and not accepted by legal positivists.  In contrast, the 
assertion that legal validity necessarily depends on social facts is accepted by both legal 
positivists and anti-positivists.  If we can discover a way to account for legal normativity without 
resorting to contentious moral facts, then we begin on more agreeable terrain.2   
As specified by the acceptance model, there are at least two layers comprising legal normativity.  
First, a legal system, because satisfying Hartian requirements and exhibiting (to some extent) 
each of Fuller’s precepts of legality, necessarily provides (1) officials with choices entailed by 
their official roles, and (2) certain subjects with several choices that may be protected by a right 
to bodily integrity.  The provision by a legal system of these choices represents a prima facie 
reason for conforming with legal directives to an extent necessary to establish efficacy.  This is 
because, per Hart, a legal system exists only if efficacious, i.e. only if its directives are 
sufficiently conformed with.  I will refer to such conformity as ‘efficacious conformity.’  The 
prima facie reason to efficaciously conform, then, is to facilitate the existence of the legal system 
so that it can provide the aforementioned choices to officials and certain subjects.  So, this prima 
facie reason to efficaciously conform is a reason that applies to those legal directives-- regardless 
of their content3-- that must be conformed with in order to facilitate efficacy of the system they 
 
2 Shapiro presents another argument for prioritizing examination of legal positivist theories: ‘I want to 
begin with the positivists not because the objections to the natural law approach are more damning, but 
rather for the simple reasons that the objections to the positivistic position are more interesting and enjoy 
logical priority.  For consider how natural lawyers must respond to the Problem of Evil: they must (1) 
deny that they are flouting a truism or (2) claim that their truism-flouting is not nearly as bad as the 
problems positivists face.  The first part of this response may be correct (though I doubt it), but it is not a 
very interesting argument.  After all, it amounts to no more than the defiant declaration that evil legal 
regimes are not possible.  Once this tack is taken, it is not clear where the conversation can go from here.  
And while the second part of the natural law response is philosophically interesting, its cogency can be 
assessed only once we have determined the force of the objections against the positivists.  Thus, we can 
know which poison to pick only once we have assessed the toxicity of the positivistic one first’ (Scott 
Shapiro, Legality (Belknap Press 2011) 50).  
3 Thus, the prima facie reason to do [X] where doing [X] is needed to efficaciously conform does not 
establish a reason to do [X] that exists independent of (the necessity of [X] for) efficacious conformity.  
Keep in mind the words of Raz: ‘It is obviously often the case that people have reason to perform actions 
which are in fact required by law. This in itself does not explain how all laws can be said to be reasons. 
But suppose it can be shown that one always has reason to perform every action which is in fact required 
by law. That would still fall short of solving our problem. We will also want to know whether it is the fact 
that those actions are required by law which is held to be the reason for performing them. Similarly we 
will not be content to learn that individuals ought to follow rules which are also legal rules. We would 
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belong to.   
Second, the prima facie reason for conforming, manifested by the provision of these choices, is 
‘had’ by officials and certain subjects because this reason counts as such from the perspective of 
the practical reasoning of officials and certain subjects.  This reason counts as such from the 
perspective of the practical reasoning of officials and subjects when officials and subjects adopt 
the implied point of view.  Officials adopt the implied point of view when, in executing their 
official duties, they exercise for any reason their capacity to choose, and thereby treat as true the 
proposition that their official roles provide choices with which to satisfy reasons (i.e. whatever 
reasons they have for executing their duties).  Similarly, subjects adopt the implied point of view 
when, by conforming with legal directives (or by acting pursuant to any choices provided by 
law), they exercise for any reason their capacity to choose, and thereby treat as true the 
proposition that the legal system provides choices with which to satisfy reasons (i.e. whatever 
reasons they have for conforming with legal directives, or for acting pursuant to choices 
provided by law).  Because they treat as true these propositions, officials and certain subjects 
ought to treat as true the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform 
with legal directives.  They ought to treat this proposition as true because, given the Hartian 
requirement of efficacy, such conformity is necessary to obtain the choices provided by a legal 
system’s existence.   
This account of legal normativity is called the ‘acceptance’ model because adopting the implied 
point of view involves officials and certain subjects accepting the proposition that the legal 
system provides them with choices that can be exercised in satisfaction of reasons.  It is due to 
the technical meaning of ‘acceptance’ (discussed in Chapter 4) that an official or subject, in 
virtue of accepting this proposition, ought to treat as true the proposition that there is a prima 
facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  In a nutshell, to ‘accept’ a 
proposition in the technical sense is to treat it as true for some reason or, stated differently, to 
 
like to know whether they ought to follow them because they are legal rules. It is not merely the validity 
of the norms which has to be established but their systemic validity. We want to know what difference the 
fact that a norm belongs to a legal system in force in a certain country makes to our practical reasoning. 
We cannot be satisfied with an answer which shows that laws coincide with systems of valid norms. 
(Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Oxford University Press 1975) 154-155).   
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reason on the basis of the truth of a proposition.  If a proposition is accepted in the technical 
sense, then one ought to accept each proposition that is entailed by the proposition that is 
accepted.  This contrasts, in several ways (elaborated in Chapter 4), to Hart’s internal point of 
view, which one accepts in a non-technical sense by endorsing a rule of recognition (i.e. criteria 
of legal validity) as a guide to conduct and standard of criticism.  
Before presenting the acceptance model, I will identify and examine some difficulties faced by 
several existing explanations of legal normativity.  My focus is on the legal positivist theories of 
Hart, Raz, and Shapiro, given that, as discussed, we start on more settled terrain by examining 
accounts that do not rely on moral facts.  The critique of Hart to be presented is unoriginal, and 
draws upon arguments made by Dworkin, Raz, Shapiro, and Simmonds.  Because this critique of 
Hart is not my own, it is discussed only within the context of presenting the acceptance model (in 
Chapter 4), rather than being discussed as a stand-alone critique.  By comparison, the critiques I 
will present of Raz (Chapter 2) and Shapiro (Chapters 2 and 3) are original, and each will be 
given a more focused treatment.   
I will argue that Raz’s theory of law is implicitly (and, in light of the sources thesis, 
incoherently) inclusive positivist, i.e. implicitly affirms that legal validity can depend on moral 
considerations.  By Raz’s ‘theory of law,’ I mean his line of reasoning leading from the authority 
thesis (law necessarily claims legitimate authority) to the sources thesis (legal validity 
necessarily depends on social facts, and cannot depend on moral considerations).  Raz’s theory is 
implicitly inclusive positivist because implying that, in certain contingent circumstances, legal 
validity depends on moral considerations.  These circumstances obtain where it is obvious or 
known to officials whether a purported legal system is immoral, and officials are not insincere or 
confused about the moral conditions of authority.  Here, the purported legal system is a true legal 
system only if it does not exhibit severe immorality because it is only if it does not exhibit severe 
immorality that its officials can sincerely claim legitimate authority, as they must for the system 
to qualify as a legal system.  
According to Shapiro’s planning theory of law, explained in Chapter 1, ‘legal systems are 
institutions of social planning and their fundamental aim is to compensate for the deficiencies of 
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alternative forms of planning in the circumstances of legality.’4  Indeed, ‘Legal institutions are 
supposed to enable communities to overcome the complexity, contentiousness, and arbitrariness 
of communal life by resolving those social problems that cannot be solved, or solved as well, by 
nonlegal means alone.’5  In Chapter 3, I argue that there are at least two inconsistencies in the 
planning theory.  First, Shapiro’s theory explicitly claims that adopting a law plan necessarily 
provides instrumentally rational reasons for following the plan; however, Shapiro’s reasoning 
implies that adopting a law plan does not necessarily provide instrumentally rational reasons.  
Implicitly, Shapiro’s reasoning suggests that adopting a law plan provides instrumentally rational 
reasons only if such law plan is not so immoral that it does a worse job, than a prior non-law 
plan, of resolving the moral problems of the circumstances of legality.  This dependence, upon 
moral considerations, leads to the second inconsistency in the planning theory.  The second 
inconsistency is that, although Shapiro explicitly endorses (exclusive) legal positivism, his 
theory is implicitly anti-positivist.    
This dissertation aims to contribute to the literature of legal philosophy in both a critical and a 
constructive sense.  Critically, I hope to identify some of the difficulties faced by the legal 
theories of Raz and Shapiro.  Constructively, I hope to present-- in the form of the acceptance 
model-- a plausible account of legal normativity.  The dissertation is organized into five chapters.  
In Chapter 1, I identify the normativity of law as the relationship between legality and reasons 
for action, and introduce several prominent legal theories that have tried to explain legal 
normativity.  In Chapter 2, I critique Raz’s theory of law, and examine Shapiro’s argument 
against the incorporation thesis (whereby a rule of recognition can include moral criteria of 
validity).  In Chapter 3, I scrutinize Shapiro’s planning theory of law, arguing that it contains at 
least two inconsistencies.  Then, in Chapter 4, I present the acceptance model of legal 
normativity, and try to explain why it improves upon Hart’s theory.  Finally, in Chapter 5, I 
examine whether the acceptance model represents a return to Kantian legal philosophy (No).  A 
key difference between the acceptance model and Kant’s theory of law is that Kant, but not the 
acceptance model, purports to establish a political obligation. 
 
4 Shapiro (n 2) 171.  
5 ibid.  
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Chapter 1: The Normativity of Law    
1.1 A Relationship Between Legality and Reasons for Action 
Perhaps counterintuitively, the issue of legal normativity-- broadly defined as a relationship 
between legality and reasons for action-- is what results from, rather than what initiates, the 
inquiry undertaken in this dissertation.  The question with which my research began simply 
asked, ‘what is implied by the nature of legality (i.e. the quality of being law)?’  More exactly, 
assuming that a legal system exists only where Hartian requirements, and Fuller’s precepts of 
legality, are sufficiently fulfilled, is there anything of interest that is entailed by law?  Through 
this inquiry, I ultimately reached the acceptance model and the conclusion that each legal system 
necessarily provides officials and certain subjects with a prima facie reason to conform with 
particular legal directives, and contingently provides a conclusive reason to do the same.   
The relationship between legality and reasons for action (as embodied in the acceptance model) 
is thus the output (and not the input) of the analysis.  Accordingly, my research did not begin 
with any particular question about the normativity of law, which I then sought to answer.  
Instead, I wanted simply to further illuminate the nature of law in any way that might be of 
interest to legal philosophy.  There is, therefore, no assumption that any particular question 
regarding legal normativity needs answering.  What needs answering is the question, ‘what is 
implied by the nature of law?’  If this answer involves legal normativity, then we can conclude 
that normativity-- as entailed by legality-- is an essential feature of law and thus something 
worthy of explanation6 (to the extent that it has not been adequately explained already).  That 
said, some discussion of legal normativity may provide helpful context for the acceptance model 
to be presented in Chapter 4.   
 
6 This point responds to those (e.g. Enoch--see David Enoch, ‘Reason-Giving and the Law’ (2011) 
Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law 1) who argue that legal normativity is a pseudo-problem and so 
not something that necessarily needs to be explained by a legal theory.  If the elements described by the 
acceptance model (e.g. the several choices) are entailed by legality, then they are essential elements of 
law.  If, therefore, any of these elements is absent from a purported legal system, then the system in 
question is not a legal system.  Resultantly, to the extent that it is important to distinguish legal from non-
legal systems, it is important to identify and understand these elements.  
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The issue of the normativity of law, and its significance to legal theory, is much-discussed 
among legal philosophers.  According to Gerald Postema, ‘We understand law only if we 
understand how it is that laws give members of a community, officials and law-subjects alike, 
reasons for acting.’7  Thus, ‘any adequate general theory of law must give a satisfactory account 
of the normative (reason-giving) character of law’8  Speaking of legal normativity, Andrei 
Marmor says, ‘Laws do not purport to describe aspects of the world; they do not consist of 
propositions about the way things are.  In one way or another, laws purport to affect or modify 
people’s conduct, and mostly by providing them with reasons for action.’9  Legal normativity, 
then, has to do with the relationship between legality and reasons for acting.  
For Raz, perhaps the most important issue in jurisprudence is how to explain law’s dual nature, 
which includes law’s essential normative aspect: ‘In many ways it is the most important set of 
problems that any philosophy of law has to face since it raises the problem of the double aspect 
of law, its being a social institution with a normative aspect.  The supreme challenge for any 
theory of law is to do justice to both facets of the law.’10  Accordingly, ‘A theory of law must 
explain this dual nature of the law, as fact and as norm.’11  For Raz, then, law has a dual nature 
because law is a social fact with a normative aspect, and a legal theory’s success depends on 
adequately explaining this duality.  There are, says Raz, two things we must know in order to 
understand law’s normative aspect.  First, one must understand law’s capacity to provide reasons 
for subjects: ‘the question of normativity is whether, and when, laws constitute or provide 
reasons (and of what kind) to those subject to them.’12  Second, for Raz, understanding law’s 
normative aspect entails understanding law’s use of normative language: ‘The problem of the 
 
7 Gerald Postema, ‘Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law’ (1982) Journal of Legal 
Studies 165, 165. 
8 ibid.  
9 Andrei Marmor, Philosophy of Law (Princeton University Press 2011) 2.  
 
10 Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law, 2nd ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 296.  
11 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) at 345. 
12 ibid. at 3.  
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normativity of law is the problem of explaining the use of normative language in describing the 
law or legal situations.’13   
Here is another way of thinking about the normativity of law.  As noted by Simmonds, law is not 
only a social practice, but is also an idea within such social practice.  The idea of law is 
embedded within the social practice of law because the status of law is invoked by judges, in the 
course of adjudication, to justify to subjects the imposition of sanctions for violating legal 
directives.  Subjects are not sanctioned by courts because they violated mere rules; rather, 
subjects are sanctioned because they violated the law.  To understand the social practice of law, 
therefore, we must understand the idea of law that is invoked in the course of such practice.  
Pursuant to Simmonds,  
The judicial judgment is addressed to the litigants 
amongst others, and is intended to justify the 
judicial decision.  An adequate account of law’s 
nature must be able to make sense of this, and must 
therefore be able to explain how the arguments 
characteristically offered in judicial judgments 
(arguments that attach central importance to the 
status of certain rules as law) can intelligibly be 
offered as a justification for a decision that may 
involve the ordering of coercive force against the 
citizen.14  
For Simmonds, then, to adequately explain law we must be able to render intelligible the judge’s 
invocation of the status of law as a justification (i.e. a reason) for sanctions.  If the status of law 
cannot be intelligibly invoked as a justification for sanctions, then the social practice of law is 
unintelligible to the extent that it makes such invocation.  Given the centrality of the invocation 
to the practice of law, this threat of unintelligibility is a threat to coherently describing the social 
practice of law: ‘Even if our object is simply to identify the distinctive characteristics of the 
practices composing a legal order, there is nevertheless a need to understand the ascription of 
normativity to law, for that ascription of normativity is central to the entire framework of thought 
 
13 Raz (n 3) 170.   
14 Nigel Simmonds, Law as a Moral Idea (Oxford University Press 2007) 136.    
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that makes up the relevant practices.’15  Further, ‘The claim that the rule violated was law, 
moreover, is not a classificatory or conceptual afterthought forming no part of the justificatory 
reasoning: it is a central (indeed, the central) element in that reasoning.’16   
As identified by David Enoch, there are multiple ways in which legal normativity might 
manifest.  Enoch specifies the following five possibilities.  First, legal normativity could refer to 
how law necessarily provides legal reasons for action.17  Second, legal normativity could refer to 
how law necessarily gives real (genuine, non-qualified) reasons for action.18  Third, it might be 
that legal normativity means that law often gives reasons: ‘Of course, one may concede that the 
law doesn’t-- as a matter of necessity-- give reasons for action, but nevertheless insist that often 
enough, at least in basically decent and effective legal systems, the law does give reasons for 
action.’19  Fourth, legal normativity might refer to the fact that law is necessarily capable of 
providing reasons: ‘perhaps what is true of the law as a matter of necessity is not that it does give 
reasons for action, but rather that it can do so?’20  Fifth, legal normativity might mean that law 
necessarily claims or purports to give reasons for action.21   
As demonstrated by the variety (discussed below) in the legal theories of Kant, Simmonds, Hart, 
Raz, and Shapiro, legal normativity manifests in different ways to different theorists.  Yet each 
of these theorists agree (at least implicitly) that legal normativity involves some relationship 
between legality and reasons for action.  But what is the precise nature of this relationship?  Is it 
accurately described by one (or more) of Enoch interpretations?  While Enoch talks of reasons 
for action generally, the acceptance model focuses more specifically on reasons for efficacious 
conformity (keeping in mind that such conformity may, of course, involve action) that are 
 
15 ibid. at 119.  
16 ibid. at 129. 
 
17 David Enoch, ‘Reason-Giving and the Law’ (2011) Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law 1, 16.  
 
18 ibid. at 19. 
 
19 ibid. at 26. 
 
20 ibid. at 33. 
 
21 ibid. at 33-34. 
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provided to officials and certain subjects (i.e. those who are granted several choices).  The 
(Chapter 4) argument, in summary, is that each legal system necessarily provides-- by granting 
several choices-- a prima facie reason for officials and certain subjects (i.e. those granted several 
choices) to efficaciously conform with legal directives, and contingently provides (also in the 
form of such choices) a conclusive reason to efficaciously conform.  The contingent 
circumstances, in which a conclusive reason is provided, arise where there are no considerations 
(e.g. no conflicting reasons) that defeat the prima facie reason favouring efficacious conformity.     
The argument involving prima facie and conclusive reasons, supporting efficacious conformity, 
begins with Raz.  Reasons for action are ‘referred to in explaining, in evaluating, and in guiding 
people’s behaviour’22 -- these are the three primary purposes of the concept of a reason.23  
Reasons have a dimension of strength, which means that some reasons are stronger or more 
weighty than others.24  Where there is a conflict between them, the stronger reason overrides the 
weaker.25  The concern is with logical strength rather than phenomenological strength, which is 
the degree to which the thought of the reason preoccupies a person, dominating his 
consciousness.26  Regarding strength, there are two important features: ‘Firstly, of two 
conflicting reasons the one which overrides the other is the stronger.  Secondly, if one reason 
overrides all the reasons which are overridden by another reason, and if it overrides other reasons 
as well, then it is stronger than that second reason.’27  In this way, the ‘relative strength of a 
reason has been explained in terms of its power to override other reasons.’28  
 
22 Raz (n 3) 15-16.  
 
23 ibid. at 16.  
 
24 ibid. at 25.  
 
25 ibid.  
 
26 ibid.  
 
27 ibid. at 27.  For a more detailed formulation of these two features, see ibid. at 26.  
 
28 ibid. at 27. 
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The idea of overriding should not be confused with the situation in which a reason is cancelled 
by a cancelling condition.29  Cancellation by a cancelling condition ‘does not involve a conflict 
of reasons’ and ‘does not reflect on the strength of reasons.’30  Thus, the ‘fact that one reason 
would be cancelled by a certain condition whereas another reason would not does not tend to 
establish that the second is stronger than the first.  It implies nothing of the relative strength of 
these reasons.’31      
For Raz, there are both first order and second order reasons.  A second order reason is ‘any 
reason to act for a reason or to refrain from acting for a reason.’32  Conflicts between first order 
reasons are resolved by reference to the relative strength or weight of the reasons.  A conflict 
between a first order reason and a second order reason is resolved ‘by a general principle of 
practical reasoning which determines that exclusionary reasons always prevail, when in conflict 
with first order reasons.’33  It is also possible for an exclusionary reason to conflict with and be 
overridden by another second order reason; only undefeated exclusionary reasons succeed in 
excluding.34  
First order reasons include conclusive reasons, absolute reasons, and prima facie reasons.  
Second order reasons include exclusionary reasons.  An exclusionary reason is a ‘second order 
reason to refrain from acting for some reason.’35  Regarding conclusive reasons: P is a conclusive 
reason for one to X if, and only if, P is a reason for one to X (which has not been cancelled) and 
there is no Q that overrides P.36  Regarding absolute reasons: P is an absolute reason for one to X 
 
29 ibid.  
 
30 ibid.  
 
31 ibid.  
 
32 ibid. at 39. 
 
33 ibid. at 40.  
 
34 ibid.  
 
35 ibid. at 39. 
 
36 ibid. at 27. 
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if, and only if, there cannot be a fact which would override it; that is to say, for all Q it is never 
the case that when Q, Q overrides P.37  A prima facie reason is a first order reason which is 
neither conclusive nor absolute.38  So, my argument is that each legal system, by granting several 
choices, necessarily provides at least a prima facie reason for officials and certain subjects to 
efficaciously conform, and contingently provides a conclusive reason for efficacious conformity.   
To further contextualize the acceptance model of legal normativity, it may be helpful to review 
some other examinations of the relationship between law and reasons for action.  Suppose a legal 
theorist makes the claim that law is normative because legal directives are necessarily moral (i.e. 
have morally meritorious content).  We could undermine this theorist’s argument by identifying 
a legal system that lacks moral directives.  A key point is that the normativity of law attaches to 
the status of law, and so necessarily obtains wherever a legal system obtains.  Because legal 
normativity necessarily obtains wherever law obtains, the explanation for legal normativity, to be 
adequate, must also necessarily obtain wherever law obtains.  We can infer that an explanation 
that is contingent in relation to (i.e. not entailed by) law’s existence will be inadequate as an 
account of legal normativity.39  Pursuantly, an explanation that identifies the moral content of 
law (i.e. morally meritorious directives) as the source of legal normativity is an explanation that 
is inadequate because contingent in relation to law’s existence.  Such an explanation is 
contingent given that a legal system can exist although lacking moral directives.    
A more promising explanation of law’s essential normative aspect might be: law is not 
necessarily normative in virtue of its content (i.e. what its directives actually require), but is, 
rather, necessarily normative in virtue of its existence depending on moral considerations (in 
addition to depending on social facts).40  If law’s existence depends on moral considerations, 
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39 In Chapter 3, I argue that Shapiro’s planning theory identifies a source of legal normativity that is 
contingent in relation to law’s existence. 
 
40 What is the difference between, on the one hand, law necessarily having a moral content and, on the 
other hand, law’s existence depending on moral considerations?  These ideas are distinct because there is 
no mutual entailment between them.  If law necessarily has a moral content, then law’s existence depends 
on moral considerations (i.e. the considerations determining whether the moral content obtains); however, 
just because law’s existence depends on moral considerations, we cannot conclude that law necessarily 
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then the very status of law-- regardless of the content of its directives-- would seem to carry at 
least some normative weight.  And, because attaching to the status of law, such normativity 
would be entailed by law’s existence, and thus could41 adequately explain law’s essential 
normative aspect (which is also entailed by law’s existence).  This is the approach generally 
taken by anti-positivist theories, which assert that identifying law necessarily involves moral 
judgments.  However, anti-positivism is not the only sort of explanation of legal normativity-- 
explanations can also be legal positivist.   
There are several theses that comprise legal positivism’s core commitments.  The social fact 
thesis asserts that law is a social creation or artefact, and that legal norms are distinguished from 
non-legal norms because the former instantiate a property that refers to some social fact.42  The 
obtainment of the relevant social fact is what ultimately explains the existence of a legal 
system.43  According to the weak conventionality thesis, ‘the authority of the validity criteria in 
any conceptually possible legal system’ is accounted for because such criteria ‘constitute the 
terms of a social convention among the persons who function as officials.’44  A social convention 
consists of a convergence of behaviour and attitude-- in addition to conforming behaviour, there 
must be a ‘shared belief that non-compliance is a legitimate ground for criticism.’45  For Hart, 
this social convention consists of officials taking the internal point of view towards a rule of 
recognition (i.e. criteria of legal validity).  Pursuant to the strong conventionality thesis, the rule 
of recognition imposes a legal duty on officials to conform to its criteria of validity, and so ‘the 
 
has a moral content.  There could be considerations, other than those relating to law necessarily having a 
moral content, that account for law’s existence depending on moral considerations.    
41 I am not discounting the possibility that any normativity carried by the status of law could be so weak 
as to fail to account for law’s normative aspect.  I am suggesting only that the normativity carried by the 
status of law (if indeed it does carry normativity) could be strong enough to account for law’s normative 
aspect.    
42 Kenneth Himma, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press 2004) 126.  
 
43 ibid.  
 
44 ibid. at 129.  
 
45 ibid. at 130. 
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conventional rule of recognition is a duty-imposing rule.’46  The strong conventionality thesis 
affirms that officials are obligated to apply the rule of recognition in discharging their official 
roles, and that such a rule of recognition is what autonomously gives rise to this obligation.47   
Finally (and, for my purposes, most importantly), the separability thesis asserts that law and 
morality are conceptually distinct.  Per the ‘object-level interpretation’ of the separability thesis, 
there exists a conceptually possible legal system in which the legal validity of a norm does not 
depend on its moral merits48 or, in other words, that there exists at least one conceptually 
possible legal system in which the criteria of validity are exclusively source- or pedigree-based.49               
The details of the separability thesis differ depending on what the morality referenced in the 
thesis is contrasted to.  There are at least three contrasts: (1) morality contrasted with evil or 
immorality; (2) morality contrasted with factuality; and (3) morality contrasted with prudence.50  
In the context of the distinction between the moral and the evil/immoral, the separability thesis 
asserts that ‘the norms implemented by a legal system can be evil in their content or in their 
effects,’ such that ‘Nothing guarantees that a legal system or a law will be benign merely 
because it is a legal system or a law.’51  In the context of the distinction between morality and 
factuality, the separability thesis claims that ‘the process of ascertaining the law does not 
perforce involve moral judgments,’ and so such process can ‘unfold as a starkly factual inquiry 
into the relevant sources of legal norms that have been constituted by previous legislative and 
adjudicative decisions.’52  For Kramer, although a legal system can obligate and empower its 
officials to apply moral tests when identifying the law, this is merely a contingent feature.53  
 




48 ibid. at 135-136. 
 
49 ibid. at 136. 
 
50 Matthew Kramer, In Defense of Legal Positivism (Oxford University Press 1999) 3. 
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Regarding the distinction between morality and prudence, the separability thesis asserts that 
‘legal decision-making and rule-of-law observances can be based on officials’ purely prudential 
calculations,’ such that ‘officials who care only about their own interests in securing the efficacy 
of their grip on power will typically have solid reasons for adhering quite consistently to the rule 
of law.’54  The implication here is that the ideal of the rule of law is not an intrinsically moral 
ideal.55  
In contrasting legal positivism and anti-positivism, I am primarily concerned with the 
separability thesis as related to the distinction between morality and factuality.  So, as I am using 
the term, anti-positivism is the denial of the separability thesis as it operates in the context of the 
distinction between morality and factuality.  Thus construed, anti-positivism affirms that 
identifying law necessarily involves moral judgments.  The distinction between legal positivism 
and anti-positivism can be better understood by looking at some examples.  Examples of anti-
positivism include the theories of Kant and Simmonds.  Legal positivists include Hart, Raz, and 
Shapiro.  I will discuss, in the order presented above, each of these legal theorists.  The purpose 
of the discussion is not only to illustrate the distinction, introduced above, between legal 
positivists and anti-positivists; the discussion also serves to introduce the theories that I will 
subject to critique in later chapters.     
1.2 Anti-Positivism  
For the anti-positivist Kant, legal validity necessarily depends on moral considerations because 
law’s existence necessarily depends on two conditions, each of which entails moral 
considerations.  Kant’s first condition is that the lawmaker has authority, established by natural 
law, to bind others by choice.  Kant’s second condition is that there are certain judgments about 
the moral content of legal directives.   
Regarding the first condition, Kant says that positive law depends on the lawmaker having 
authority, established by natural law, to bind others by choice: ‘One can therefore conceive of 
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external lawgiving which would contain only positive laws; but then a natural law would still 
have to precede it, which would establish the authority of the lawgiver (i.e., his authorization to 
bind others by his mere choice).’56  In Simmonds’ description, ‘Kant equated the normativity of 
law with moral bindingness,’ such that, ‘even in a system of wholly posited laws one would still 
require a basic natural law that established the moral authority of the law-giver.  The possible 
scope of positive law was consequently determined by the extent of such moral authority.’57  
Regarding the second condition (of law’s existence), Kant says that ‘any possible giving of 
positive laws’ depends on ‘judgments’ about ‘whether what [law] prescribed is also right.’  The 
jurist, says Kant,  
can indeed state what is laid down as [positive law], 
that is, what the laws in a certain place and at a 
certain time say or have said.  But whether what 
these laws prescribed is also right, and what the 
universal criterion is by which one could recognize 
right as well as wrong, this would remain hidden 
from him unless he leaves those empirical 
principles behind for a while and seeks the sources 
of such judgments in reason alone, so as to establish 
the basis for any possible giving of positive laws.58  
Although the wording in the above passage is somewhat awkward, it seems clear enough that, 
according to Kant: the ‘judgments’ (sourced in ‘reason alone’), of ‘whether what these laws 
prescribed is also right,’ is what ‘[establishes] the basis for any possible giving of positive laws.’  
For Kant, then, the existence of any legal system depends on those moral considerations entailed 
by judgments about ‘whether what these laws prescribed is also right.’  So, as specified by 
Kant’s anti-positivism, legal validity necessarily depends on moral considerations-- and thus law 
has an essential normative aspect-- because the existence of any legal system depends on those 
moral considerations entailed by (1) the authority of the lawmaker, established by natural law, to 
 
56 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge University Press 1996) 17.  
57 Matthew Kramer, NE Simmonds, and Hillel Steiner, A Debate Over Rights (Oxford University Press 
1998) 135.  
58 Kant (n 56) 23 [italics are mine].  
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bind others by choice, and (2) judgments about ‘whether what these laws prescribed is also 
right.’  
What, then, does a Kantian legal system look like?  According to Arthur Ripstein, Kant’s legal 
system is guided by the universal principle of right, which generates each person’s innate right to 
freedom, which leads to private right and then finally public right:  
The Universal Principle of Right says that ‘an 
action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s 
freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on 
its maxim the freedom of choice of each can co-
exist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with 
universal law.’  The universal principle generates 
each person’s ‘one innate right’ to ‘Freedom 
(independence from being constrained by another’s 
choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of 
every other in accordance with a universal law,’ 
which ‘is the only original right belonging to every 
human being by virtue of his humanity.’ This innate 
right leads to private right, which governs the 
interactions of free persons, and then to public right, 
which requires the creation of a constitutional 
state.59  
Kant thus establishes, from a foundation of a single principle and a single (innate) right, a 
comprehensive legal order:  
The idea of independence carries the justificatory 
burden of the entire argument, from the prohibition 
of personal injury, through the minutiae of property 
and contract law, on to the details of the 
constitutional separation of powers. Kant argues 
that these norms and institutions do more than 
enhance the prospects for independence: they 
provide the only possible way in which a plurality 
of persons can interact on terms of equal freedom.60  
 
The primary difficulty with Kant’s theory is that not all legal systems resemble the Kantian legal 
system.  There can, and have been, legal systems that are unjust and immoral, and it is doubtful 
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that such systems can be accurately described as representing a rightful condition61 of equal 
freedom entailed by the innate right.  If Kant’s conception of law excludes unjust or immoral 
legal systems, then Kant cannot account for the existence-- and thus the normativity-- of such 
unjust or immoral legal systems.  As will become apparent in Chapters 4 and 5, the acceptance 
model has certain affinities with Kant’s legal system.  Most notably, the acceptance model 
specifies a right to bodily integrity that overlaps with Kant’s innate right to freedom.  However, 
while Kant’s legal system is moral in nature, the acceptance model applies to all legal systems, 
whether moral, amoral, or immoral.  It is due to this universal application that the acceptance 
model, unlike Kant’s legal theory, is capable of accounting for legal normativity.   
Simmonds’ archetypal theory of law offers a more recent anti-positivist account of law’s nature 
and normativity.  Simmonds’ theory is, at least prima facie, somewhat similar to the acceptance 
model that I present later on-- both Simmonds’ archetypal theory and the acceptance model are 
underpinned by, and expand upon, Fuller’s precepts of legality.  When I present the acceptance 
model (in Chapter 4), I will compare and contrast it to Simmonds’ theory, and so it is helpful for 
readers to understand Simmonds’ ideas.  Further, in the course of contrasting the acceptance 
model to Simmonds’ archetypal theory, I will present a critique of Simmonds which will be 
understandable only to those familiar with his theory.   
For Simmonds, law is an archetypal concept, with the archetype of law being an ideal of liberty 
as independence.  The ‘essential hallmark of an archetypal concept is the fact that instantiations 
of the concept count as such by resemblance or approximation to the archetype, such 
resemblance or approximation being a property that can be exhibited to varying degrees.’62  Law, 
says Simmonds, is not only an archetypal concept, but the archetype of law is moral in nature.  
The archetype of law is moral in nature because it represents an ideal of liberty as independence: 
‘When citizens live under the rule of law, it is conceivable that the duties imposed upon him or 
her will be very extensive and onerous, and the interstices between these duties might leave very 
few options available.  Yet, if the rule of law is a reality, the duties will have limits and the limits 
 
61 ‘It is possible to have something external as one’s own only in a rightful condition, under an authority 
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will not be dependent upon the will of any other person.’63  Indeed, ‘to the extent that law 
governs, citizens will enjoy certain zones of optional conduct where the state will not interfere; 
and they will benefit from certain general prohibitions on the most general forms of interference 
that might be attempted by their fellow citizens.’64  This is because  
Simply in consisting of followable rules, the law 
must recognize certain areas of (non-obligatory) 
conduct, however narrowly circumscribed those 
areas may be: for the law’s demands cannot be 
limitless while also being possible to comply with.  
Even if my daily round is entirely absorbed by the 
performance of legal duties, I must enjoy certain 
options about how I perform those duties (e.g. 
should I wear a hat whilst doing so?) if the duties 
are to be performable at all.65   
The foundation of law’s archetype consists of Fuller’s precepts of legality.66  Thus, it is sufficient 
proximity to Fuller’s precepts (coupled with the other features, discussed below, of law’s 
archetype) that ensures a legal system grants to its subjects zones of optional conduct that are not 
subject to the will of a sovereign lawmaker: ‘One needs to remember here that laws must be 
prospective, and must not be subject to constant change.  At any one time, therefore, the law may 
conflict with the present will of the sovereign lawmaker.’67   
There are other parts of law’s archetype.  First, Simmonds suggests that, in the archetype of law, 
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rules should perhaps be enforced.68  Second, Simmonds suggests that the archetype of law may 
be experiential in that the ideal law is gradually revealed to us only through the experience of its 
pursuit.69  Indeed, ‘We discover the limitations of an explicitly formulated principle, and deepen 
our understanding of the moral value that it imperfectly expresses, through the experience of 
trying to apply it in the multifarious circumstances of the real world.’70  Third, the archetype 
‘might also include, for example, conditions that would integrate the totality of published 
enactments more closely into an intelligible and possible way of life which is compatible with 
the various projects that humans typically wish to pursue.’71 
In review, for Simmonds, legal validity depends conclusively on sufficient proximity to the 
moral archetype of law.72  The archetype of law is moral because it represents an ideal of liberty 
as independence.73  Simmonds’ suggestion, then, is that a legal system exists only if sufficiently 
proximate to the moral archetype of law.  Because legal systems exist only if sufficiently 
proximate to the moral archetype of law, legal validity necessarily depends on moral 
considerations (i.e. depends on those considerations needed to determine sufficient proximity to 
the moral archetype). 
Why should we think of law as an archetypal concept, with the archetype of law being an ideal 
of liberty as independence?  Simmonds argues law is an archetypal, rather than class, concept 
because this conclusion is reflected in how we think of law as both (1) a mundane instrument 
(that is morally neutral), and (2) embodying a moral ideal.  Indeed, ‘we seem to think of law in 
two mutually incompatible ways.  On the one hand, it seems to be a mundane institution that has 
no intrinsically moral properties but derives its moral status (as good or evil) from the 
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contingencies of particular circumstances.  On the other hand, it seems to embody a lofty moral 
ideal.’74   
There are three ways in which the idea of an archetype is reflected by how we think of law as 
both (1) a mundane instrument and (2) a moral ideal.  The first way involves the rule of law:  
A theoretical approach that views the concept of 
law as structured by an archetype has a number of 
virtues.  In the first place, an understanding of the 
concept of law as structured by an archetype 
captures our intuitive sense (acknowledged by Raz) 
that the ideal of the rule of law ‘is an ideal rooted in 
the very essence of law’ such that ‘[i]n conforming 
to it the law does nothing more than be faithful to 
its own nature.’75   
Simmonds argues that ‘the rule of law is intrinsically linked to liberty, understood as one’s not 
being under the power of others.’76  The second way in which the idea of law, as an archetype of 
liberty as independence, is reflected by our understanding of law, is that this idea explains certain 
features we associate with legality, including how the status of law can be intelligibly invoked by 
officials as a justification for sanctions.77  Third, conceiving of law as an archetype of liberty as 
independence reflects our understanding about doctrinal legal scholarship.78    
We can see that each of Kant and Simmonds is an anti-positivist given that each affirms, albeit in 
different ways, that legal validity necessarily depends on moral considerations.  It is these moral 
considerations that, for anti-positivists, explain legal normativity.  There is, however, a 
 
74 ibid. at 44. 
 
75 ibid. at 100. 
 
76 ibid. at 158. 
 
77 ibid. at 159. 
 
78 ‘We see that the claims of doctrinal scholarship fit very well with the account of law as a moral idea.  
The forms of doctrinal reasoning and analysis that compose both the treatise and the judgment can be 
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26 
significant obstacle-- presented by Raz-- that any anti-positivist theory must face.  Raz argues 
that anti-positivist theories cannot account for legal normativity because they are unable to 
account for the use of normative language in legal discourse: because the moral facts that (say 
anti-positivists) legal validity necessarily depends on are not generally known, such moral facts 
cannot explain the use of normative language in legal discourse.  In Raz’s words:  
Many people who do not accept the natural law 
view of the necessary morality of law, indeed many 
who reject it, are happy to apply normative 
language to the law.  This must mean that the 
explanation of the use of normative terms to 
describe the law and legal situations cannot depend 
on the truth of the controversial natural law 
theories-- and it is the explanation of the use of 
normative language which lies at the heart of the 
problem of the normativity of law.79  
 
Raz is not saying that ‘an explanatory theory of the use of normative language in legal contexts 
must already be accepted by all and sundry’--  ‘This is obviously false.’80  Raz’s argument is that  
if natural law theories are to explain the use of 
normative language in such contexts they must 
show not only that all law is morally valid but also 
that this is generally known and thus accounts for 
the application of normative value to the law.  Since 
this assumption is false, natural law cannot explain 
the normativity of law.81  
Raz’s critique of natural law theories, and the difficulty they face in accounting for legal 
normativity, presents an important lesson to learn: to adequately account for legal normativity, 
an explanation must account for the use of normative language, and thus a source of normativity 
must be generally known at least by officials and arguably subjects as well.  The acceptance 
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model learns this lesson because the source of normativity specified by the model-- that a legal 
system is a means of satisfying reasons-- is generally known to officials and subjects.82  
My contention is that, regardless of whether they are correct, anti-positivist theories are 
unnecessary to answer the question of the normativity of law.  In affirming the acceptance 
model, therefore, I am not relying on the incorrectness of any particular anti-positivist theory 
(although I do critique Simmonds in Chapter 4 and Kant in Chapter 5); however, I am denying 
the necessity of any anti-positivist theory to account for legal normativity.  In contrast, I will 
argue that the legal positivist theories of Hart, Raz, and Shapiro are inadequate to account for 
legal normativity (or at least face significant difficulties in doing so).  
1.3 Inclusive Legal Positivism  
Hart 
The second category of answer, to the question of legal normativity, is legal positivism, which 
affirms (among other things) the separability thesis.  There are two versions of legal positivism: 
inclusive legal positivism and exclusive legal positivism.  Inclusive legal positivism asserts that 
legal validity can (but need not) depend on moral considerations, while exclusive positivism 
holds that legal validity cannot depend on moral considerations.     
Inclusive legal positivism includes the incorporation thesis, which Kenneth Himma summarizes 
this way: ‘there are conceptually possible legal systems in which the validity criteria include 
substantive moral norms.  In such legal systems, whether a norm is legally valid depends, at least 
in part, on the logical relation of its content to the content of the relevant moral norms.’83  Notice 
that, because inclusive legal positivists affirm that legal validity does not necessarily depend on 
moral considerations, inclusive positivists cannot rely on such moral considerations to explain 
law’s essential normative aspect.  Those who affirm the incorporation thesis, then, must come up 
with some other explanation for law’s normativity.  The incorporation thesis is associated with 
Hart’s idea of a rule of recognition.  A rule of recognition, says Hart, ‘is accepted and used for 
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the identification of primary rules of obligation’84 such that, ‘To say that a given rule is valid is 
to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recognition and so as a rule of the 
system.’85  In Leslie Green’s words, ‘a rule of recognition provides criteria of legal validity by 
determining which acts create law.’86  For Hart, then, the rule of recognition represents the 
criteria conclusively determining legal validity.87  Here is how the rule of recognition is 
associated with the incorporation thesis: pursuant to the incorporation thesis, legal validity can 
depend on moral considerations in that a rule of recognition can incorporate, into its criteria for 
determining legal validity, such moral considerations (‘the rule of recognition may incorporate as 
criteria of legal validity conformity with moral principles or substantive values.’)88  
In Hart’s version of inclusive legal positivism, the social facts on which legal validity (i.e. law’s 
existence) necessarily depends are the presence of generally-followed primary rules, and a rule 
of recognition accepted by officials from the internal point of view (i.e. endorsing it as a guide to 
conduct and a standard of criticism):89  
There are therefore two minimum conditions 
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal 
system.  On the one hand, those rules of behaviour 
which are valid according to the system’s ultimate 
criteria of validity must be generally obeyed, and, 
on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying 
the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change 
and adjudication must be effectively accepted as 
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common public standards of official behaviour by 
its officials.90    
Now, recall that inclusive (or exclusive) legal positivists must explain law’s essential normative 
aspect while denying that legal validity necessarily depends on moral considerations.  The 
incorporation thesis-- whereby a rule of recognition may incorporate moral criteria-- is explicitly 
affirmed by Hart91 but does not represent Hart’s explanation of law’s essential normative aspect.  
This is because the incorporation thesis suggests only that legal validity could (but does not 
necessarily) depend on moral considerations.  And, moral considerations that legal validity 
(merely) could depend on are moral considerations that are not entailed by law’s existence.  
Because they are not entailed by law’s existence, such moral considerations are inadequate to 
explain law’s normative aspect, which is entailed by law’s existence.  Therefore, if Hart used the 
incorporation thesis (without more) to explain law’s normative aspect, then Hart’s explanation of 
law’s normative aspect would be clearly inadequate.  It is, rather, the internal point of view, and 
not the incorporation thesis, that represents Hart’s explanation of law’s normative aspect.92   
The internal point of view is ‘that of the participant in such practice who accepts the rules as 
guides to conduct and as standards of criticism.’93  Here is how Shapiro describes the internal 
point of view:  
Normative judgments, on this view, are not 
apprehensions of normative facts, but rather 
commitments to giving descriptive facts certain 
weight in one’s deliberations.  Thus, one may take 
the internal point of view toward the social practice 
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92 ‘When a social group has certain rules of conduct, this fact affords an opportunity for many closely 
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at 89 [italics are mine]). Below in Chapter 4, I discuss Shapiro’s argument that the purpose of Hart’s 
internal point of view is not to explain legal normativity but is, rather, to render law intelligible.  
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of rule recognition and, in so doing, treat it as a 
standard for guidance and evaluation.  The 
normative judgments that are formed through this 
practical engagement with social practice can then 
be used to derive other normative judgments about 
legal rights, obligations, and validity.94 
The internal point of view explains how law’s normative aspect is entailed by law’s existence in 
a way that does not render law’s existence necessarily dependent on moral considerations.  To 
this end, by asserting that a legal system exists only if officials adopt the internal point of view,95 
Hart explains how law’s normativity, generated by the internal point of view, is entailed by law’s 
existence.  At the same time, Hart’s explanation of how law’s normativity is entailed by legal 
validity does not render legal validity necessarily dependent on moral considerations.  This is 
because legal validity can be conditional on the internal point of view without being conditional 
on moral considerations.  Legal validity can, without being conditional on moral considerations, 
be conditional on the internal point of view because the internal point of view can be adopted 
absent moral judgments.96  If the internal point of view can obtain absent moral judgments, then 
legal validity can depend on the internal point of view without depending on moral 
considerations.  In this way, Hart uses the internal point of view to explain legal normativity 
without rendering legal validity necessarily dependent on moral considerations.  Again, because 
Hart is an inclusive legal positivist denying that legal validity necessarily depends on moral 
considerations, he cannot rely on such moral considerations to explain the normativity of law.  
Instead, Hart uses the internal point of view, which is normative but not necessarily moral, to 
explain the normativity of law.  
1.4 Exclusive Legal Positivism  
Exclusive legal positivism affirms the sources thesis, whereby legal validity necessarily depends 
on social facts, and cannot depend on moral considerations.  I will discuss Raz and Shapiro as 
representatives of exclusive legal positivism.   
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Raz’s Theory of Law  
By Raz’s ‘Theory of Law,’ I mean his line of reasoning leading from the authority thesis (law 
necessarily claims legitimate authority) to the sources thesis (legal validity necessarily depends 
on social facts, and cannot depend on moral considerations).  For Raz, ‘it is an essential feature 
of law that it claims legitimate authority.’97  Because claiming legitimate authority is an essential 
feature of law, law necessarily claims legitimate authority or, stated otherwise, law exists only if 
claiming legitimate authority.  This is the authority thesis.98  Raz argues the authority thesis is 
established because such thesis is how to properly interpret four facts of law: (1) the fact law 
requires conformity even if conformity is unsupported by the balance of reasons; (2) the fact law 
uses normative language (e.g. ‘right’ and ‘duty’); (3) the fact legal institutions are designated as 
‘authorities’; and (4) the fact officials claim subjects owe allegiance to and ought to obey the 
law.99  
Note that, although (per the authority thesis) law necessarily claims legitimate authority, law’s 
claim of legitimate authority is not necessarily fulfilled: ‘A legal system may lack legitimate 
authority.  If it lacks the moral attributes required to endow it with legitimate authority then it has 
none.’100  Law ‘claims to have legitimate authority, in the sense that legal institutions both act as 
if they have such authority, and articulate the view that they have it.’101  Further, the law claims 
authority in the sense that it ‘presents itself as a body of authoritative standards and requires all 
those to whom they apply to acknowledge their authority.’102  Law’s ‘claim to legitimate 
authority is not merely a claim that legal rules are reasons.  It includes the claim that they are 
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exclusionary reasons for disregarding reasons for non-conformity.’103  An exclusionary reason104 
is ‘[a reason] not to act for certain reasons,’105 or ‘a reason for not following (i.e. not acting for) 
reasons that conflict with the rule.’106  Exclusionary reasons ‘exclude reliance on conflicting 
reasons, not all conflicting reasons, but those that the law-maker was meant to consider before 
issuing the directive.’107  In this way, when law claims legitimate authority, it is claiming to 
provide exclusionary reasons for subjects to conform with legal directives.  
But, one might ask, when does law actually provide exclusionary reasons for subjects to conform 
with legal directives? (i.e. when is law’s claim of legitimate authority fulfilled?).  Raz’s service 
conception of authority108 provides the answer.  According to Raz’s service conception, there are 
two conditions determining whether law has legitimate authority: the normal justification 
condition109 and the independence condition.  The normal justification condition is ‘based on a 
contrast between how I would act if unaffected by the authority compared with how I would act 
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when trying to follow the authority.’110  As specified by the normal justification condition, 
‘authorities are legitimate only if their directives enable their subjects to better conform to 
reason.’111  The normal justification condition is fulfilled if ‘the subject would better conform to 
reasons that apply to him anyway (that is, to reasons other than the directives of the authority) if 
he intends to be guided by the authority’s directives than if he does not.’112  Authoritative 
directives, then, ‘are binding because, and where, they improve our powers by enabling us to 
conform to reason better than we could without them.’113  In short, the normal justification 
condition is fulfilled if, but only if, directives guide subjects to better conformity with reason 
than would subjects’ own judgments (of what best conforms with reason).  According to the 
independence condition, ‘authority is legitimate only where acting by oneself is less important 
than conforming to reason.’114  The independence condition is fulfilled if ‘the matters regarding 
which the [normal justification condition] is met are such that with respect to them it is better to 
conform to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority.’115  
Pursuant to the next step in Raz’s argument: to claim legitimate authority, something must be at 
least capable of having legitimate authority.  How do we know that, for Raz, law claims 
legitimate authority only if capable of having it?  We know because Raz is explicit on the matter:   
If the claim to authority is part of the nature of law, 
then whatever else the law is it must be capable of 
possessing authority.  A legal system may lack 
legitimate authority.  If it lacks the moral attributes 
required to endow it with legitimate authority then it 
has none.  But it must possess all the other features 
of authority, or else it would be odd to say that it 
claims authority.  To claim authority it must be 
capable of having it, it must be a system of a kind 
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which is capable in principle of possessing the 
requisite moral properties of authority.116   
More precisely, if one claims legitimate authority, then one is capable of having legitimate 
authority, unless (1) the claim is insincere, and/or (2) the claimant misunderstands the nature of 
the claim or the nature of himself.117  However, says Raz, the claim made by law does not 
generally involve insincerity or misunderstanding.  The possibility that law’s claim of legitimate 
authority is normally insincere or based on a conceptual mistake is ruled out because ‘the claim 
is made by legal officials wherever a legal system is in force.’118  Further, Raz says legal officials 
and institutions cannot be conceptually confused, at least not systematically, about the nature of 
the claim.119  This is because, ‘given the centrality of legal institutions in our structures of 
authority,’ the claims and conceptions of legal officials and institutions are ‘formed by and 
contribute to our concept of authority,’ such that our concept of authority ‘is what it is in part as 
a result of the claims and conceptions of legal institutions.’120  The upshot of this reasoning is 
that, since law’s claim of legitimate authority does not normally involve insincerity or 
misunderstanding, such claim can normally be made only by a legal system capable of having 
legitimate authority.121   
Raz then specifies ‘two features which must be possessed by anything capable of being 
authoritatively binding’:122 ‘First, a directive can be authoritatively binding only if it is, or is at 
least presented as, someone’s view of how its subjects ought to behave.  Second, it must be 
possible to identify the directive as being issued by the alleged authority without relying on 
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reasons or considerations on which directive purports to adjudicate.’123  This second feature is 
‘closely tied to the mediating role of authority’:124  
A decision is serviceable only if it can be identified 
by means other than the considerations the weight 
and outcome of which it was meant to settle [...] 
The same applies to the subjects of any authority.  
They can benefit by its decisions only if they can 
establish their existence and content in ways which 
do not depend on raising the very same issues 
which the authority is there to settle.125 
In other words, the ‘subjects of any authority’ can ‘benefit by its decisions only if they can 
establish their existence and content’ without ‘raising the very same issues which the authority is 
there to settle.’  This argument is supported by Raz’s idea of legitimate authority as exclusionary 
reasons.  If a legal system is to have directives representing exclusionary reasons for conforming, 
then the identification of such directives cannot require subjects to depend on the very reasons 
that, being depended on in the process of identifying directives, are not excluded by such 
directives.  Stated differently, if legal directives are to represent exclusionary reasons, then 
identifying the existence and content of such directives cannot require subjects to depend on the 
very reasons that are supposed to be excluded.  If identifying legal directives cannot require 
subjects to depend on reasons meant to be excluded by such directives, then legal validity cannot 
depend on moral considerations.  This follows because moral considerations are among those 
reasons meant to be excluded by legal directives: ‘for the law to be able to fulfill its function, and 
therefore to be capable of enjoying moral authority, it must be capable of being identified 
without reference to the moral questions which it pre-empts, i.e. the moral questions on which it 
is meant to adjudicate.’126 
Here is a less abstract description of Raz’s argument.  Because exclusionary reasons take the 
form of directives guiding subjects to better conformity with reason than would subjects’ own 
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judgments of what best conforms with reason, law can provide exclusionary reasons only if 
identifying legal directives does not depend on subjects judging what best conforms with reason.  
Why?  Because, if identifying legal directives did depend on subjects judging what best 
conforms with reason, then it would be impossible for such directives to guide subjects to better 
conformity with reason than would subjects’ own judgments of what best conforms with 
reason.127  Given that subjects’ judgments of what best conforms with reason include moral 
considerations, this point-- that identifying legal directives cannot depend on such judgments-- 
implies that identifying legal directives cannot depend on moral considerations.  And, if 
identifying legal directives cannot depend on moral considerations, then (per the sources thesis) 
legal validity cannot depend on moral considerations.  
Inclusive legal positivists have made several attempts to respond to Raz by arguing that the 
incorporation thesis, whereby a rule of recognition can include moral criteria of validity, is not 
falsified by the authoritative nature of law.  As identified by Brian Leiter, there are at least three 
possible rejoinders to Raz.  First, inclusive positivists ‘might contest whether identifying laws by 
reference to moral considerations necessarily requires taking into account the dependent reasons 
on which those laws are based.’128  To this end, WJ Waluchow notes that ‘The set of all moral 
reasons is not identical with the set of dependent moral reasons underlying an authoritative 
directive.’129  However, says Leiter, even if Waluchow is correct on this point, ‘it wouldn’t prove 
enough’ because ‘it suffices to defeat [inclusive legal positivism] as a theory compatible with the 
law’s authority if there exists any case in which the dependent reasons are the same as the moral 
reasons that are required to identify what the law is’-- it is irrelevant that there ‘remain some 
cases where these reasons “may” be different.’130  Second, Jules Coleman has argued that 
inclusive positivism is ‘compatible with the authoritative nature of law because the rule of 
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recognition is not the rule by which ordinary people (those subject to the law’s authority) 
identify what the law is.’131  Coleman’s argument depends on at least two empirical claims: (1) 
that most ordinary people can identify valid law; and (2) that most ordinary people cannot 
formulate the applicable rule of recognition.132  The problem, says Leiter, is that these claims get 
the matter backwards-- ordinary people typically do not know the legally valid law; however, 
they are likely to know the rule of recognition.133  Further, there is no necessary reason why only 
those aspects of a rule of recognition that employ source-based criteria are likely to become 
known to ordinary people and thus only those will play an epistemic role for them (in identifying 
the law).134  Third, inclusive positivists might deny that authority involves exclusionary reasons-- 
if authoritative directives are not exclusionary reasons, then the fact that one ‘might need to 
consider dependent reasons in order to identify law-- a consequence of [inclusive legal 
positivism]-- would not be fatal to law’s claimed authority.’135  Waluchow argues136 that the 
Canadian Charter is an inclusive rule of recognition that can exert authority without providing 
exclusionary reasons.  For instance, the Supreme Court of Canada has held (in R. v. Oakes) that 
a Charter right can be limited so long as the objectives of such limitation are ‘sufficiently 
important’ and that there is no other way of achieving these objectives.  For Waluchow, this 
indicates that, although Charter rights do enjoy a heavy presumption in their favour, such rights 
are not fully exclusionary.  However, Himma argues that Waluchow’s observation-- that the 
scope of a constitutional right can be limited by other kinds of value-- cannot by itself defeat the 
Razian critique.  This is because, as Raz concedes, an exclusionary reason may exclude all or 
only a certain class of first-order reasons.  Accordingly, ‘Raz can respond that the reasons 
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provided by the Canadian Charter are exclusionary but nonetheless have a limited scope that 
excludes the more important values that can justify limiting a Charter right.’137  
Recently, Himma has provided a purported counter-example to Raz’s authority argument.  This 
counter-example takes the form of an institutional normative system that ‘validates all and only 
mandatory moral norms in a possible world that resembles ours’ and ‘shows that the system 
satisfies every condition plausibly thought conceptually necessary for the existence of a legal 
system.’138  Himma’s counter-example exists in a ‘nomologically possible world’ in which 
subjects have intellectual abilities ‘limited in the same way as ours,’ but they differ from us in 
several ways regarding their beliefs about morality.139  First, the subjects always agree on what 
morality requires.140  Second, subjects’ beliefs regarding what morality requires always happen 
to be correct.141  Third, subjects’ beliefs regarding what morality requires always happen to be 
epistemically justified-- the subjects ‘always stumble onto a sound argument that justifies their 
beliefs and are hence in cognitive possession of an epistemic justification for each of their 
beliefs.’142  These subjects are thus accidentally-- but not necessarily-- infallible with respect to 
morality.143  Like us, the subjects in Himma’s counter-example often commit ‘socially disruptive 
acts that they believe are morally wrong.’144  In the world of the counter-example, material 
resources are scarce and there will frequently be violent conflicts breaching the peace.145  These 
conflicts arise with sufficient frequency that ‘something like law is needed to keep the peace.’146  
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As to the rule of recognition of Himma’s system, ‘the officials in this institutional normative 
system converge on recognizing, applying, and enforcing as rules of the system all and only 
mandatory moral norms.’147  The subjects of this normative system ‘conform to the valid norms 
enough to permit them to live and work peacefully together in something properly characterized 
as a community,’ and they generally believe that the norms governing them are ‘morally justified 
as a necessary but regrettable means of ensuring that they can live together in comparative peace 
so as to secure the benefits of social cooperation.’148  Himma thus proposes a ‘nomologically 
possible world with an efficacious institutional normative system that validates all and only 
mandatory moral norms.’149  
The viability of Himma’s counter-example depends on the normal justification condition being 
unnecessary to establish legitimate authority.  The problem is that Raz implies that the normal 
justification condition is necessary to establish legitimate authority.  Himma explains that ‘at first 
blush,’ his counter-example seems to ‘run afoul’ of the normal justification condition, which 
asks: ‘Is it metaphysically possible for subjects to better comply with what right reason requires 
by following the authority’s view of what right reason requires than by following their own 
views of what right reason requires?’150  According to the normal justification condition, 
authority is morally justified ‘only insofar as subjects are likely to better comply with respect to 
right reason by following the authority’s view of what it requires than by following their own 
views.’151  However, if moral norms take into consideration prudential interests and determine 
what subjects should do all things considered according to reason, then it is ‘not metaphysically 
possible for subjects to better comply with right reason by following the authority’s view than by 
following their own views because they will always arrive at exactly the same result’ regarding 
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what reason requires since ‘the moral standards reflect the balance of all applicable reasons, 
including the prudential reasons.’152   
Himma acknowledges that his system ‘does not satisfy [the normal justification condition],’153 
but argues that, in response to such non-satisfaction, we should not reject the counter-example 
but, rather, should conclude that the normal justification condition is unnecessary to establish 
legitimate authority.  Himma’s system ‘appears to be morally legitimate,’154 such that ‘If any 
legal system authorizing sanctions for violations of law is legitimate in this nomologically 
possible world, this system is.’155  In any event, for Himma, the normal justification condition is 
‘not properly construed as articulating a necessary condition for the existence of a legitimate 
authority.’156  Himma notes that, in describing the normal justification condition, Raz 
‘scrupulously avoids’ characterizing it as ‘providing either necessary or sufficient conditions for 
legitimacy’; rather, it expresses only the ‘primary’ and ‘normal’ way to show that authority is 
legitimate.157  Himma recommends construing the normal justification condition as ‘compatible 
with the legitimacy of the system constructed in the model,’ such that ‘although the “normal” 
condition is not satisfied, the system is nonetheless legitimate in virtue of the distinctive 
properties of the system and its subjects.’158  
However, there is another passage, unmentioned by Himma, that implies that Raz intends the 
normal justification condition to be necessary for establishing legitimate authority: ‘Criticism [of 
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the service conception] can be radical, rejecting the service conception altogether. Or it can be 
more moderate, accepting the service conception or some of its central traits, especially the 
normal justification thesis, as setting necessary conditions for the legitimacy of authority.’159  
The suggestion is not that Himma’s system necessarily lacks legitimate authority (after all, Raz’s 
service conception may be wrong), but rather that perhaps Himma’s system does not falsify 
Raz’s arguments from authority: if Himma’s counter-example depends on the normal 
justification condition being unnecessary to establish legitimate authority, but Raz suggests that 
the condition is necessary, then perhaps Himma’s system does not represent a counter-example 
to Raz’s theory.  As for why it is called the ‘normal’ justification condition, perhaps the name 
comes not because the condition applies merely in ‘normal’ circumstances (and thus is 
unnecessary to establish legitimate authority), but rather because it is-- relative to the 
independence condition-- the normal way in which a purported authority fails to have legitimate 
authority, and thus represents the primary or ‘normal’ difficulty that must be overcome before 
authority is established.  This is, of course, speculative, but the larger point is that we cannot 
discern, simply from the fact that it is called the ‘normal’ justification condition, that the 
condition is unnecessary to establish legitimate authority.  
Shapiro’s Planning Theory of Law 
Shapiro’s ‘central claim’ is that ‘legal activity is a form of social planning’:160  
Legal institutions plan for the communities over 
which they claim authority, both by telling members 
what they may or may not do, and by identifying 
those who are entitled to affect what others may or 
may not do. Following this claim, legal rules are 
themselves generalized plans, or planlike norms, 
issued by those who are authorized to plan for 
others. And adjudication involves the application of 
these plans, or planlike norms, to those to whom 
they apply. In this way, the law organizes individual 
and collective behavior so that members of the 
community can bring about moral goods that could 
not have been achieved, or achieved as well, 
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For Shapiro, plans are ‘abstract propositional entities that require, permit, or authorize agents to 
act, or not act, in certain ways under certain conditions.’162  According to Shapiro’s planning 
theory, ‘legal systems are institutions of social planning and their fundamental aim is to 
compensate for the deficiencies of alternative forms of planning in the circumstances of 
legality.’163  The circumstances of legality exist ‘whenever a community has numerous and 
serious moral problems whose solutions are complex, contentious, or arbitrary.’164  In these 
circumstances, the ‘benefits of planning will be great, but so will the costs and risks associated 
with nonlegal forms of ordering behavior, such as improvisation, spontaneous ordering, private 
agreements, communal consensus, or personalized hierarchies. Indeed, the costs and risks of 
nonlegal planning may be so large as to be prohibitive.’165  Legal systems are ‘supposed to 
enable communities to overcome the complexity, contentiousness, and arbitrariness of communal 
life by resolving those social problems that cannot be solved, or solved as well, by nonlegal 
means alone.’166  Thus, ‘[t]he fundamental aim of the law is to rectify the moral deficiencies 
associated with the circumstances of legality.’167  Shapiro presents this idea as the moral aim 
thesis.168  
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Pursuant to the planning theory, ‘what makes the law, understood here as a legal institution, the 
law is that it is a self-certifying compulsory planning organization whose aim is to solve those 
moral problems that cannot be solved, or solved as well, through alternative forms of social 
ordering.’169  Shapiro ‘[calls] a planning organization “self-certifying” whenever it is free to 
enforce its rules without first demonstrating to a superior (if one exists) that its rules are valid.’170  
Therefore, a planning organization ‘will be self-certifying whenever it is supreme or enjoys a 
general presumption of validity from all superior planning organizations.’171  The planning 
theory implies that ‘what makes laws laws is that they are either (1) parts of the master plan of a 
self-certifying, compulsory planning organization with a moral aim; (2) plans that have been 
created in accordance with, and whose application is required by, such a master plan, or (3) 
planlike norms whose application is required by such a master plan.’172    
Shapiro argues the planning theory is supported by multiple reasons.  First, law shares many 
features with plans.  Second, the planning theory purportedly resolves (what Shapiro calls) the 
possibility puzzle.  Third, Shapiro claims that the planning theory explains the normativity of 
law.  With respect to the first reason-- regarding features shared by law and plans-- Shapiro 
points to four features (or groups of features).  The first feature of both law and plans is that each 
is built incrementally.  Legal regulation is ‘typically assembled piece by piece, starting off either 
as broad standards that are refined over time, detailed regulations that are unified by the 
development of general standards, or a hodgepodge of rules that are supplemented bit by bit as 
new problems arise.’173  In comparison, ‘planning typically involves the creation of [...] larger 
plans.’174  The second shared feature of law and plans is that each can be expressed in either a 
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top-down or bottom-up structure.  In particular, legislation often matches the structure of top-
down planning,175 while the common law tends to match the structure of bottom-up planning.176  
The third feature is that ‘legal activity also seeks to accomplish the same basic goals that 
ordinary, garden-variety planning does, namely, to guide, organize, and monitor the behavior of 
individuals and groups.’177  The fourth feature is really a trio of features-- that law and plans are 
(1) settling, (2) dispositive, and (3) purposive.  Regarding the law as ‘settling,’ Shapiro says that 
‘Legal institutions are not in the business of either offering advice or making requests. They do 
not present their rules as one more factor that subjects are supposed to consider when deciding 
what they should do.’178  Instead, the task of legal institutions is to ‘settle normative matters in 
their favor and claim the right to demand compliance.’179  Legal systems are ‘dispositive’ in the 
sense that their existence depends on efficacy: ‘The dispositive nature of legal activity can be 
seen by attending to the “general efficacy” condition on legal systems. All legal philosophers 
agree that legal systems exist only if they are generally efficacious, that is, they are normally 
obeyed.’180  Finally, law is purposive in that it is intentionally created: ‘The legislative process 
does not just happen to produce laws as a side effect of its pursuit of some other end. Its very 
point is to create norms that are supposed to settle questions about how to act. Similarly, the 
 
175 ibid. at 124-125. In top-down planning: ‘the planner starts with the overall action to achieve (cook 
dinner) and breaks it up into a few major tasks (buy food, cook food, clean up). She then refines each 
major task into its component parts (buy food: drive to store, select food, buy food, load car, and drive 
home). The planner continues this process of refinement at each step until she reaches a point at which the 
relevant actions can be accomplished without further planning (get in car, start car, make right at State 
Street, and so on).’ 
 
176 ibid. at 125. In bottom-up planning: ‘the planner starts with a vague sense of the goals to be achieved 
[...] and proceeds to think through the lower-level tasks in great detail [...] Once other basic tasks are 
planned, she attempts to combine them to see whether they fit together [...] Once the subplans are 
adjusted, the new high-level tasks are then combined to see whether they fit together [...] The process of 
planning ends when all the tasks settled on are sufficient to achieve the ultimate goal.’ 
 
177 ibid. at 200. 
 
178 ibid. at 202. 
 





function of adjudication is to apply norms to others.’181  
The second reason Shapiro offers as support for the planning theory is that it resolves the 
possibility puzzle.  According to the possibility puzzle, ‘Some body has power to create legal 
norms only if an existing norm confers that power’; however, ‘A norm conferring power to 
create legal norms exists only if some body with power to do so created it.’182  By ‘norm,’ 
Shapiro means ‘any standard-- general, individualized, or particularized-- that is supposed to 
guide conduct and serve as a basis for evaluation or criticism.’183  The possibility puzzle results 
because ‘it appears that any body with power to create legal norms must derive its power from 
some norm, while any norm that could confer such a power must itself be created by someone 
with the power to do so.’184  The possibility puzzle essentially asks the more abstract question: 
‘On what does legal authority ultimately rest, social facts alone or moral facts as well?’185  How 
does the planning theory resolve the possibility puzzle?  According to the planning theory,  
legal authority is possible because certain kinds of 
agents are capable of (1) creating and sharing a plan 
for planning and (2) motivating others to heed their 
plans.  Legal systems are possible, in other words, 
because certain states of affairs are achievable, 
namely, those that underwrite the existence of a 
legal system’s master plan and those that account 
for the disposition of the community to comply with 
the plans created under normal conditions.186  
Explained differently, for Shapiro, legal authority can obtain even absent prior law.  Instead of 
legal authority resulting only from some prior law, legal authority is facilitated by the capacity to 
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authorize legal officials to plan for others because human beings are planning agents capable of 
guiding and organizing their actions both over time and across persons [...] we are able to create 
law because we are able to create and share plans.’187   
The third reason Shapiro offers in support of the planning theory is that the theory accounts for 
the normativity of law.  The planning theory ‘requires officials to accept the fundamental legal 
rules as a condition of their existence.’188  Regarding the acceptance of plans, Shapiro explains 
that:  
since the Planning Theory regards the fundamental 
rules as elements of a shared plan, the acceptance in 
question is a more complex attitude than Hart’s 
internal point of view. [...] acceptance of a plan 
involves more than just committing to do one’s part; 
one must also commit to allow others to do their 
parts as well. Moreover, to accept one’s plan is to 
adopt a plan. In other words, to accept one’s part 
does not merely commit one to following the plan; 
one also commits to filling out the plan, to ensuring 
consistency with one’s beliefs, subplans, and other 
plans, and to not reconsidering it absent a 
compelling reason for doing so.189   
Law’s normativity, for officials, is generated by the instrumental rationality involved in the 
acceptance of a plan: ‘Since acceptance of the fundamental legal rules involves the adoption of 
plans, the distinctive norms of rationality that attend the activity of planning necessarily come 
into play.’190  Pursuantly, ‘an official who accepts her position within an authority structure will 
 
187 ibid. at 180-181. Here is how Schiavello describes Shapiro’s answer to the possibility puzzle: ‘legal 
authority derives from the master plan and the power of the officials to adopt the shared plan derives from 
the norms of instrumental rationality. In this connection, as we have seen, planning is a rational way to 
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Can Still Learn from Hart’s Mistakes’ in Damiano Canale and Giovanni Tuzet (eds), The Planning 
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be rationally criticizable if she disobeys her superiors, fails to flesh out their orders so that she 
may take the means necessary to satisfy their demands, adopts plans that are inconsistent with 
these orders, or reconsiders them without a compelling reason to do so.’191  Shapiro describes 
these ‘rationality requirements,’ which ‘apply whenever legal systems exist,’ as the ‘inner 
rationality of law.’192  Keep in mind, however, that ‘The inner rationality of law [...] is a limited 
set of constraints because the rational norms of planning only apply to those who accept 
plans.’193  Consequently, the bad man ‘cannot be rationally criticizable for failing to obey legal 
authorities insofar as he does not accept the law.’194  At the same time, ‘since most officials do 
accept the master legal plan, they are criticizable for disobeying the law absent a compelling 
reason to do so,’195 even though ‘there is no reason to think that the master plans of every 
possible legal system will be morally legitimate.’196  
To understand how law is normative for its subjects, recall that plans are norms.197  Shapiro is 
careful to note that ‘The fact that someone adopts a plan for others to follow does not, of course, 
mean that, from a moral point of view, those others ought to comply. The plan might be foolish 
or evil and, thus, unless there are substantial costs associated with nonconformity, the subjects 
morally should not carry it out.’198  Further, Shapiro concedes that ‘the normativity of the master 
plan of a legal system is of a very limited sort. While legal officials are rationally required to 
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bound.’199  Further, ‘the master plan of a legal system may be morally illegitimate and hence not 
capable of imposing a moral obligation on anyone to obey.’200  Nonetheless,  
if the subject has accepted the shared plan that sets 
out the hierarchy, then, from the point of view of 
instrumental rationality, he is bound to heed the 
plan. For if someone submits to the planning of 
another, and yet ignores an order directed to him, he 
will be acting in a manner inconsistent with his own 
plan. His disobedience will be in direct conflict with 
his intention to defer.201  
Indeed, ‘Even in cases of economic or physical coercion, once individuals form an intention to 
treat the supervisor’s directives as trumps to their own planning, they have transformed their 
normative situation and are rationally-- if not morally-- committed to follow through unless good 
reasons suddenly appear that force them to reconsider.’202 
Regarding legal authority, Shapiro asserts that a body has legal authority in a particular legal 
system when two conditions are met.  The first condition is that ‘the system’s master plan 
authorizes that body to plan for others,’ and the second condition is that ‘the members of the 
community normally heed all those who are so authorized.’203  Resultantly, legal authority is 
possible ‘just in case it is possible for both of these conditions to obtain.’204  To understand what 
Shapiro means by ‘legal authority,’ we must distinguish between an ‘adjectival’ interpretation 
and a ‘perspectival’ interpretation.  The adjectival interpretation imputes ‘a type of moral 
authority’ such that, ‘On this reading, the word “authority” means the same as it does in moral 
contexts, roughly speaking, the power to impose moral obligations and confer moral rights, and 
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the word “legal” functions as an adjective, identifying this kind of moral power.’205  On the 
adjectival interpretation, then, ‘the person in question has moral authority in virtue of being an 
official in a legal institution.’206  In contrast, regarding the perspectival interpretation, Shapiro 
explains that, ‘although the term “authority” in claims of legal authority refers to a moral power, 
the word “legal” often does not modify this noun-phrase; rather, its role is to qualify the 
statement in which it is embedded.’207  On the perspectival interpretation, ‘When we ascribe 
legal authority to someone [...] we are not necessarily imputing any kind of moral authority to 
her.  To the contrary, we are qualifying our ascription of moral legitimacy.  We are saying that, 
from the legal point of view, the person in question has morally legitimate power.’208  In the same 
vein, ‘to say that one is legally obligated to perform some action need not commit the asserter to 
affirming that one is really obligated to perform that action, that is, has a moral obligation to 
perform that action.’209  This is because ‘the statement may be understood to mean only that 
from the legal point of view one is (morally) obligated to perform that action.’210  Unlike 
adjectival legal claims, perspectival legal claims carry no moral implications.211   
But, what is the legal point of view?  The legal point of view  
is not necessarily the perspective of any particular 
legal official.  No officials may personally accept it, 
although they will normally act as though they do.  
The legal point of view, rather, is the perspective of 
a certain normative theory. According to that 
theory, those who are authorized by the norms of 
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disobedience is criticizable from the legal point of view.’ (ibid. at 186);  
 
50 
legal institutions have moral legitimacy and, when 
they act in accordance with those norms, they 
generate a moral obligation to obey.  The legal point 
of view of a certain system, in other words, is a 
theory that holds that the norms of that system are 
morally legitimate and obligating.212  
Note that the aforementioned normative theory ‘may be false from a moral perspective’: ‘Those 
authorized by legal institutions to act may be morally illegitimate and their actions may generate 
no moral obligations to obey [...] In short, the legal point of view always purports to represent 
the moral point of view, even when it fails to do so.’213  Stated concisely, the legal point of view 
‘will ascribe moral legitimacy to a body just in case its norms confer power on that body.’214 
Because the legal norms that confer legal authority are subplans of the system’s master plan, ‘the 
legal point of view will ascribe moral legitimacy to a body when its master plan authorizes that 
body to so act.’215  Thus, ‘On the perspectival reading, a body has legal authority in a system just 
in case it has moral authority from the legal point of view and it has moral authority from the 
legal point of view just in case it is authorized by the system’s norms.’216   
Shapiro’s planning theory is an instance of exclusive legal positivism because it affirms the 
sources thesis, whereby legal validity (i.e. law’s existence) necessarily depends on social facts, 
and cannot depend on moral considerations.  Regarding exclusive legal positivism, Shapiro notes 
that the existence of plans is established simply by pointing to ‘the fact of their adoption and 
acceptance,’217 and does not depend on the merits of such plans: ‘Whether I have a plan to go to 
the store today, or we have a plan to cook dinner together tonight, depends not on the desirability 
of these plans but simply on whether we have in fact adopted (and not yet rejected) them.’218 
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What this means is that ‘positivism is trivially and uncontroversially true in the case of plans: the 
existence of a plan is one thing, its merits or demerits quite another.’219  Next, ‘The existence 
conditions for law are the same as those for plans because the fundamental rules of legal systems 
are plans’220; and, ‘In other to determine the content of the plan, the planner must be careful not 
to engage in deliberation about its merits.’221  This is because ‘the value of a plan is that it does 
the thinking for us’ and ‘Plans cannot do the thinking for us if, in order to discover their counsel, 
we are required to repeat the same sort of reasoning.’222  Consequently, ‘Shared plans must be 
determined exclusively by social facts if they are to fulfill their function’223:  
As we have seen, shared plans are supposed to 
guide and coordinate behavior by resolving doubts 
and disagreements about how to act.  If a plan with 
a particular content exists only when certain moral 
facts obtain, then it could not resolve doubts and 
disagreements about the right way of proceeding.  
For in order to apply it, the participants would have 
to engage in deliberation or bargaining that would 
recreate the problem that the plan aimed to solve.  
The logic of planning requires that plans be 
ascertainable by a method that does not resurrect the 
very questions that plans are designed to settle.  
Only social facts, not moral ones, can serve this 
function.224  
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224 ibid.  Here is how Shapiro summarizes his exclusive legal positivist approach: ‘Why might one claim-- 
as legal positivists do-- that law and morality do not share the same basic ground rules?  Why is the 
determination of legal validity a matter of sociological, rather than moral, inquiry?  I hope that my answer 
to these questions is now apparent: namely, that the fundamental rules of a legal system constitute a 
shared plan and, as we have seen, the proper way to ascertain the existence or content of a shared plan is 
through an examination of the relevant social facts.  A shared plan exists just in case the plan was 
designed with a group in mind so that they may engage in a joint activity, it is publicly accessible, and it 
is accepted by most members of the group in question.  As a result, if we want to discover the existence or 
content of the fundamental rules of a legal system, we must look only to these social facts.  We must look, 
in other words, only to what officials think, intend, claim and do around here.’ (ibid.) 
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Shapiro is clear that ‘the existence of the shared plan does not depend on any moral facts 
obtaining’ and that it ‘can be morally obnoxious.’225  Indeed, the shared plan ‘may cede total 
control of social planning to a malevolent dictator or privilege the rights of certain subgroups of 
the community over others’ or ‘may have no support from the population at large; those 
governed by it may absolutely hate it.’226  Nonetheless, ‘if the social facts obtain for plan 
sharing-- if most officials accept a publicly accessible plan designed for them-- then the shared 
plan will exist.’227  This shared plan represents a system of legal authority if it ‘sets out an 
activity of social planning that is hierarchical and highly impersonal and the community 
normally abides by the plans created pursuant to it.’228 
Although Shapiro’s planning theory is an exclusive legal positivist theory, it is not devoid of 
moral elements.  As mentioned, Shapiro asserts what he calls the moral aim thesis.  As specified 
by the moral aim thesis, a legal system, unlike a criminal syndicate, has a ‘moral mission’229 in 
that ‘The fundamental aim of legal activity is to remedy the moral deficiencies of the 
circumstances of legality.’230  Consistent with exclusive legal positivism, however, ‘to say that 
the law’s mission is to address the moral defects of alternative forms of social ordering is not to 
claim that legal systems always succeed in their mission.  The law may end up pursuing immoral 
objectives or simply replace private moral mistakes with public ones.’231  Thus, ‘What makes the 
law the law is that it has a moral aim, not that it satisfies that aim.’232  
The moral aim thesis, argues Shapiro, is supported by three considerations.  First, the moral aim 
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thesis ‘explains why we think that law is invaluable in the modern world but not, say, among 
simple hunter-gatherers.  The former is a paradigm of the circumstances of legality, whereas the 
latter is its antithesis.’233  Second, ‘the Moral Aim Thesis explains why legal systems that are 
unable to solve serious moral problems are criticizable’: ‘No one blames baseball for failing to 
alleviate poverty or protecting populations from natural disasters, but a legal system that ignores 
such problems, or addresses them incompetently, is subject to rebuke.’234  Third, the moral aim 
thesis distinguishes legal systems from criminal syndicates: ‘If we want to explain what makes 
the law the law, we must see it as necessarily having a moral aim, an end that criminal 
organizations do not necessarily possess.’235   
Having reviewed several anti-positivist and legal positivist theories, I will now proceed to the 
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Chapter 2: Some Concerns Regarding Exclusive Legal Positivism 
Each of Raz and Shapiro has offered arguments purporting to impugn and undermine inclusive 
legal positivism, whereby it is possible for legal validity to depend on moral considerations.  For 
Raz, inclusive positivism is inconsistent with the sources thesis, which follows from the 
authoritative nature of law.  For Shapiro, directives that depend for their validity upon moral 
considerations (as specified by an inclusive rule of recognition) cannot guide conduct as (per 
Hart) they must be able to in order to count as law.   
I will argue, however, that these arguments fail to achieve their intended outcome.  Raz’s theory 
of law, although intending to establish exclusive legal positivism, is implicitly (and, in light of 
the sources thesis, incoherently) inclusive legal positivist.  Raz’s theory implicitly affirms 
inclusive legal positivism because implying that, in certain contingent circumstances, legal 
validity depends on moral considerations.  These circumstances exist, generally speaking, where 
the severe immorality of a purported legal system is obvious or known to officials, such that they 
are prevented from claiming legitimate authority.236  Shapiro’s argument against the 
incorporation thesis is undermined by the fact that the content of a rule of recognition is 
contingent and can evolve from being wholly or partly moral to being purely social.  Because the 
content of a rule of recognition can evolve from being inclusive to being purely social, directives 
that depend for their validity on an inclusive rule of recognition are nonetheless capable of 
guiding conduct because they belong to a system that is capable of having a purely social rule of 
recognition.  If these analyses are correct, then two of the primary arguments supporting 
exclusive legal positivism are significantly flawed.    
2.1 Raz’s Theory Implies Inclusive Legal Positivism 
 
236 I am aware of Horacio Spector, ‘A Pragmatic Reconstruction of Law’s Claim to Authority’ (2019) 
32(1) Ratio Juris 21, which includes a critique of Raz that is very similar to, and which reaches some of 
the same conclusions as, the critique presented in this Chapter 2.  I came upon Spector’s recent article 
after finishing my research and, indeed, after I had finished my dissertation.  Although Spector argues for 
some of the same conclusions regarding Raz that I reach, there are enough differences in the analyses to 
warrant the retention in the dissertation of the critique of Raz presented.  Had Spector’s article been 
published earlier, I would of course have taken account of it in my own discussion.  Given how recent 
Spector’s article is, however, I will confine myself to pointing out the similarities between his work and 
mine.  The fact that two discussions of Raz have independently reached the same conclusions regarding 
his theorizing is grounds for heightened confidence in the correctness of those conclusions.  
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If Raz’s theory implies inclusive legal positivism, then it is inconsistent with the sources thesis 
and therefore, by Raz’s own standards, inadequate as a theory of law: the ‘social thesis’ (i.e. the 
sources thesis), which is the ‘backbone of the version of positivism’ Raz defends, is ‘best viewed 
not as a “first-order” thesis but as a constraint on what kind of theory of law is an acceptable 
theory-- more specifically it is a thesis about some general properties of any acceptable test for 
the existence and identity of legal systems.’237   
Here, in overview, is the line of reasoning leading to the conclusion that Raz’s theory implicitly 
affirms inclusive positivism.  For Raz, a legal system exists only if its officials claim legitimate 
authority.  Raz explicitly argues that officials, in claiming authority, are not systematically 
insincere or confused regarding the conceptual conditions of authority; however, his reasoning 
for this conclusion implies that officials are also not systematically insincere or confused 
regarding the moral conditions of authority.  If this is correct, then (Raz implies) a legal system 
exists only if its officials, who are not insincere or confused regarding the moral conditions of 
authority, claim legitimate authority.  But, there are certain contingent circumstances-- i.e. where 
the immoral nature of directives is obvious or known to officials-- in which a purported legal 
system can be so severely immoral that its officials can claim authority only if they are 
systematically insincere or confused regarding the moral conditions of authority.  Therefore, a 
legal system’s existence-- in affirmation of inclusive positivism-- depends in certain 
circumstances on it not being so severely immoral that its officials, who are not insincere or 
confused about the moral conditions of authority, are prevented from claiming authority.  These 
circumstances arise where the immorality of the system is obvious or known to officials.    
To begin, Raz’s theory relies on the conclusion that a legal system exists only if the conceptual 
conditions of legitimate authority are satisfied.  This conclusion follows from combining two 
statements that can be attributed to Raz:  
(1) A legal system exists only if its officials claim legitimate authority;  
(2) Officials claim legitimate authority only if the conceptual conditions of having authority 
are satisfied (but the moral conditions need not be satisfied for the claim to be made).  
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Regarding statement (1), we know that Raz holds the authority thesis, whereby a legal system 
exists only if it claims legitimate authority.238  In support of statement (2), Raz says that ‘since 
the law necessarily claims authority, and therefore typically has the capacity to be authoritative, 
it follows that it typically has all the non-moral, or non-normative, attributes of authority.’239  For 
its officials to claim legitimate authority, a purported legal system must satisfy the conceptual 
conditions of authority; however, a claim of legitimate authority can be made even if the moral 
conditions of authority are unsatisfied:     
A legal system may lack legitimate authority.  If it 
lacks the moral attributes required to endow it with 
legitimate authority then it has none.  But it must 
possess all the other features of authority, or else it 
would be odd to say that it claims authority.  To 
claim authority it must be capable of having it, it 
must be a system of a kind which is capable in 
principle of possessing the requisite moral 
properties of authority.240  
Notice that statement (2)-- that officials claim legitimate authority only if the conceptual 
conditions of having authority are satisfied-- assumes that officials are not systematically 
insincere or confused regarding the conceptual conditions.  Specifically, the assumption is that 
officials are not systematically insincere or confused regarding (1) the nature of the conceptual 
conditions of authority, or (2) the nature of the entity that is purported to have authority.  Raz 
needs to make this assumption because, if officials are systematically insincere or confused 
regarding (at least one of) (1) the nature of the conceptual conditions, and/or (2) the nature of the 
entity purported to have authority (e.g. trees), then officials can claim an entity has authority 
even if these conceptual conditions are unsatisfied: ‘If I say that trees have authority over people, 
you will know that either my grasp of the concepts of authority or of trees is deficient or that I 
am trying to deceive (or, of course, that I am not really stating that trees have authority but 
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merely pretending to do so, or that I am play-acting, etc.).’241  This passage indicates that it is 
possible to claim that an entity (e.g. a tree), which is incapable of having authority, has authority, 
but only if one is confused regarding (1) the nature of the conceptual conditions (‘the concepts of 
authority’) or (2) the nature of the entity purported to have authority (‘trees’) (or if one is trying 
to deceive, or is not really stating that trees have authority but merely pretending to do so, or is 
play-acting, etc.).  Therefore, for Raz to conclude that officials claim a system has authority only 
if it satisfies the conceptual conditions of authority, he must assume that officials are not 
insincere (i.e. not ‘trying to deceive’) or confused regarding (1) the nature of the conceptual 
conditions, or (2) the nature of the entity purported to have authority.   
Raz is, of course, aware of this assumption, which is why he specifies that officials, in claiming 
legitimate authority, are neither systematically insincere nor confused about their system 
satisfying the conceptual conditions of authority:  
That is enough to show that since the law claims to 
have authority it is capable of having it.  Since the 
claim is made by legal officials wherever a legal 
system is in force, the possibility that it is normally 
insincere or based on a conceptual mistake is ruled 
out.  It may, of course, be sometimes insincere or 
based on conceptual mistakes.  But at the very least 
in the normal case the fact that the law claims 
authority for itself shows that it is capable of having 
authority.242  
Although officials and institutions can be occasionally confused regarding the conceptual 
conditions of authority, they cannot be systematically confused because, ‘given the centrality of 
legal institutions in our structures of authority, their claims and conceptions are formed by and 
contribute to our concept of authority.  It is what it is in part as a result of the claims and 
conceptions of legal institutions.’243   
 







The difficulty for Raz begins with the point that the reasoning he offers in support of the 
conclusion, that officials are not systematically insincere or confused regarding the conceptual 
conditions of authority, is equally supportive of the conclusion that officials are not 
systematically insincere or confused regarding the moral conditions of authority.244  If the facts, 
that ‘the claim is made by legal officials wherever a legal system is in force,’ and that the ‘claims 
and conceptions’ of legal institutions are ‘formed by and contribute to our concept of authority’ 
(such that the concept is partly determined by such claims and conceptions), are sufficient to 
support the conclusion that officials cannot be systematically insincere or confused about the 
nature of the conceptual conditions of authority, then-- given that the authority claimed consists 
of moral conditions245 in addition to conceptual conditions-- it is reasonable to infer that these 
facts equally support the conclusion that officials cannot be systematically insincere or confused 
about the nature of the moral conditions of authority (e.g. the content of directives conforming 
with moral reasons to an extent consistent with such directives guiding subjects to better 
conformity with the balance of first order reasons).  In other words, if the explanation for why 
officials cannot be systematically insincere or confused about the nature of the conceptual 
conditions of authority is because their claims are necessarily made and partly determinative of 
the concept of authority, then the fact that these claims involve moral conditions as well as 
conceptual conditions indicates that officials also cannot be systematically insincere or confused 
about the nature of the moral conditions of authority.  Raz's reasoning, meant to support the 
conclusion that there is among officials no systematic insincerity or confusion regarding the 
conceptual conditions of authority, does not distinguish between conceptual conditions and 
moral conditions.  If, therefore, this reasoning is sufficient to support the conclusion that officials 
are not systematically insincere or confused regarding the conceptual conditions, then it must 
also be sufficient to support the parallel conclusion regarding the moral conditions.  
 
244 This point was suggested to me by Matthew Kramer.  
 
245 Keep in mind that, in the service conception, legitimate authority obtains only if directives guide 
subjects to better conformity with reasons-- including moral reasons-- than would be achieved by subjects 
following their own judgments of what they ought to do.  A moral condition of authority, therefore, is 
conforming with moral reasons to an extent that is consistent with better conforming with the balance of 
all first order reasons.  
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Note that I am not arguing (or denying) that it is actually true that officials cannot be 
systematically insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority; the argument is that 
Raz’s reasoning supports this conclusion regarding moral conditions just as much as it does the 
parallel conclusion regarding conceptual conditions.  To avoid this analysis, Raz must argue that 
officials’ claims and conceptions are formed by and contribute to the conceptual-- but not the 
moral-- conditions of our concept of authority.  But, if the reason why officials’ claims and 
conceptions are formed by and contribute to the conceptual conditions of our concept of 
authority is because of the ‘centrality of legal institutions in our structures of authority,’ then the 
fact that legal institutions make a claim involving not only conceptual but also moral conditions 
(i.e. that directives conform with moral reasons to an extent consistent with guiding subjects to 
better conformity with first order reasons) suggests that officials’ claims and conceptions are also 
formed by and contribute to the moral conditions of our concept of authority.  Once again, Raz’s 
reasoning, regarding officials’ systematic insincerity or confusion, fails to distinguish between 
the conceptual and the moral conditions of authority.  
This discussion suggests that Raz’s reasoning, if adequate to support the conclusion that officials 
cannot be systematically insincere or confused about the nature of the conceptual conditions of 
authority, is also adequate to support the conclusion that officials cannot be systematically 
insincere or confused about the nature of the moral conditions of authority (e.g. the extent to 
which the content of directives must conform with moral reasons to be consistent with directives 
guiding subjects to better conformity with the balance of first order reasons).  Combining this 
conclusion with the analysis above, we can infer that (per Raz) a legal system exists only if its 
officials claim legitimate authority, and officials, in making this claim, are not systematically 
insincere or confused regarding each of (1) the nature of the conceptual conditions of authority, 
(2) the nature of the entity/system purported to have authority, and (3) the nature of the moral 
conditions of authority.  At this point, we can make an inference: if officials are not insincere or 
confused regarding (3) the nature of the moral conditions of authority, then it is possible that a 
severely and obviously immoral system (as described below) does not count as a legal system 
because its officials can claim that the system has authority only insincerely or pursuant to 
confusion about the moral conditions of authority.  Given that (per the service conception) 
legitimate authority entails guiding subjects to better conformity with the balance of first order 
reasons-- including moral reasons-- an atrocious non-conformity with moral reasons (i.e. severe 
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immorality) could indicate a failure to guide subjects to better conform with the balance of first 
order reasons.  For this to be impossible, it would have to be the case that the concept of 
immorality is (arbitrarily) restricted such that, at its strongest, conforming with it does not 
indicate a failure to better conform with the balance of reasons.  But why should the concept of 
immorality be restricted in this way?   
When I speak of a system characterized by severe and obvious immorality, I am not referring to 
a legal system that is only slightly or even moderately immoral, such that one could-- wrongly 
but without insincerity or confusion about the moral conditions of authority-- claim that it guides 
subjects to better conformity with the balance of first order reasons.  I am referring to a legal 
system exhibiting an immorality (perhaps embedded in the rule of recognition) that is so severe 
and obvious that officials can claim the system has legitimate authority only pursuant to 
insincerity or confusion about the moral conditions of authority; given that (as implied by Raz’s 
reasoning) officials are not insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority, they 
cannot claim that such a system has legitimate authority-- indicating (pursuant to the authority 
thesis) that the system does not qualify as a legal system.   
Consider, for instance, a purported legal system (i.e. an institutional normative system) 
underpinned by a rule of recognition specifying that validity obtains for only those directives 
exhibiting an immorality so severe that it precludes such directives from coming even remotely 
close to guiding subjects to better conformity with the balance of first order reasons.  Given that 
they are (Raz’s reasoning implies) not systematically insincere or confused regarding the moral 
conditions of authority, officials of this system are precluded from claiming that the system has 
legitimate authority.  Here, there are only two scenarios in which officials might be able to claim 
authority.  First, officials could claim authority pursuant to a sincere but confused understanding 
of the moral conditions of authority.  Second, officials could claim authority while being 
insincere (and only possibly confused) regarding the moral conditions.  Unfortunately for Raz, 
the first scenario is precluded because, as implied by Raz’s reasoning, officials are not confused 
about the moral conditions of authority; and the second scenario is precluded because, implicitly 
per Raz, officials are not insincere regarding the moral conditions of authority.  Because each 
scenario, in which officials could claim authority (in facilitation of law’s existence), is precluded 
in these circumstances, it is possible that an institutional normative system fails to claim 
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legitimate authority-- and thus does not count as a legal system-- due to being severely and 
obviously immoral.  In this way, it is possible for severe and obvious immorality to preclude the 
existence of a legal system.  If it is possible for immorality to preclude the existence of a legal 
system, then-- in affirmation of inclusive positivism-- it is possible that a legal system’s 
existence (i.e. legal validity) depends on moral considerations (pertaining to the non-obtainment 
of such immorality).   
Notice that the meaning of ‘severe immorality’ varies, from system to system, depending on 
what level of conformity with reason subjects would likely achieve by following their own 
judgments of what they ought to do.246  In a purported legal system having subjects whose 
actions (resulting from following their own judgments) are highly reasonable, the severity of the 
immorality that would preclude the system from being a legal system is less extreme than the 
severity that would apply to a purported legal system having subjects whose actions are less 
reasonable.  This is because the severe immorality I am specifying represents a non-conformity 
with moral reasons that is so atrocious as to indicate a clear failure to guide subjects to better 
conformity with the balance of first order reasons; and, whether such non-conformity indicates a 
clear failure to guide subjects to better conformity with first order reasons depends on how well 
subjects would likely conform with reasons by following their own judgments of what they 
ought to do.  It is conceivable, then, that a purported legal system, governing subjects whose 
actions (resulting from following their own judgments) would likely conform to a very high 
degree with the balance of reasons, would be disqualified from being a legal system if it 
exhibited an immorality that can be easily imagined and possibly instantiated by legal systems 
that have existed (e.g. the Nazi legal system).247  
 
246 Which is not to suggest that morality is subjective.  Rather, the suggestion is that the level of morality, 
that could disqualify a system from being a legal system, varies from system to system (or at least could 
do so depending on the nature of the respective subjects).  
 
247 This does not suggest that (implicitly per Raz) the Nazi legal system was not a true legal system; 
rather, it indicates that (implicitly per Raz) the Nazi legal system could have been disqualified from being 
a true legal system if its immorality was so severe that its directives did not come remotely close to 
guiding subjects to better conformity with first order reasons.  The correctness of the conclusion-- that the 
Nazi system did not come remotely close to guiding subjects to better conformity with reason-- depends 
on the level of conformity with reason that subjects of the system would likely achieve by following their 
own judgments.  Because Raz does not identify any particular level of conformity with reason that 
subjects of the Nazi system would likely achieve by following their own judgments, we cannot conclude 
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This critique does not imply that (per Raz) officials claim legitimate authority (and that law 
exists) only if a legal system is actually legitimately authoritative.  To be clear, the argument is 
not that Raz's theory is implicitly inclusive positivist in the sense that it implies a legal system's 
existence can depend on satisfying its claim of authority; rather, Raz's theory is implicitly 
inclusive positivist in the sense that it implies a legal system's existence can depend on the 
system not being so severely and obviously immoral that its officials, who are not systematically 
insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority, are prevented from claiming 
legitimate authority.  We cannot conclude, merely because a legal system is not severely and 
obviously immoral, that such system is legitimately authoritative (i.e. guides subjects to better 
conformity with reason).  Thus, it is possible for a legal system, which is not severely or 
obviously immoral, to exist while lacking legitimate authority.   
Here is a summary of the critique of Raz.  Where (as implied by Raz’s reasoning) officials are 
not systematically insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority, legal validity 
can depend on moral considerations.  Legal validity depends on moral considerations if the 
immoral nature of a purported legal system is obvious or known to officials.  In these 
circumstances, the purported legal system is an actual legal system only if it is not severely 
immoral.  A purported legal system is severely immoral if its officials can claim authority only 
pursuant to insincerity or confusion about the moral conditions of authority.  The assumption 
supporting this reasoning is that it is possible for directives to fail to conform to morality to such 
an extent that officials can claim such directives guide subjects to better conformity with first 
order reasons only if they are insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority (i.e. 
confused about the extent to which directives must conform with morality to be consistent with 
guiding subjects to better conformity with first order reasons).  Given that (as implied by Raz’s 
reasoning) officials are not insincere or confused about the moral conditions, they are precluded 
in these circumstances from claiming authority.  Because no claim of authority is made by its 
officials, the purported legal system is not a true legal system.  Law’s existence-- and thus legal 
validity-- can therefore depend on the non-obtainment of severe immorality.    
 
that he implies the Nazi legal system was disqualified by its immorality from being a true legal system.  
And, we know that the sources thesis means that Raz explicitly disavows the conclusion that the 
immorality of Nazi law disqualified it from being a legal system.   
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There are at least two counter-arguments that could be made in response to this critique of Raz.  
First, one could respond by arguing that, even if officials are not insincere or confused about the 
moral conditions of authority, they can nonetheless claim that a severely and obviously immoral 
system, lacking legitimate authority, has legitimate authority (i.e. guides subjects to better 
conformity with reason than subjects would likely achieve by following their own judgments of 
what they ought to do).  They can make this claim because such officials could be insincere or 
confused about the level of conformity with reason that subjects would likely achieve by 
following their own judgments of what they ought to do.  More specifically, even if officials are 
not insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority, they could be insincere or 
confused that the level of conformity with reason, that subjects would likely achieve on their 
own, is so low that even immoral directives can guide subjects to better conformity with reason.  
If officials are insincere or confused that even immoral directives can guide subjects to better 
conformity with reason, then-- even if they are not insincere or confused about the moral 
conditions of authority-- they can claim that the immoral system has legitimate authority.  
However, there is a problem with this counter-argument: the possibility of insincerity or 
confusion, regarding this level of conformity, is precluded by the fact that officials are not 
insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority.   
So, in response to this counter-argument, I am claiming that, where officials are not insincere or 
confused about the moral conditions of authority (i.e. a legal system conforming with moral 
reasons to an extent that is consistent with guiding subjects to better conformity with first order 
reasons), they are also not insincere or confused that the level of conformity with reason, that 
subjects would likely achieve on their own, is so low that even immoral directives can guide 
subjects to better conformity with first order reasons.  Suppose that there is an institutional 
normative system that is severely immoral.  If officials of this system are insincere or confused 
that the level of conformity with reason, that subjects would likely achieve on their own, is so 
low that even the severely immoral directives of the system can guide subjects to better 
conformity with reason, then such officials are insincere or confused about the moral conditions 
of authority (i.e. that authority depends on directives conforming with morality to an extent that 
is consistent with guiding subjects to better conformity with first order reasons).  
Contrapositively, if officials are not insincere or confused about the moral conditions of 
authority, then they are also not insincere or confused that the level of conformity with reason, 
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that subjects would likely achieve on their own, is so low that even severely immoral directives 
can guide subjects to better conformity with reason.   
Second, one might respond by arguing that the critique presented establishes only that a legal 
system’s existence can depend on it not being severely and obviously immoral-- the critique does 
nothing to preclude a legal system that is severely, but not obviously, immoral.  But, keep in 
mind that the purpose of the critique is not to establish that Raz's theory precludes every possible 
immoral legal system.  That would be an outlandish conclusion.  The purpose of the critique is to 
establish that Raz's theory implies inclusive positivism, which can be done by showing there 
could be a system that does not qualify as a legal system only because of its immorality.  If there 
can be an instance of immorality that is sufficient to disqualify a system from being a legal 
system, then a legal system’s existence can depend on the non-obtainment of that instance of 
immorality.   
To illustrate the point, suppose we have two purported legal systems (i.e. institutional normative 
systems), LS0 and LS1, which are identical in every way except for their contrasting levels of 
immorality.  LS0 is obviously severely immoral (as described), and its officials are not insincere 
or confused about the moral conditions of authority.  LS1 is obviously not severely immoral, and 
its officials are not insincere or confused about the moral conditions of authority.  If the analysis 
above is correct, then Raz’s theory implies that LS1-- but not LS0-- qualifies as a legal system.  
LS1 is a legal system because, given that it is not severely immoral, its officials can claim-- 
perhaps wrongly but without insincerity or confusion about the moral conditions of authority-- 
that the system has authority.  LS0 is not a legal system because, given that it is severely 
immoral, its officials cannot without insincerity or confusion claim legitimate authority.  Because 
LS0 and LS1 are identical in every way other than their contrasting levels of immorality, we can 
infer that the only reason why LS0 is not a legal system is because of its (severe) level of 
immorality.  The status of LS1 as a legal system thus depends on the non-obtainment of the 
severe immorality that characterizes LS0.  This hypothetical shows that (implicitly per Raz) 
severe immorality can disqualify a system from being a legal system, the existence of which can 
therefore depend on the non-obtainment of severe immorality. 
Looking at the big picture, the critique of Raz is basically supported by two points.  The first 
point is that it is possible for there to be a purported legal system (i.e. an institutional normative 
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system) that is so severely and obviously immoral that its officials can claim legitimate authority 
only pursuant to insincerity or confusion about the moral conditions of authority.  The second 
point is that, implicitly per Raz, officials are not systematically insincere or confused about the 
moral conditions of authority.  If each of these points is correct, then this purported legal system 
is disqualified from being a true legal system (given that its officials cannot claim authority), 
which indicates that Raz’s theory is implicitly inclusive positivist because implying that, in 
certain circumstances (i.e. where the moral or immoral nature of a system is obvious or known to 
officials), legal validity depends on the non-obtainment of severe immorality.  
The critique suggests that Raz implicitly (and, in light of the sources thesis, incoherently) affirms 
the incorporation thesis, whereby a rule of recognition can include moral criteria of validity.  If a 
particular legal system's existence depends on the non-obtainment of severe immorality, then 
identifying legally valid directives-- and thus the rule of recognition-- requires or includes 
reference to moral considerations (e.g. 'validity obtains only absent severe immorality.').  So, 
given that (implicitly per Raz) a legal system's existence can depend on the non-obtainment of 
severe immorality, a rule of recognition can include moral criteria specifying this fact.  The 
assumption behind this reasoning is that there are legally valid directives only if there is a legal 
system-- there are no laws without a legal system.  Because a directive is legally valid only if 
there is a legal system in place, identifying a directive as law requires identifying an existing 
legal system.  As a result, if a legal system exists only if it is not severely immoral, then 
identifying a directive of the system as legally valid (via a rule of recognition) requires 
confirming the non-obtainment of such severe immorality.  Raz therefore implies that a legal 
system can have a rule of recognition specifying that validity obtains only absent severe 
immorality.   
2.2 Shapiro’s Argument Against Inclusive Positivism 
Shapiro argues that (1) Hart implies that a legal system is necessarily capable of guiding conduct, 
and that (2) this function is inconsistent with an inclusive rule of recognition.  For Shapiro, ‘If a 
judge is guided by a rule of recognition that validates certain norms based on moral criteria, 
those norms that pass such a test will not be able to guide conduct.’248  Shapiro asserts that Hart 
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holds the practical difference thesis, whereby ‘Legal rules must in principle be capable of 
securing conformity by making a difference to an agent’s practical reasoning.’249  Shapiro 
argues, however, that it is impossible to simultaneously believe that (1) every legal system has a 
social rule of recognition, (2) such rule of recognition can make morality a condition of legality, 
and (3) legal rules must be capable of making a practical difference.250   
Hart actually operated with two different concepts of guidance-- epistemic and motivational.251  
The law’s function is to ‘epistemically guide the conduct of its ordinary citizens via its primary 
rules and to motivationally guide the conduct of judicial officials via its secondary rules.’252  To 
be epistemically guided by a legal rule is to ‘learn of one’s legal obligations from the rule and to 
conform to the rule because of that knowledge.  It does not imply that one is motivated because 
of the rule.’253  Hart would later clarify what is meant by motivational guidance.  An agent is 
motivationally guided by a rule when he treats it as ‘both a content-independent and a 
peremptory reason for action.’254  One treats a rule as a content-independent reason when he 
complies with it because he was so commanded; one treats a rule as a peremptory reason when 
his compliance is not conditional on the outcome of deliberation about the merits of following 
the rule.255  
Shapiro’s argument can be considered in relation to a rule of recognition that is either 
incorporationist or inclusive.  An incorporationist rule of recognition includes (at least some) 
moral criteria as a sufficient condition of validity.  An inclusive rule of recognition includes (at 
least some) moral criteria as a necessary condition of validity.  I will begin by discussing 
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Shapiro’s argument in relation to an incorporationist rule, before turning attention to the 
relationship between this argument and an inclusive rule.  
Can an incorporationist rule of recognition epistemically guide the conduct of subjects?  
Pursuant to this conception of guidance, the ‘primary function of the law is to designate certain 
standards of conduct as legitimate.’256  The difficulty arises because it is hard to see ‘how the law 
can serve this function with respect to rules that are valid in virtue of their moral content.’257  
Shapiro makes the point concisely: ‘Telling people that they should act on the rules that they 
should act on is not telling them anything.’258  In more detail, ‘Marks of authority are supposed 
to eliminate the problems associated with people distinguishing for themselves between 
legitimate and illegitimate norms,’ but ‘a mark that can be identified only by resolving the very 
question that the mark is supposed to resolve is useless.’259  A norm bearing such a trivial mark 
is therefore ‘unable to discharge its epistemic duties.’260  A purported legal system with an 
incorporationist rule of recognition is ‘no advance over a regime of primary rules’ because 
‘people are left to discover which rules they ought to apply rather than being able to rely on the 
mediating role of authorities.’261  Furthermore, an incorporationist rule of recognition ‘cannot 
epistemically guide judges in adjudication’ because such a rule does not ‘tell judges which moral 
rules they should apply,’ rather, it simply ‘[tells] judges to apply moral rules.’262  The judge of a 
system underpinned by an incorporationist rule of recognition cannot be epistemically guided 
because he is left to figure out for himself what the rules are.263   
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Yet, says Himma, there is a straightforward objection to this reasoning: ‘if it is possible, as is 
presupposed by our ordinary practices, for mandatory moral norms to epistemically guide non-
official behavior, it would also have to be possible for legal norms valid in virtue of moral merit 
to epistemically guide non-official behavior.’264  Himma finds it difficult to see ‘how an official 
act of recognizing, applying, or enforcing a mandatory moral norm that is antecedently capable 
of epistemically guiding non-official behavior would render that norm incapable of doing so 
simply because officials treat it as a mandatory legal norm.’265  If we are morally accountable for 
our behavior, then ‘it must be possible for us both to discern what a mandatory moral norm 
requires by consulting the norm and to conform our behavior to that norm.’266  Inferentially, if it 
is possible for a subject to be epistemically guided by mandatory moral norms governing non-
official behavior, then a subject can be epistemically guided by an institutional norm governing 
non-official behavior that is valid in virtue of reproducing the content of a mandatory moral 
norm.267  What subjects can learn about a norm’s requirements by consulting it is not changed 
simply by ‘giving a norm a new name and treating it as a member of a different class of 
norms.’268    
Regarding judges, Shapiro argues that a system underpinned by an incorporationist rule of 
recognition is incapable of motivational guidance.  To be capable of guiding conduct, a rule must 
be capable of making a practical difference.  Whether a rule makes a practical difference depends 
on what would happen if the agent did not appeal to the rule.  A rule ‘makes a difference to one’s 
practical reasoning only if, in this counterfactual circumstance, the agent might not conform to 
the rule.’269  For instance, if the agent were ‘fated to conform to the rule even though he or she 
did not appeal to it,’ then such rule ‘does not make a practical difference.’270  We can establish 
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that, ‘if a judge guided his or her conduct by the [incorporationist] rule of recognition, then that 
judge would act in conformity to any valid rule even if he or she never appealed to such a 
rule.’271  Shapiro considers an example consisting of an incorporationist rule of recognition that 
states, ‘in hard cases, act according to the principles of morality’:272  
In Riggs, judges guided by this [incorporationist] 
rule of recognition would conform with the 
principles of morality when deciding whether to 
invalidate the will. Let us further assume that the 
only relevant principle of morality is that people 
should not profit from their own wrongs and that 
the majority in that case believed this to be so. A 
judge guided by the rule of recognition, therefore, 
would invalidate the will.273  
 
Here, the principle-- that no man should profit from his wrongs-- cannot make a practical 
difference as a legal norm, ‘For if the judge were guided by the [incorporationist] rule of 
recognition, but did not appeal to the moral principle, he or she would still end up invalidating 
the will.’274  This outcome creates a problem for Hart because ‘the rule of recognition is 
supposed to create the possibility of legally authoritative guidance,’ but ‘guidance by an 
[incorporationist] rule of recognition [...] precludes the possibility that the primary rules can 
guide anyone’s conduct.’275  The primary rules cannot guide conduct because, ‘once the judge is 
guided by an [incorporationist] rule of recognition, the rules supposedly validated by it can no 













276 ibid.  Here is how Coleman describes Shapiro’s argument: ‘Shapiro's point is that someone cannot 
have his conduct guided both by the rule of recognition and by the rules validated under it. The reason is 
simple: if one is guided by the rule of recognition, one will be moved to act morally. That is what the rule 
of recognition asserts, and if one is guided by the rule, one is moved to act in accordance with it for the 
reason that the rule requires it. If that is the case, "legal" rules identified under the rule of recognition 
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Shapiro’s argument seems to refute the idea that a legal system can have an incorporationist or 
inclusive rule of recognition.  First, regarding incorporationism: where an institutional normative 
system with moral criteria of validity lacks any source-based criteria, each valid norm of the 
system would be valid in virtue of moral merit; however, this means that none of the norms valid 
under the rule of recognition are capable of motivationally guiding the official behavior of a 
judge who is motivationally guided by the rule of recognition to apply those norms.277  Given 
that no valid norm of the system can make a practical difference in the deliberations of a judge 
motivationally guided by the rule of recognition, none are properly considered to be a legal 
norm.278  Here, the system would have a rule of recognition but no valid legal norms and would 
therefore not be properly considered a legal system-- ‘there can be no law without laws.’279  So, 
if ‘all the norms expressing, say, the minimum content of natural law have not been officially 
promulgated and are putatively valid only in virtue of moral merit, then they are not legal norms 
and the system fails, for that reason, to be a legal system.’280   
Second, regarding an inclusive rule of recognition: where an ‘institutional normative system with 
moral criteria of validity also incorporates source-based criteria of validity as a necessary 
condition for a norm to be valid in the system,’ it is only those norms that are valid partly in 
virtue of source that can make a practical difference in the deliberations of a judge 
motivationally guided by the rule of recognition.281  This indicates that ‘every norm putatively 
 
cannot add anything of practical significance. One is, after all, already moved to act morally by the rule of 
recognition. The rules identified as law under the rule of recognition are not capable of adding anything of 
practical significance.  If such rules cannot in principle add anything of practical significance, they cannot 
be legal rules. Legal rules must in principle be capable of making a practical difference. These cannot. 
Thus, they cannot be legal rules. If they cannot be legal rules, then the rule of recognition that sets out the 
conditions that validate them cannot be a rule of recognition. Thus, the classic incorporationist "rule of 
recognition" cannot, in the end, be a rule of recognition at all.’ (Jules Coleman, ‘Incorporationism, 
Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis’ (1998) 4 Legal Theory 381, 421-422).  
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valid wholly in virtue of moral merit would not be a legal norm’ under the practical difference 
thesis.282  As there are here no norms valid in virtue of moral merit that count as law, ‘the system 
would have, despite appearances to the contrary, only source-based criteria of validity.’283  
Pursuantly, if ‘all the norms expressing the minimum content of natural law have been officially 
promulgated and are hence valid in virtue of source, then the system is a legal system; those 
norms would be valid in virtue of having a proper source.’284  However, since each norm of the 
institutional system that is putatively valid wholly in virtue of moral merit would not count as a 
legal norm, ‘the legal system to which that institutional system gives rise would lack moral 
criteria of legal validity.’285   
At this point, I will interject to identify a problem with the reasoning behind Himma’s analysis of 
the second option.  The problem arises because Himma assumes that the source-based criteria is 
sufficient to establish legal validity (e.g. if ‘all the norms expressing the minimum content [...] 
have been officially promulgated and are hence valid in virtue of source’); but, if the source-
based criteria is sufficient to establish validity, then satisfying moral criteria is unnecessary to 
establish validity.  The problem is that this assumption is applied to a hypothetical premised on 
moral criteria being necessary to determine validity-- where ‘an institutional normative system 
with moral criteria of validity also incorporates source-based criteria of validity as a necessary 
condition for a norm to be valid in the system.’  In this passage, Himma must mean that the 
moral criteria is necessary for validity (i.e. he must be referring to an inclusive rule of 
recognition)-- he cannot mean that it is sufficient286 given that there is also ‘source-based criteria 
of validity as a necessary condition.’  The reasoning here is that, if social facts are necessary for 
validity, then moral facts are insufficient for validity, given that moral facts do not entail social 
facts.  More precisely, if moral facts do not entail social facts, then moral facts can obtain absent 
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moral facts can obtain without a necessary condition of validity, then moral facts are insufficient 
to establish validity-- this follows because, if moral facts were sufficient to establish validity, 
then they would obtain only when all necessary conditions of validity are satisfied.  Where the 
rule of recognition makes the obtainment of moral facts a necessary condition of validity (i.e. is 
inclusive), there are only two possibilities: either (1) moral facts are necessary and sufficient for 
validity, and so social facts are insufficient and unnecessary; or (2) moral facts are necessary and 
insufficient for validity, and so social facts are insufficient and necessary.  In neither option is the 
obtainment of social facts sufficient to establish validity.  Therefore, once we enter the 
hypothetical premised on moral facts being necessary to establish validity, we cannot reason on 
the basis of the assumption that social facts are sufficient to establish validity-- to make this 
assumption is to depart from the hypothetical.   
Here is how Shapiro characterizes his argument asserting that a legal system cannot have an 
inclusive rule of recognition.  Recall that an ‘agent is epistemically guided by a legal rule when 
he learns of his legal obligations or rights from the rule without having to engage in deliberation 
about the merits of following such a rule,’ and that legal rules are ‘able to perform this function 
because they possess authoritative marks’: ‘By appealing to the mark, agents are able to identify 
those rules that are authoritative without having to appeal to shared judgments about which rules 
are legitimate and which are illegitimate.’287  So, authoritative marks must be identifiable as such 
without deliberation ‘given that their function is to enable agents to learn that a rule is a legal 
rule without deliberation’;288 however, if one can identify a mark only by deliberating on the 
merits of following the rule it affixes to, then one cannot learn of one’s legal obligations or rights 
from the rule without engaging in deliberation.289  An inclusive rule of recognition ‘flouts this 
constraint precisely by allowing moral properties to be marks of authority.’290  Judges cannot be 
motivationally guided by an inclusive rule of recognition, such as one that ‘validates only those 
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rules that are both passed by Congress and consistent with fundamental rights.’291  Here, to 
decide whether a given rule is a legal rule, a judge must assess some of the moral properties of 
the rule in question-- she must determine whether the rule is consistent with fundamental 
rights.292  Pursuantly, the judge will not be treating the rule as a peremptory reason for action 
because ‘her compliance is conditional on her judgment about the moral appropriateness of 
following the rule.’293  The judge therefore cannot be motivationally guided by the rule.  
Matthew Kramer has responded to Shapiro, who presumes that, ‘if ascertaining the existence of a 
legal norm will perforce involve some moral judgments, then the norm cannot amount to a 
peremptory reason for action.’294  For Kramer, Shapiro’s presumption disregards Raz’s 
‘observations concerning possible restrictions on the scope of any particular reason’s 
exclusionary or peremptory force.’295  Indeed, ‘In almost every instance, the peremptory sway of 
a norm is limited.’296  More exactly, ‘As long as an exclusionary reason removes some factors 
from a balance of considerations that can be legitimately acted upon, it need not remove all such 
factors,’ such that ‘Restrictions on the scope of a peremptory reason are fully compatible with its 
nature as such a reason.’297  Stated differently, a legal norm ‘can partake of peremptoriness even 
if it disqualifies only some countervailing concerns, rather than all countervailing concerns, as 
reasons for legitimately acting at variance with the norm’s demands.’298   
In Shapiro’s words, Kramer ‘claims that a judge can be guided in a peremptory fashion by a 
primary legal rule even when he must deliberate about some of the merits of the rule.’299  Kramer 
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implies that ‘Morality can serve as a necessary condition of legality in a way consistent with the 
peremptory nature of motivational guidance, provided that the moral reasons conditioning 
legality fall outside the exclusionary scope of the primary legal rules.’300  Shapiro admits that 
‘Kramer’s response is very clever and might be useful to any inclusive legal positivist who 
permitted rules to have flexible scopes of preemption’; however, Shapiro does not think that 
Hart-- the main target of Shapiro’s arguments-- is one of these inclusive positivists.301 
Waluchow responds to Shapiro’s argument by questioning whether the ‘functions noted by 
Shapiro’ should be ‘ascribed to individual laws or to legal systems in general.’302  As Waluchow 
says, ‘it fails to follow from the fact that a function is attributable to the legal system that it must 
be attributable to any and all laws within the system.’303  Consequently, ‘even if, as Hart and 
others have argued, it is an important function of legal systems that they provide something like 
the kind of guidance Shapiro describes, there is no reason to think the same must be said of all 
laws.’304  Stated concisely, ‘it fails to follow from the proposition that a legal system must make 
a practical difference that all its rules must do likewise.’305  Shapiro, in reply to Waluchow, 
agrees that although ‘one cannot, in general, conclude that a part has a function F just because 
the whole has the function F,’ such an inference is sound in the case of legal rules and legal 
institutions.306  This is because ‘legal rules are the means by which legal systems guide conduct’-
- ‘We can say that the function of legal rules is to guide conduct because they have been 
produced by legal institutions in order to guide conduct.’307  Furthermore, ‘the idea that legal 
 
  

















rules have, as their function, the guidance of conduct is one of the core features of Hart’s theory 
of law.’308 
Himma offers an overarching critique of Shapiro’s arguments against the incorporation thesis.  
Himma argues that the guidance function of law ‘does not imply that every legal norm must be 
capable of guiding or informing the behavior of every person’; rather, what is implied is that 
‘every legal norm must be capable of guiding or informing the behavior of every person whose 
behavior it governs.’309  Given that the rule of recognition governs only official behavior, we 
cannot conclude that subjects must be able to determine, by consulting the rule of recognition, 
their non-official obligations under valid law.310  Shapiro’s guidance arguments are problematic 
only insofar as they assume that ‘a rule that does not govern someone’s behavior must 
nonetheless be capable of guiding or informing her behavior.’311  No plausible conceptual theory 
of law entails that ‘it must be possible for the rule of recognition to epistemically guide or inform 
non-official behavior because the rule of recognition does not govern that behavior.’312  By the 
same token, no plausible conceptual theory of law entails that ‘the valid legal norms that a judge 
applies to a case involving non-official behavior must be capable of motivationally guiding the 
judge’s official behavior because those norms do not govern the judge’s official behavior.’313  
Shapiro’s arguments are unsuccessful in that neither strand shows that ‘the norms of an 
institutional normative system with moral criteria of validity cannot properly guide someone 
whose behavior it must be capable of guiding.’314  
If there is doubt regarding the deficiencies of Shapiro’s arguments, there is another criticism that 
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contingent and may evolve-- undermines Shapiro’s argument that directives are incapable of 
guiding conduct if their validity depends on satisfying moral criteria.  I will now attempt to 
justify this conclusion.  Imagine that there is an institutional normative system that is 
underpinned by a partly moral (i.e. inclusive) rule of recognition, meaning that it includes criteria 
making the obtainment of certain moral facts a necessary condition of validity.  Now, suppose 
that a precedent case comes before the adjudicative body of the system, and the judgment in this 
case establishes and applies system norm A.  Then, some time after the precedent case, the 
normative system’s rule of recognition-- having a contingent content-- evolves from being partly 
moral to being purely social.  At some time following the evolution of the rule of recognition, a 
subsequent case comes before the adjudicative body of the system.  The judge in the subsequent 
case applies system norm A as a precedent, having identified it (as a valid norm of the system) 
by reference to the (now) purely social rule of recognition.  This hypothetical shows that, 
because a normative system’s rule of recognition can evolve from partly (or wholly) moral to 
purely social, norms of the system depending for their validity on a partly (or wholly) moral rule 
of recognition are not thereby incapable of guiding conduct-- system norm A is capable of 
guiding conduct because it is valid during a time when the rule of recognition could evolve to be 
purely social.      
To this analysis, one might respond by arguing that, once system norm A depends for its validity 
on social facts (i.e. depends on satisfying the evolved, purely social, rule of recognition), it no 
longer depends for its validity on satisfying the moral criteria of the partly moral rule of 
recognition.  This argument may or may not be true, but it is besides the point, which is that, at 
one time (i.e. prior to the rule of recognition evolving), system norm A depends for its validity 
on satisfying moral criteria, and yet-- because the rule of recognition could evolve to be purely 
social-- system norm A is capable of guiding conduct.  Even if we assume that there is a time 
(e.g. the moment the evolved rule of recognition comes into existence) during which system 
norm A is capable of guiding conduct but does not depend for its validity on satisfying moral 
criteria, we cannot without more infer that there is no time (e.g. after A is established but prior to 
the rule of recognition evolving) during which A is both capable of guiding conduct and 
dependent for its validity on satisfying moral criteria.  To be precise, while an inclusive rule of 
recognition is in place, system norm A (1) does not make a practical difference (because it is 
identified by reference to moral criteria), but (2) is capable of making a practical difference 
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(because-- given that the rule of recognition could evolve-- norm A could be identified by 
reference to purely social criteria).  If there is a time during which system norm A is both 
capable of guiding conduct and dependent for its validity on satisfying moral criteria, then it is 
untrue that being dependent for its validity on satisfying moral criteria is sufficient for A to be 
incapable of guiding conduct.  Because the content of a rule of recognition is only contingently 
moral, and could be purely social, norms that depend for their validity on satisfying the moral 
criteria of a rule of recognition are capable of guiding conduct, even if they fail to do so.  
Shapiro is essentially relying on the truth of the (incorrect) statement, ‘if a rule of recognition 
contingently includes moral criteria, then system norms cannot guide conduct.’  The problem is 
that the correct statement reads, ‘if a rule of recognition contingently includes moral criteria, then 
system norms do not guide conduct.’   
The remaining question is whether system norm A is capable of guiding the conduct of subjects.  
The answer must be ‘yes.’  Assuming that, following the subsequent case, the system’s rule of 
recognition remains purely social, then subjects will be able to guide their conduct according to 
system norm A, having identified it as valid by reference to the purely social rule of recognition. 
In response to this critique of Shapiro, one might argue that the institutional normative system 
with an inclusive rule of recognition is not the same system as the one with a purely social rule 
of recognition.  However, to reach this conclusion, we would have to assume or show that a legal 
system cannot survive the evolution, from partly moral to purely social, of its rule of recognition.  
But why would this be the case?  For Raz, ‘That one legal system comes to an end and another 
takes its place manifests itself in a change of rule of recognition, for each legal system has a 
different rule of recognition.’315  And yet, the rule of recognition is a customary rule, and so it is 
‘constantly in a process of change.’316  We can therefore ask: ‘What changes are consistent with 
the continued existence of the same rule, and what changes compel the admission that a new rule 
has replaced the old one?’317  Raz suggests that the answer depends on whether there is 
continuity in the relevant political system: ‘the continuity of the legal system is fundamentally a 
 







function of the continuity of the political system.’318  If this is correct, then a rule of recognition 
evolving from partly moral to purely social need not indicate that a new legal system is in place 
because such evolution could occur within the context of a continuous political system.  We can, 
therefore, defend against this response to my critique of Shapiro simply by supplementing the 
hypothetical such that there is a continuous political system in place while the rule of recognition 

















318 ibid. at 100. 
 
79 
Chapter 3: Two Inconsistencies in the Planning Theory of Law  
Shapiro’s planning theory of law can be criticised on two grounds.  First, I will argue that, 
implicitly per Shapiro, adopting a law plan provides instrumentally rational reasons for 
conforming only if the content of such plan is sufficiently moral.  If this is correct, then 
Shapiro’s theory (incoherently) asserts that adopting a law plan does-- and does not-- necessarily 
provide instrumentally rational reasons for following the plan.  Second, I will argue that 
Shapiro’s planning theory is internally inconsistent because its legal positivism is contradicted by 
its account of legal normativity.   
The key to this critique of the planning theory is a slight shift in perspective.  Shapiro focuses 
primarily on the instrumental rationality generated by adopting a law plan.  I want to take a step 
back, and focus instead on the instrumental rationality generated by adopting a non-law plan that 
precedes (adopting) a law plan.  To establish the critique, I will present four points, which will 
then inform a question that is problematic for Shapiro.  The first point is that (it is reasonable to 
assume) a non-law plan precedes a law plan.  The second point is that adopting/accepting a (law 
or non-law) plan necessarily establishes instrumental rationality (i.e. instrumentally rational 
reasons for following the plan).  The third point is that, once a plan is accepted, it is 
instrumentally irrational to depart from such plan without a compelling reason to do so.  The 
fourth point is that it is possible for a law plan to be highly immoral.  These four points inform 
the question of whether there is necessarily a compelling reason to adopt a highly immoral law 
plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  If there is no compelling reason to adopt a highly 
immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan, then such adoption-- from the 
perspective of the instrumental rationality of the prior non-law plan-- will be instrumentally 
irrational.  And, if adopting a law plan is instrumentally irrational, then such adoption fails to 
provide instrumentally rational reasons for following the plan.  Moreover, this reasoning 
supports the second critique of Shapiro, which argues that the planning theory is internally 
inconsistent because its account of legal normativity contradicts the legal positivism it espouses. 
I will begin the initial critique by discussing the four points, summarized above, informing the 
question of whether there is necessarily a compelling reason to adopt a highly immoral law plan 
in departure from a prior non-law plan.  The first point is that we can reasonably assume that a 
non-law plan will precede a law plan.  This is reasonable given that ‘it is plausible to suppose 
80 
that law is a comparatively recent invention,’319 while ‘Planning is a core component of human 
agency because we have desires for many ends that demand substantial coordination’320 and we 
are compelled to plan by our limited rationality.321  If law is a ‘comparatively recent invention’ 
and yet planning is ‘a core component of human agency’ that we are compelled to do, then we 
can reasonably assume that planning in general (i.e. non-law planning) precedes law (i.e. law 
planning).  A non-law plan is an abstract propositional entity that (1) is not a legal system, and 
that (2) requires, permits, or authorises agents to act, or not act, in certain ways under certain 
circumstances.322  To reach this definition of a non-law plan, I have simply adopted Shapiro's 
definition of a 'plan,' and then added the requirement that the plan in question is not a legal 
system.323  Non-legal forms of planning include 'improvisation, spontaneous ordering, private 
agreements, communal consensus, [and] personalized hierarchies.'324  In contrast, a law plan is a 
plan that qualifies as a legal system. 
The second point is that, for Shapiro, adopting a plan-- either a non-law plan or a law plan-- 
necessarily establishes instrumentally rational reasons for following the plan: ‘Since acceptance 
of the fundamental legal rules involves the adoption of plans, the distinctive norms of rationality 
that attend the activity of planning necessarily come into play.’325  In other words, accepting the 
fundamental legal rules brings into play the ‘distinctive norms of rationality that attend the 
activity of planning’ because to accept the fundamental legal rules is to adopt a plan.  Given that 
there are ‘distinctive norms of rationality that attend the activity of planning,’ and given that 
planning does not necessarily involve law (because there can be non-law plans), we can conclude 
that the adoption of non-law plans, like the adoption of law plans, establishes instrumental 
rationality.  So, the second point is that adopting a (law or non-law) plan necessarily establishes 
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instrumental rationality (i.e. instrumentally rational reasons for following the plan) because ‘the 
distinctive norms of rationality that attend the activity of planning necessarily come into play.’  
Adopting a plan involves accepting it: ‘In order for a group to share a plan, then, each member of 
the group must accept the plan.’326  Accepting a shared plan ‘does not mean simply that each 
member accepts her particular part of the plan.  To accept a plan entails a commitment to let the 
other members do their parts as well.’327  However, accepting a plan ‘does not require that the 
participants actually know the full content of the shared plan; the commitment may simply be to 
allow others to do their parts, whatever they happen to be.’328    
The third point is that, once officials accept a plan, they are-- from the perspective of 
instrumental rationality-- criticizable for departing from it without a compelling reason.  From 
the perspective of instrumental rationality, ‘an official who accepts her position within an 
authority structure will be rationally criticizable if she disobeys her superiors, fails to flesh out 
their orders so that she may take the means necessary to satisfy their demands, adopts plans that 
are inconsistent with these orders, or reconsiders them without a compelling reason to do so.’329 
Pursuantly, given that ‘most officials do accept the master legal plan, they are criticizable for 
disobeying the law absent a compelling reason to do so.’330  According to the third point, then, it 
is instrumentally irrational to depart from an adopted plan unless there is a compelling reason for 
such departure.   
Regarding the fourth point, notice that, just because (Shapiro says) a law plan is necessarily 
instrumentally rational, does not mean that such law plan is necessarily moral:  
The shared plan can be morally obnoxious.  It may 
cede total control of social planning to a malevolent 
dictator or privilege the rights of certain subgroups 
of the community over others.  The shared plan may 
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have no support from the population at large; those 
governed by it may absolutely hate it.331   
The fourth point, then, is that it is possible for a law plan to be highly immoral.    
Here, in summary, are the four points established above.  First, we can reasonably assume that a 
non-law plan will precede a law plan.  Second, accepting a (law or non-law) plan necessarily 
establishes instrumental rationality, which, third, means that those who have accepted a non-law 
plan ought not depart from it unless there is a compelling reason to do so.  Fourth, a law plan can 
be highly immoral.  With these four points in mind, consider the following hypothetical.  
Suppose that a community of planners are finding that their accepted non-law plan cannot help 
them resolve the problems that have arisen in the circumstances of legality.  They want to switch 
to a law plan; however, the only law plan under consideration is one already used by a 
neighbouring jurisdiction, where the law plan, far from resolving the moral problems of the 
circumstances of legality, actually makes such problems much worse.  This is because the law 
plan is ‘morally obnoxious’ as it cedes ‘total control of social planning to a malevolent dictator’ 
who ‘[privileges] the rights of certain subgroups of the community over others’ and has ‘no 
support from the population at large.’  Here is the question I want to ask: in this hypothetical, is 
there a compelling reason to adopt the morally obnoxious law plan in departure from the prior 
non-law plan?  The question is important because, if there is no compelling reason to adopt the 
morally obnoxious law plan in departure from the non-law plan, then adopting such law plan will 
contradict the instrumental rationality established by accepting the (prior) non-law plan.  And, if 
the adoption of the law plan is instrumentally irrational, then such adoption fails to provide 
instrumentally rational reasons for following the law plan.  
In response to this critique, Shapiro might say that, in the circumstances of legality, there is a 
compelling reason to switch from a non-law plan to a law plan because only a law plan can 
resolve the problems associated with the circumstances of legality: ‘Communities who face [the 
circumstances of legality], therefore, have compelling reasons to reduce these associated costs 
and risks. And in order to do so, they will need the sophisticated technologies of social planning 
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that only legal institutions provide.332  Notice what Shapiro is saying here: there are compelling 
reasons to switch, in the circumstances of legality, from a non-law plan to a law plan because a 
law plan is necessary to resolve the problems associated with the circumstances of legality.  But, 
just because a law plan is necessary to resolve the problems associated with the circumstances of 
legality, does not mean that a law plan is sufficient to resolve such problems.  Indeed, the fact 
(assuming it is a fact), that a law plan is necessary to resolve the problems associated with the 
circumstances of legality, is entirely consistent with a law plan exacerbating such problems by 
virtue of being ‘morally obnoxious’ because ceding ‘total control of social planning to a 
malevolent dictator’ who privileges ‘the rights of certain subgroups of the community over 
others’ and which has ‘no support from the population at large.’  The question therefore remains: 
if a (highly immoral) law plan-- although necessary to resolve the moral problems of the 
circumstances of legality-- actually exacerbated such problems, would there be a compelling 
reason to adopt such (immoral) law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan?  Looked at 
differently, is the mere capacity to resolve the problems of the circumstances of legality 
sufficient to generate a compelling reason to adopt a highly immoral law plan in departure from a 
non-law plan?  I think the answer is ‘no.’  I think, instead, that the existence of a compelling 
reason to adopt a law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan depends on the content of such 
law plan being moral enough to not exacerbate the moral problems associated with the 
circumstances of legality-- or, more precisely, to not exacerbate these problems to such an extent 
that the law plan does a significantly worse job, than does the prior non-law plan, of resolving 
such problems.  If a highly immoral law plan does a significantly worse job, than does a prior 
non-law plan, of resolving the problems of the circumstances of legality, then it is difficult to see 
how there can be a compelling reason to adopt the immoral law plan in departure from the prior 
non-law plan.  And, if there is no compelling reason to switch from the non-law plan to the 
immoral law plan, then-- from the perspective of the instrumental rationality of the prior non-law 
plan-- it is instrumentally irrational to adopt (and then follow) the immoral law plan.  The 
conclusion-- that it is irrational to adopt a highly immoral law plan that does a significantly 
worse job (than a prior non-law plan) of resolving the problems of the circumstances of legality-- 
is implicitly supported by Shapiro’s own words, when he says:  
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To say that the fundamental aim of the law is to 
compensate for the infirmities of custom, tradition, 
persuasion, consensus, and promise is not to suggest 
that the law never relies on these other mechanisms.  
When simpler methods of organizing behavior 
work, it would be irrational to abandon or overturn 
them in favor of accomplishing the very same ends 
through more sophisticated methods.333   
If, as Shapiro says, it would be irrational to abandon a non-law plan in favour of a law plan that 
accomplishes ‘the very same ends through more sophisticated methods,’ then it would 
presumably also be irrational to abandon a non-law plan in favour of a law plan that does a 
significantly worse job of resolving the problems associated with the circumstances of legality.   
If the above discussion is correct, then adopting a law plan is not necessarily instrumentally 
rational because there is not necessarily a compelling reason to adopt a law plan in departure 
from a prior non-law plan.  There is not necessarily a compelling reason because it is possible 
that the law plan is so immoral that it does a significantly worse job, than does the prior non-law 
plan, of resolving the moral problems associated with the circumstances of legality.  Indeed, just 
because a law plan, unlike a non-law plan, is capable of resolving the problems of the 
circumstances of legality, we cannot conclude that a law plan necessarily resolves such problems 
better-- it is, on the contrary, possible that a law plan does a worse job than does a non-law plan 
of resolving such problems.  This is possible because a highly immoral law plan could 
exacerbate the moral problems that arise in the circumstances of legality, while a non-law plan 
might simply not resolve such problems, without making them worse.  If there is no compelling 
reason to adopt a highly immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan, then, from the 
perspective of the instrumental rationality generated by (accepting) the non-law plan, adopting 
the immoral law plan is instrumentally irrational.  And, if the adoption of a law plan is 
instrumentally irrational, then such adoption does not provide instrumentally rational reasons for 
following the plan.  Whether there is a compelling reason to adopt a law plan in departure from a 
prior non-law plan depends on the moral content of the law plan.  Specifically, there can be a 
compelling reason only if the content of the law plan is moral enough to not exacerbate the moral 
problems (of the circumstances of legality) to such an extent that the law plan does a 
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significantly worse job, than a prior non-law plan, of resolving these problems.  In this way, a 
law plan’s provision of instrumentally rational reasons for conforming is content-dependent-- it 
depends on the content of the law plan being moral enough to be consistent with a compelling 
reason to adopt such law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.   
Shapiro seems to anticipate this critique: ‘While acceptance of a subordinate position within a 
hierarchy creates rational requirements of obedience, it may of course be the case that 
participants were irrational for acquiescing to the shared plan in the first place. Their superiors 
may be ignorant, unethical, or irresponsible. Nevertheless, there are often good reasons to 
defer.’334  This response, however, is inadequate as an answer to the critique presented.  This is 
so in several ways.  First, Shapiro is not here talking about the situation of transition from a non-
law plan to a law plan.  He is, rather, talking about the adoption of a shared plan that is irrational 
(perhaps because supervisors are ‘ignorant, unethical, or irresponsible’), but not irrational from 
the perspective of a prior non-law plan.  Second, Shapiro is talking about subordinate officials 
of a shared plan-- I am talking about the officials (i.e. planners) of a shared (law) plan.  Third, 
the fact (assuming it is a fact) that ‘there are often good reasons to defer’ is insufficient to 
establish a compelling reason to switch from a non-law plan to a highly immoral law plan that 
does a significantly worse job of resolving the problems associated with the circumstances of 
legality.  This is most obviously true given that, even if there are ‘often’ good reasons to defer, 
there might be no good reason to defer in the case of a highly immoral law plan.  Finally, even if 
these ‘good reasons’ obtain, each is insufficient to generate a compelling reason to adopt a highly 
immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  Here are the examples of ‘good 
reasons to defer’ (to a shared plan) that Shapiro provides:  
For example, others might know more than the 
subordinates do about what the group should do and 
can be trusted to point them in the right direction.  
As we have also seen, the complexity and 
contentiousness of shared activities increases not 
only the benefits of planning, but also its costs.  By 
vertically dividing labor between those who adopt 
plans and those who apply and carry them out, 
participants are able to resolve their doubts and 
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disagreements without having to engage in costly 
deliberations or negotiations.  It should also not be 
overlooked that individuals might accept a 
subordinate role in a shared activity because they 
have no other viable option.  They might 
desperately need the money or fear that they will be 
harmed if they do not.335  
So, these ‘good reasons to defer’ (to a shared plan) include:  
1) Others might know more than the subordinates do about what the group should do and 
can be trusted to point them in the right direction;  
2) Gaining the ability to resolve ‘doubts and disagreements without having to engage in 
costly deliberations or negotiations’;  
3) There is no other ‘viable option.’  
The first reason to defer to a shared plan does not apply in the case of a morally obnoxious law 
plan run by a malevolent dictator-- a malevolent dictator cannot be ‘trusted to point [the group] 
in the right direction.’  What about the second reason?  This second reason is insufficient to 
generate a compelling reason to switch from a non-law plan to a law plan that is morally 
obnoxious because gaining the ability to resolve ‘doubts and disagreements’ without ‘costly 
deliberations or negotiations’ is consistent with a morally obnoxious law plan exacerbating moral 
problems such that a non-law plan, simply by not exacerbating them, does a better job of 
‘resolving’ such problems (that is to say, the non-law plan does not resolve them at all, which is 
better than exacerbating them).  The third reason to defer to a shared plan (such as a law plan) is 
because there may be no other viable option.  This third reason to defer is inadequate, in two 
ways, to generate a compelling reason to adopt a morally obnoxious law plan in departure from a 
prior non-law plan.  First, the third reason to defer does not apply to the hypothetical in which 
there is a prior non-law plan, because sticking with the prior non-law plan is a viable option 
(albeit one that cannot resolve the moral problems associated with the circumstances of legality).  
Second, even if we assume there is no other viable option, we cannot without more conclude that 
there is a compelling reason to adopt a highly immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-
law plan.  To see the point, suppose that a community of planners is considering a switch from 
their non-law plan to a highly immoral law plan, and there is no other viable option (other than to 
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make the switch).  This scenario still leaves open the possibility that there is, in competition with 
the highly immoral law plan, a non-viable option.  If this is the case, then the existence of a 
compelling reason depends on whether (switching to) the highly immoral law plan is preferable 
to any non-viable option.  Is it necessarily preferable to plan for immorality than to partake in 
(for e.g.) nonsense?  I do not think so.  There are certain crimes (e.g. the holocaust) that could 
obtain only where there is a shared plan, and which could have been avoided (or at least reduced 
in magnitude) by incoherence, such as that involved in a non-viable option.  Because it is 
possible that we ought to avoid (or at least reduce in magnitude) such crimes, it is possible that 
the incoherence of a non-viable option is preferable to deferring to a highly immoral plan.       
Shapiro also says that ‘Even in cases of economic or physical coercion, once individuals form an 
intention to treat the superior’s directives as trumps to their own planning, they have transformed 
their normative situation and are rationally-- if not morally-- committed to follow through unless 
good reasons suddenly appear that force them to reconsider.’336  But this point does not facilitate 
a defence against the critique.  The issue at hand is whether there is necessarily a compelling 
reason to adopt a highly immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  From the 
above passage, we can see that economic or physical coercion does not preclude accepting a plan 
and thereby transforming one’s normative situation.  But, just because economic or physical 
coercion does not preclude instrumental rationality from being generated by accepting a shared 
plan, does not mean that economic or physical coercion is sufficient to generate a compelling 
reason to adopt a highly immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  In actuality, 
economic or physical coercion is insufficient to establish a compelling reason to adopt a highly 
immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan because the immorality of the law plan 
could outweigh the force generated by a given instance of economic or physical coercion.   
This critique, which implies that adopting a law plan does not necessarily provide reasons for 
conforming, is bolstered by comments made by Kevin Toh and Michael Bratman.  Toh notes that  
Judy could have a plan, not for something as 
anodyne as going to the zoo on Saturday, but for 
something horrible, like poisoning her children.  It 
would be odd, to say the least, to think that it 
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follows merely from the fact that Judy plans to 
poison her children that she thereby gains reasons to 
poison her children, or reasons to plan to poison her 
children.337    
Consider also the comments of Bratman, whose work underlies Shapiro’s planning theory of 
law.  First, in a move that could apply to our highly immoral law plan, described above, Bratman 
is open to ‘the possibility of a system of social structures characteristic of law that is horrendous 
in ways that block any normative support that may come from going some way to solving 
problems of the “circumstances of legality.”’338  Second, Bratman, like my critique above, 
suggests that perhaps merely adopting a law plan is insufficient to generate or induce reasons for 
following the plan.339  It is perhaps more accurate to say that law transmits-- rather than 
generates/induces-- normative reasons: ‘This suggests that one thing the planning theory of law 
does is provide a model of a kind of sociality that helps solve these characteristic problems and 
thereby transmits, in means-end fashion, the normative force of the general reasons we have to 
solve those problems to the specific legal actions mandated by the relevant planning 
structures.’340  While ‘The inner rationality of law is an essential aspect of what supports this 
transmission of reasons,’341 such transmission ‘also requires a background story of the reasons 
for law-- this is, so to speak, the major premise in the transmission.’342  These comments are 
consistent with the conclusion, implied by the critique presented, that adopting a law plan does 
not necessarily establish reasons for following the plan.   
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The second critique is that the planning theory is internally inconsistent because its explicit legal 
positivism is contradicted by its account of legal normativity.  The planning theory is an 
exclusive legal positivist theory because it affirms the sources thesis whereby legal validity 
necessarily depends on social facts, and cannot depend on moral considerations.  For Shapiro, 
‘the fundamental rules of a legal system constitute a shared plan,’ and ‘the proper way to 
ascertain the existence or content of a shared plan is through an examination of the relevant 
social facts [...] if we want to discover the existence or content of the fundamental rules of a legal 
system, we must look [...] only to what officials think, intend, claim and do around here.’343  We 
can see, from examining two points, how Shapiro’s explicit affirmation of legal positivism is 
contradicted by his account of legal normativity.  The first point is that the existence of 
fundamental legal rules depends on the norms of instrumental rationality.  The second point is 
that the norms of instrumental rationality, in the context of a law plan, depend on the content of 
such law plan being moral enough to be consistent with a compelling reason to adopt the law 
plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  Transitivity applies to these two points to establish 
the conclusion: the existence of fundamental legal rules depends on the content of a law plan 
being moral enough to be consistent with a compelling reason to adopt such law plan in 
departure from a prior non-law plan.  If the existence of fundamental legal rules depends on the 
content of a law plan being sufficiently moral, then legal validity depends on moral 
considerations-- contrary to Shapiro’s legal positivism.   
We can begin with the first point, which is that (for Shapiro) the existence of fundamental legal 
rules depends on the norms of instrumental rationality.  This point is established by looking at 
two passages from Shapiro (although the first passage is sufficient to establish the point).  Here 
is the first passage: ‘rational requirements of obedience necessarily attend the existence of any 
 
343 Shapiro (n 2) 177.  See also: ‘The crucial point here is that the determination by social facts is not 
some necessary, but otherwise unimportant, property of shared plans. Shared plans must be determined 
exclusively by social facts if they are to fulfill their function. As we have seen, shared plans are supposed 
to guide and coordinate behavior by resolving doubts and disagreements about how to act. If a plan with a 
particular content exists only when certain moral facts obtain, then it could not resolve doubts and 
disagreements about the right way of proceeding. For in order to apply it, the participants would have to 
engage in deliberation or bargaining that would recreate the problem that the plan aimed to solve. The 
logic of planning requires that plans be ascertainable by a method that does not resurrect the very 
questions that plans are designed to settle. Only social facts, not moral ones, can serve this function.’ 
(ibid.). 
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legal system.’344  And the second passage: ‘the Planning Theory is able to secure the existence of 
fundamental legal rules [...]  Legal officials have the power to adopt the shared plan that sets out 
these fundamental rules by virtue of the norms of instrumental rationality.’345  In light of the first 
passage, this second passage can be interpreted to mean: the existence of fundamental legal rules 
is secured by ‘the power to adopt the shared plan that sets out these fundamental rules,’ and this 
power depends on ‘the norms of instrumental rationality.’  Inferentially, the existence of 
fundamental legal rules depends on the norms of instrumental rationality.  
The second point is that the norms of instrumental rationality, in the context of a law plan, 
depend on the content of a law plan being moral enough to be consistent with a compelling 
reason to adopt such law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  This point was established 
in the discussion above, in which we saw that whether a law plan provides instrumentally 
rational reasons is content-dependent.  More exactly, we saw that adopting a law plan is not 
necessarily instrumentally rational because there is not necessarily a compelling reason to adopt 
a highly immoral law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  Whether there is a compelling 
reason depends on the moral content of the law plan-- if the content of the law plan means that 
the law plan is significantly worse (than a prior non-law plan) at resolving the moral problems 
associated with the circumstances of legality, then there is no compelling reason to make the 
switch.  We can on these grounds infer that (in the context of law plans) the norms of 
instrumental rationality depend on the content of a law plan being sufficiently moral.  
In review, the two points established above state: first, the existence of fundamental legal rules 
depends on the norms of instrumental rationality; and second, the norms of instrumental 
rationality (in the context of a law plan) depend on the content of a law plan being moral enough 
to be consistent with a compelling reason to adopt such law plan in departure from a prior non-
law plan.  Applying the transitive property to these points, we can conclude that (implicitly per 
the planning theory) the existence of fundamental legal rules depends on the content of a law 
plan being moral enough to be consistent with a compelling reason to adopt such law plan in 
departure from a prior non-law plan.  The problem for Shapiro is that, if the existence of 
fundamental legal rules depends on a law plan having a particular moral content, then-- contrary 
 
344 ibid. at 184.  
345 ibid. at 181.  
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to Shapiro’s legal positivism-- legal validity depends on moral facts.  It is in this way that 
Shapiro’s account of legal normativity (i.e. as being grounded in instrumental rationality) is 
inconsistent with his legal positivism.  
One counter-argument to this critique of Shapiro might assert it is an error to assume that a 
‘compelling reason,’ for adopting a law plan in departure from a prior non-law plan, is 
determined objectively.  This issue is noticed by Emily Sherwin: ‘Another preliminary issue is 
whether the existence of a compelling reason to defect from commitment is an objective question 
or a question to be answered from the perspective of the agent.’346  Sherwin believes ‘the best 
reading of Shapiro’s comments about exceptions to commitment is that agents are permitted to 
defect when they believe or reasonably believe that the reasons to defect strongly outweigh the 
reasons to obey (including the value of binding commitment).’347  However, Shapiro himself 
seems to determine compelling reasons objectively.  To this end, when he discusses the existence 
of a compelling reason (for adopting a law plan) in the circumstances of legality, Shapiro says: 
‘Communities who face [the circumstances of legality] [...] have compelling reasons’ to do that 
which ‘only legal institutions provide’348 or, in other words, communities in the circumstances of 
legality have compelling reasons to adopt a law plan.349  Notice, here, that the circumstances of 
legality are objective: they ‘obtain whenever a community has numerous and serious moral 
problems whose solutions are complex, contentious, or arbitrary’;350 and, in the circumstances of 
legality, ‘the benefits of planning will be great, but so will the costs and risks associated with 
nonlegal forms of ordering behavior.’351  If the determination of what counts as a ‘compelling 
 
346 Emily Sherwin, ‘Legality and Rationality: A Comment on Scott Shapiro’s Legality’ (2013) 19 Legal 
Theory 403, 415.  
347 ibid.    
348 Shapiro (n 2) 170 [italics are mine].  
349 This statement (‘communities in the circumstances of legality have compelling reasons to adopt a law 
plan’) is, of course, contradicted by my analysis above, which suggests that there are not necessarily 
compelling reasons (to adopt a law plan) in the circumstances of legality (given that it is possible that a 
law plan does a significantly worse job, than a non-law plan, of resolving the problems associated with 
the circumstances of legality). Nonetheless, the statement is useful to demonstrate that there is reason to 
believe Shapiro intends compelling reasons to be determined objectively.     
350 ibid. [italics are mine].  
351 ibid. [italics are mine].  
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reason’ was not objective, then the objective circumstances of legality would be insufficient to 
establish compelling reasons to adopt a law plan.  Given that, per Shapiro, the objective 
circumstances of legality are sufficient to establish compelling reasons to adopt a law plan, we 
can infer that the determination of compelling reasons involves an objective inquiry.    
In any event, even if we assume that the inquiry, determining what counts as a compelling 
reason, is subjective, the critique of Shapiro is untroubled.  In the hypothetical presented above, 
the highly immoral law plan under consideration is already in place in a neighbouring 
jurisdiction, and so the would-be adopters of this law plan subjectively believe (accurately, in 
this case) that it does a significantly worse job, than their non-law plan, of resolving the 
problems associated with the circumstances of legality.  If the planners subjectively believe the 
highly immoral law plan under consideration does a significantly worse job, than does the non-
law plan, of resolving the problems of the circumstances of legality, then-- even if compelling 
reasons are determined subjectively-- it is hard to see how there can be a compelling reason to 
adopt such immoral law plan in departure from the prior non-law plan.  Stated otherwise, even if 
compelling reasons are determined subjectively, we can think of circumstances (e.g. where the 
law plan is believed to be highly immoral) in which there is no compelling reason to adopt a law 
plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.   
The critique presented suggests that Shapiro’s planning theory of law is implicitly anti-positivist 
because implying that a law plan exists only if moral enough to be consistent with a compelling 
reason for adopting the plan in departure from a prior non-law plan.  If this is correct, then 
Shapiro’s planning theory is what Shapiro calls a natural law theory.  By ‘natural law,’ Shapiro 
means the position holding that ‘legal facts are ultimately determined by moral and social 
facts.’352  The problem with natural law theories, Shapiro tells us, is that they cannot answer the 
problem of evil: ‘Just as theologians have struggled to explain how evil is possible given the 
necessary goodness of God, the natural lawyer must account for the possibility of evil legal 
systems given that the law is necessarily grounded in moral facts.’353  Unfortunately for natural 
law theorists, ‘By insisting on grounding legal authority in moral authority or moral norms, 
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natural law theory rules out the possibility of evil legal systems.’354   
If the above analysis is correct and Shapiro’s planning theory is implicitly anti-positivist (or, as 
Shapiro says, a natural law theory), then we can ask whether the planning theory is subject to 
Shapiro’s own critique of natural law theories.  A related question is whether Shapiro’s critique 
of natural law theories, whether applicable to the planning theory or not, is sound.  If Shapiro’s 
critique is unsound, then it is inconsequential whether the planning theory is subject to it.  
Simmonds has argued that Shapiro’s critique is unsound because it discounts the possibility that 
evil legal systems are non-focal instances of law.  For Simmonds, ‘Shapiro is quite mistaken in 
his claim that natural law theories must deny the possibility of evil legal systems. They may with 
consistency say, as Finnis says, that evil systems are “non-focal” instances of law. But a “non-
focal” instance of law is still an instance of law.’355   
Shapiro does consider a ‘weak reading’ of the natural law thesis, whereby immoral laws are 
‘defective as laws,’356 but dismisses it for three reasons.  First, ‘the weak reading of the natural 
law thesis is consistent with the central tenet of legal positivism. A positivist can coherently 
maintain that the law is ultimately grounded in social facts alone but that immoral laws are 
defective as law.’357  By characterizing natural law as he has, Shapiro intends to ‘capture the 
traditional understanding that natural law theory is a rival to legal positivism.’358  Second, ‘the 
weak reading of the natural law thesis cannot explain why so many natural lawyers have claimed 
that unjust rules are not laws.’359  According to Shapiro, ‘natural lawyers accept this view 
because they hold that legal facts are ultimately determined by social and moral facts and, in the 
case of unjust rules, the right sort of moral facts are missing.’360  Third, while the weak reading 
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of natural law is not uninteresting, it is ‘not so interesting that the dispute over it should 
constitute the major debate in analytical jurisprudence.’361   
Simmonds argues that the first two of Shapiro’s reasons are unconvincing.  Shapiro’s first reason  
fails properly to acknowledge the ambiguity of the 
phrase ‘defective as laws.’ For we may reasonably 
ask whether the fact that a body of rules is 
‘defective as law’ weakens or qualifies the sense in 
which it is law. Is being ‘defective as law’ just the 
same as being law that is defective? Or is being 
‘defective as law’ a matter of being defective in 
respect of those very features that contribute to the 
status of a rule or institution a law, so that, although 
constituting law, the rule or institution is law only in 
a weaker or qualified sense?362  
In light of this ambiguity, ‘we realise that the “weak reading” of the natural law thesis fails to 
capture the difference between natural law theories and legal positivist theories only because it is 
ambiguous as between a natural law reading and a legal positivist reading.’363  Pursuant to 
Simmonds, ‘Once one has perceived the ambiguity of the phrase “defective as laws,” Shapiro’s 
second reason also collapses.’364  This collapse results because, ‘if one thinks of unjust laws as 
“defective as laws” and take that defectiveness to weaken or qualify the legal nature of the 
relevant rules, then one will surely not find it difficult to “explain” why grossly unjust 
enactments might be regarded by some theorists as not being law at all,’ i.e. because ‘a 
defectiveness that weakens or qualifies legal status may not unreasonably be regarded as 
negating such status at the extreme.’365  
The debate regarding the weak reading of the natural law thesis is, relative to my purposes, 
largely contextual because the planning theory inadequately accounts for evil legal systems 
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regardless of whether Shapiro’s critique of natural law theories is tempered by the weak reading 
of the natural law thesis.  More exactly, even if we adopt the weak reading of the natural law 
thesis, Shapiro’s theory inadequately accounts for evil legal systems because such theory cannot 
account for even non-focal instances of (certain) evil legal systems.  Keep in mind that a non-
focal instance of law is still an instance of law.  Thus, to account for a non-focal evil legal 
system, the planning theory must account for the existence of an evil legal system.  The problem 
is that, as argued above, the planning theory can account for only those law plans that are moral 
enough to be consistent with a compelling reason for adopting such plan in departure from a 
prior non-law plan.  Shapiro’s planning theory implies that an evil law plan can exist only if, at 
the time of its adoption in departure from a prior non-law plan, it was not significantly worse 
than the prior non-law plan at resolving the moral problems of the circumstances of legality.  
This is inadequate to account for all evil legal systems, however, because evil legal systems can 
arise even if, when they are adopted in departure from a prior non-law plan, they do a 
significantly worse job at resolving the problems of the circumstances of legality.  Resultantly, 
the planning theory cannot account for the existence of an evil legal system that-- whether a focal 
or non-focal instance of law-- is adopted in departure from a prior non-law plan that does a 












Chapter 4: The Acceptance Model of Legal Normativity 
 
This chapter argues that legality entails a particular conception-- captured by the acceptance 
model-- of legal normativity.  As I am using the term, legal normativity refers broadly to the 
relationship between legality and reasons for action.  
According to the acceptance model, there are at least two layers of legal normativity, which is 
largely about officials and subjects accepting that law provides them with choices with which to 
satisfy reasons.  First, a legal system, because satisfying Hartian requirements and exhibiting (to 
some extent) each of Fuller’s precepts of legality, necessarily provides (1) officials with choices 
entailed by their official roles, and (2) certain subjects with several choices that may be protected 
by a right to bodily integrity.  The provision by a legal system of these choices represents a 
prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  This is because, per Hart, a 
legal system exists only if its directives are conformed with to such an extent as to be efficacious.  
The prima facie reason to efficaciously conform, then, is to facilitate the existence of the legal 
system so that it can provide officials and subjects with the aforementioned choices.  Second, the 
prima facie reason for efficaciously conforming, manifested by the provision of these choices, is 
‘had’ by officials and certain subjects because this reason counts as such from the perspective of 
the practical reasoning of officials and certain subjects.  The key to this process is the adoption, 
by officials and subjects, of the implied point of view.   
Officials adopt the implied point of view when, in executing their official duties, they exercise 
for any reason their capacity to choose, and thereby treat as true the proposition that their official 
roles provide them with choices with which to satisfy reasons (i.e. whatever reasons they have 
for executing their duties).  Similarly, subjects adopt the implied point of view when, by 
conforming with legal directives (or by acting out any other choice provided by law),366 they 
exercise for any reason their capacity to choose, and thereby treat as true the proposition that the 
legal system provides choices with which to satisfy reasons (i.e. whatever reasons they have for 
conforming with legal directives, or for acting out a choice provided by law).  Because they treat 
as true the proposition that the legal system provides choices with which to satisfy reasons-- and 
 
366 Here is what I mean by ‘acting out’ a choice provided by law: if a legal system provides subjects with 
a choice of whether to [X], then to ‘act out’ this choice is to perform those actions (or inactions) that are 
treated by the legal system as manifesting [X]. 
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so is a means of satisfying reasons-- officials and subjects ought to treat as true the proposition 
that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  They ought to 
treat this proposition as true because, given the Hartian requirement of efficacy, such conformity 
is needed for a legal system to exist to provide officials and subjects with these choices and thus 
to be a means of satisfying reasons.  
This account of legal normativity is called the ‘acceptance’ model because adopting the implied 
point of view involves officials and certain subjects accepting the proposition that a legal system 
provides them with choices with which to satisfy reasons.  It is due to the technical meaning of 
‘acceptance’ that an official or subject, in virtue of making this acceptance, ought to treat as true 
the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  
In a nutshell, to accept a proposition in the technical sense is to treat it as true for some reason or, 
more exactly, to reason on the basis of the truth of a proposition.  If a proposition is accepted in 
the technical sense, then one ought to accept each proposition that is entailed by the proposition 
that is accepted.  This contrasts to Hart’s internal point of view, which one accepts in a non-
technical sense by endorsing a rule of recognition (i.e. criteria of legal validity) as a guide to 
conduct and standard of criticism.  
4.1 Preliminaries and Basic Elements of Law 
Does legality entail any particular form of legal normativity and, if so, what is the nature of this 
normativity?  These are among the questions addressed by the acceptance model.  The model can 
be understood as a neo-Fullerian project, but one that tries, hopefully with success, to avoid some 
of the deficiencies of Fuller’s ideas.  Unlike Fuller, I will not argue (or deny) that Fuller’s 
precepts of legality are inherently moral.  The argument is that, regardless of whether they are 
inherently moral, Fuller’s precepts-- properly fleshed-out and supplemented with Hartian 
requirements and the implied point of view-- are adequate to illuminate at least part of the 
relationship between legality and reasons for action.  By ‘properly fleshed-out,’ I refer to a 
conception of Fuller’s precepts involving a greater appreciation for the implications of adhering, 
to some extent, to each of these precepts in the context of a Hartian legal system.   
In the acceptance model, legal normativity is at least partly explained because officials and 
subjects ought to treat as true the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously 
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conform with legal directives.  The prima facie reason to efficaciously conform is to facilitate the 
existence of the legal system so that it can, by providing choices, be a means of satisfying 
reasons.  This explanation, if correct, (1) accounts for legal normativity without relying on moral 
considerations on which legal validity necessarily depends, and yet (2) does not deny that there 
could be moral considerations on which legal validity necessarily depends.  Because the 
acceptance model does not deny that legal validity necessarily depends on moral considerations, 
the model is consistent with anti-positivism (affirming that legal validity necessarily depends on 
moral considerations).  At the same time, the explanation presented is not itself anti-positivist; 
this is because it does not affirm that legal validity necessarily depends on moral considerations.  
So, while the acceptance model does not specify any moral considerations on which legal 
validity necessarily depends, the model does not deny that there could be moral considerations 
on which legal validity necessarily depends.  There could be such moral considerations because 
there could be other necessary elements of law, not specified by the acceptance model,367 that are 
inherently moral.    
I am affirming, then, that while it is possible that legal validity necessarily depends on moral 
considerations, we do not have to rely on moral considerations in order to explain the 
normativity of law.  Even if we assume that the provision, by a legal system, of choices to 
officials and subjects is not inherently moral, such provision is nonetheless a prima facie reason 
to efficaciously conform with legal directives because, due to the implied point of view, officials 
and subjects are committed by their own decisions-- premised on reasons which may or may not 
be moral-- to accepting a proposition that entails the proposition that there is such a prima facie 
reason.  
We can begin by examining (at least some of) the essential elements of a legal system, and how 
they are connected to each other.  According to the acceptance model, there are, in addition to 
Hart’s requirements, at least368 two essential elements of law.  For Hart, a legal system exists 
 
367 One reason I am calling it the ‘acceptance model of legal normativity’ rather than the ‘acceptance 
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our understanding of legal normativity.   
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only if there are sufficiently followed (i.e. efficacious) primary rules, and a rule of recognition 
accepted by officials from the internal point of view.369  I will argue that, in addition to these 
Hartian requirements, a legal system exists only if (1) it exhibits, to some extent, each of Fuller’s 
precepts of legality, and (2) officials and certain subjects take the implied point of view.  The 
first additional requirement is adopted directly from Fuller: ‘A total failure in any one of these 
eight directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not 
properly called a legal system at all, except perhaps in the Pickwickian sense in which a void 
contract can still be said to be one kind of contract.’370  Here are Fuller’s eight precepts of 
legality: there must be (1) general rules that are (2) promulgated, (3) not retroactive, (4) 
sufficiently clear, (5) non-contradictory, (6) possible to conform with, (7) not subject to constant 
change, and (8) there must be congruence between official action and declared rule (e.g. no 
sanctions unless there has been a violation of a rule).371  
With these basic elements in mind, we can now examine the fleshed-out conception of Fuller’s 
precepts, in the context of a Hartian legal system, that I have described.  The central idea is that a 
legal system, by satisfying Hartian requirements and exhibiting each of Fuller’s precepts to some 
extent, necessarily provides certain subjects with several choices that may be protected by a right 
to bodily integrity.   
4.2 The Choices Necessarily Provided by Any Legal System 
The proposal in this part is that a legal system satisfies Hartian requirements and fulfills, to some 
extent, each of Fuller’s precepts-- and thus exists as law-- only if it provides to certain subjects at 
least seven choices:372 (1) a choice of whether to conform with legal directives; (2) a choice of 
how to conform with legal directives; (3) a choice of whether to defend (i.e. plead not guilty) 
against sanctions; (4) a choice of whether to challenge the law in court; (5) a choice of whether 
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to alter, via property or contract, one’s rights; (6) a choice of whether to seek a legal remedy; and 
(7) a choice of whether to be governed by a legal system.  At least (the initial) six of these 
choices may be protected by a right to bodily integrity.  Because law’s existence is conditional 
on providing several choices, the law itself functions (as discussed below) as a sort of security 
interest for those subjects who must be granted these choices.  Given that there is no non-legal 
form of governance that is conditional on providing these choices, there is no non-legal form of 
governance that is normative in this way.    
To be clear, when I argue that law necessarily provides certain subjects with several choices, I 
am not adopting Simmonds’ argument that law necessarily exhibits, to some extent, liberty as 
independence (i.e. independence from the will of others).  These ideas-- liberty as independence 
and providing subjects with choices-- are distinct in the sense that providing subjects with 
choices does not entail liberty as independence.  The provision of choices to subjects is granted 
by law and thus depends on-- rather than being independent of-- the will of lawmakers.  
Therefore, the argument that law necessarily provides choices to subjects does not entail the 
argument that law necessarily exhibits liberty as independence.  The acceptance model is 
somewhat similar to Simmonds’ archetypal theory in that each attempts to explain the 
normativity of law by reference to a fleshed-out conception of negative liberty entailed by a 
commitment to Fuller’s precepts of legality.  There are at least two points of distinction between 
the acceptance model and the archetypal theory: (1) (as mentioned) the acceptance model does 
not imply that law necessarily exhibits liberty as independence; and (2) unlike the archetypal 
theory, the acceptance model does not adopt Simmonds’ idea of the depth of the ideal of 
legality.373  However, like the archetypal theory, the acceptance model does affirm that a legal 
system exists only if exhibiting, to some extent, each of Fuller’s precepts (which can be 
exhibited to varying degrees).   
First, I am not arguing that law necessarily exhibits liberty as independence because, as pointed 
out by Kramer, a legal system does not necessarily exhibit liberty as independence:  
under the rule of law or under any other mode of 
governance, the continuation of anyone’s 
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opportunities is always dependent on the wills of 
other people.  Most notably, the continued existence 
of the opportunities open to any person is dependent 
on the wills of legal-governmental officials, who if 
they are so inclined can act concertedly to remove 
any of those opportunities (if necessary, by slaying 
the person).374    
Kramer’s critique of Simmonds appears sound.  If the existence of a legal system depends on the 
will of lawmakers as described by Kramer, then such existence can ensure liberty as 
independence only if what subjects are independent of is lawmakers’ wills apart from their will 
regarding whether to continue to provide subjects with any opportunities at all.  But, if officials 
can choose to remove-- by killing a subject-- any opportunities provided by law, then it is hard to 
see how a subject is independent of the will of lawmakers in any meaningful sense.  
Second, I am not adopting Simmonds’ idea of the depth of the ideal of legality (although the 
acceptance model is open to the possibility that law is an archetypal concept) given that, if legal 
validity is determined by proximity to an archetype, then such archetype cannot manifest the 
depth of the ideal.  To understand this conclusion, it is helpful to review what Simmonds means 
by the ‘depth of the ideal.’  By this phrase, Simmonds means  
the possibility that our experience of the problems 
internal to the realization of the ideal will lead to an 
enriched grasp of what the ideal really amounts to, 
and how it should be understood.  Perhaps the 
possibility of revision is inherent in any statement 
of a guiding ideal, for we may always deepen our 
grasp of the ideal by reflecting upon the experience 
of its pursuit.375   
Notice that Simmonds’ idea of the depth of the ideal implies that the archetype of law is infinite: 
if the ‘possibility of revision is inherent in any statement’ of the archetype, such that ‘we may 
always deepen our grasp’ of it, then the nature of the archetype cannot be something that can 
ever be completely understood.  And, if the archetype can never be completely understood, then 
it must be infinite given that, if the archetype was finite, then it would be at least conceptually 
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possible to completely understand.  I will argue that law can be an archetypal concept only if the 
archetype of law is finite; but, if the archetype of law is finite, then Simmonds is wrong 
regarding the depth of the ideal of legality.  If this analysis is correct, then the archetype of law 
(assuming it obtains) does not manifest the depth of the ideal.  
To begin, consider that there are, regarding the archetype of law, only two possibilities:376 the 
archetype is either finite or infinite.  Where the archetype of law is infinite, we cannot use it to 
distinguish on the basis of proximity a legal system from a non-legal system, because any two 
purported legal systems will be equal proximity away from the archetype-- that is to say, each 
will be infinite proximity away from the infinite archetype.  Because each system will be infinite 
proximity away from the infinite archetype of law, we cannot conclude that one is more law-like 
than the other.  We know this is correct because infinity minus any finite value is still infinity; 
thus, the difference (or distance) between the infinite archetype of law and any finite system is 
infinite.  This analysis is significant because, if the archetype of law cannot distinguish a legal 
system from a non-legal system, then the archetype of law cannot conclusively determine the 
existence of a legal system.  Consequently, if the existence of a legal system is conclusively 
determined by an archetype, then such archetype is not infinite in nature.  We can on these 
grounds infer that law is an archetypal concept (i.e. the existence of law is determined by 
proximity to an archetype) only if the archetype of law is finite. 
Next, if the archetype of law is finite, then it does not manifest Simmonds’ idea of the depth of 
the ideal of legality.  We can reach this conclusion by looking at Simmonds’ comments on the 
difference between an archetype and a (Finnisian) focal or central case.  Simmonds suggests that 
an archetype differs from a central case in that central cases are ‘fully instantiated in experience, 
whereas archetypes are not.’377  This fact-- that ‘archetypes are not perfectly instantiated’-- is 
connected to the depth of the ideal.378  However, if the above discussion is correct and the 
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378 ibid. at 279. ‘Here my suggestion is that it is always possible for us to deepen our understanding of an 
ideal through the experience of pursuing it. Moral knowledge always in principle contemplates an entire 
way of life and is concerned with the conditions of human flourishing as a whole: such knowledge, 
therefore, is always in part a product of experience. Moreover, the very practices that at any one time 
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archetype of law is finite, then it must be conceptually possible for the archetype to be fully 
instantiated in experience.  And, if the archetype can be fully instantiated in experience, then (1) 
the archetype does not manifest the depth of the ideal, and (2) Simmonds’ argument 
distinguishing archetypes from central cases collapses.  Indeed, if the archetype can be fully 
instantiated in experience, then it is not ‘always possible for us to deepen our understanding of 
[the archetype] through the experience of pursuing it.’ 
But, one might ask, what if the archetype is finite enough to determine legal validity, but infinite 
enough that we can always deepen our understanding of it?  This question does not help 
Simmonds.  Suppose that the archetype of law is infinite enough that we can always deepen our 
understanding of it.  If we can always deepen our understanding of the archetype, then we can 
always gain new insights regarding what counts as a legal system.  This is because the archetype 
contains the essential elements of law.  The archetype contains the essential elements of law 
because the existence of law is determined by proximity to the archetype.  Sufficient proximity 
to the archetype being the determinant of legal validity makes sense only if the archetype 
contains (in their ideal form) the essential elements of law.  Resultantly, if the archetype of law is 
infinite enough that we can always deepen our understanding of it, then we can always gain new 
insights regarding what counts as a legal system.  However, if we can always gain new insights 
of what counts as a legal system, then any determination of legal validity is necessarily subject to 
revision (indeed, any revision of a determination of validity would also be subject to revision).   
This outcome creates a problem for this particular defence of Simmonds.  Where any 
determination of legal validity is necessarily subject to revision, the invocation of the status of 
law, as a justification for sanctions, is unintelligible-- how can something that is necessarily 
subject to revision justify (to the subject) the imposition of sanctions that could include a lengthy 
prison term or even the death penalty?  
As a result of these considerations, although the acceptance model asserts that law necessarily 
provides certain subjects with several choices, it does not argue that law necessarily exhibits 
 
partially embody the ideal (and which may in advance have seemed perfectly to realise the ideal) can 
open up forms of moral perception and understanding that enable us to grasp the extent to which the ideal 
outstrips its current embodiment. The idea of a central case seems to me rather different, and not to 
involve these complexities.’ (ibid.).    
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liberty as independence, nor that the archetype of law-- assuming it obtains-- manifests the depth 
of the ideal of legality.  Here are the choices that are necessarily provided by law, the initial six 
of which may be protected by a right to bodily integrity.   
A choice of whether to conform with legal directives  
We can begin the discussion of choices necessarily provided by law with Hart’s idea of efficacy 
(i.e. that a legal system exists only if its directives are sufficiently conformed with) and Fuller’s 
sixth precept of legality (i.e. that a legal system exists only if its directives are, to some extent, 
followable).  If a legal system exists only if its directives are, to some extent, followable and 
sufficiently conformed with, then law necessarily provides subjects with a choice of whether to 
conform with its directives.  If subjects cannot choose to conform with directives, then such 
conformity can only be involuntary and sporadic-- even if officials force subjects to conform 
involuntarily, it is hard to imagine such power not being confined to those instances in which 
officials are capable of exerting physical force upon subjects.  And, involuntary and sporadic 
conformity is likely insufficient to establish (or maintain) a legal system, which (by Hart’s 
requirements) exists only if its directives are sufficiently conformed with.   
Note that, when I say ‘to some extent’ (as in ‘a legal system exists only if its directives are, to 
some extent, followable’), I mean ‘in at least one case.’  A feature (e.g. directives being 
followable) occurring in (at least) one case may not seem significant; however, it is important to 
remember that I am talking about theoretical minimums-- the task is to identify elements that are 
essential for law’s bare conceptual existence.  Given the doctrine of precedent and the systematic 
nature of law, it is highly unlikely that a legal system will in practice exhibit only a single, 
isolated, case exhibiting the features identified.  In practice, if there is a single case affirming a 
given principle or exhibiting a certain feature, then there will likely be a line of cases resulting 
therefrom, which must cohere with the larger legal system.    
The fact that law necessarily provides subjects with a choice of whether to conform is sufficient 
to distinguish law from a gunman writ large.  When we picture the gunman in our minds, we 
might imagine him as saying, ‘your money or your life’ (or something of that nature); but, in 
reality, there is no reason why the gunman has to give his victim any choice at all-- he can, 
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rather, simply shoot (and then rob) his victim.379  We have, then, identified one way in which law 
necessarily respects, to some extent, subjects’ capacity to choose the ends to which their means 
will be put: law-- unlike a state of lawlessness-- necessarily provides subjects with a choice of 
whether to conform with its directives. 
The choice of whether to conform with legal directives is, more exactly, a choice of whether to 
perform those acts (or non-acts) which will be treated by the legal system as conforming with 
directives.     
A choice of how to conform with legal directives 
Simmonds has argued that law necessarily provides subjects with choices regarding how to 
conform with legal directives: 
Simply in consisting of followable rules, the law 
must recognize certain areas of (non-obligatory) 
conduct, however narrowly circumscribed those 
areas may be: for the law’s demands cannot be 
limitless while also being possible to comply with.  
Even if my daily round is entirely absorbed by the 
performance of legal duties, I must enjoy certain 
options about how I perform those duties (e.g. 
should I wear a hat whilst doing so?) if the duties 
are to be performable at all.380  
Simmonds’ suggestion, that law necessarily provides subjects with choices of how to conform 
with legal directives, is supported by the Hartian fact that a legal system exists only if its 
directives are efficaciously conformed with: to deprive subjects of all choices regarding how to 
conform, legal directives would have to be specified with such extensive detail that it would not 
be possible for subjects to efficaciously conform with them.  Where (for instance) subjects have 
a legal obligation to appear in court, the law cannot-- without becoming generally unfollowable-- 
specify when subjects will eat what for breakfast, how many steps they are to walk to their cars, 
which route to drive to the courthouse etc.  Given that law exists only if its directives are 
efficaciously conformed with, subjects must have choices as to how to conform with legal 
 
379 Notice, however, that this is a limited distinction, because it is possible that a gunman requires the 
cooperation, with his directives, of his victims in order to achieve his criminal purposes. 
 
380 Simmonds (n 14) 104. 
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directives.  These choices are choices regarding which acts (or non-acts)-- from among those 
constituting conformity with directives-- to perform. 
A choice of whether to defend (i.e. plead not guilty) against sanctions  
There is a third choice that law necessarily provides: legal subjects necessarily have, to some 
extent, a choice of whether to defend (i.e. plead not guilty) against sanctions.  This is a choice of 
whether to perform those acts (or non-acts) which will be treated by a legal system as a plea of 
not guilty.   
According to Fuller, a legal system exists only if its sanctions are, to some extent, imposed only 
following non-conformity with directives.  This is due to the precept that there must be, to some 
extent, congruence between official action and declared rule.  Now, consider that a subject can 
be charged and prosecuted even if innocent, i.e. even if he has not violated a legal directive.  We 
know this is true because sometimes subjects who are prosecuted are (correctly) found not liable 
(in virtue of not violating a legal directive).  However, if subjects have no opportunity to plead 
not guilty (i.e. if the court deems them to have pled guilty in any event), then being prosecuted is 
the same as being liable.  In these circumstances, being prosecuted is the same as being liable 
because, if a (deemed) guilty plea is the only available option, then liability necessarily follows 
prosecution.  And, if liability necessarily follows prosecution, then liability is imposed without 
having to show that the subject failed to conform with a legal directive (given that it is not 
necessary, for a guilty plea to be registered, for the prosecution to prove a directive has been 
violated).   
In this way, if subjects have no opportunity to plead not guilty, then sanctions do not depend, to 
any extent, on non-conformity with directives, given that liability (and thus sanction) results 
from prosecution regardless of whether a subject has failed to conform.  If the imposition of 
sanctions does not depend, to any extent, on subjects’ non-conformity with directives, then 
sanctions are not necessarily imposed, to any extent, only on subjects who have failed to 
conform.  In the end, if (as Fuller says) a legal system exists only if its sanctions are, to some 
extent, imposed only on subjects who have failed to conform, then subjects must have some 
opportunity to plead not guilty-- if subjects never have any opportunity to plead not guilty, then 
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the legal system’s sanctions will be imposed regardless of whether there has been non-
conformity with directives.  
A choice of whether to challenge the law in court 
A plea of not-guilty can be supported in at least three ways.  First, a subject can argue that he did 
not violate the directive he is accused of violating.  Second, a subject can argue that, although he 
violated the directive he is accused of violating, he has an applicable defence.  Third, a subject 
can argue that, although he violated the directive he is accused of violating, the directive in 
question is not a legal directive (i.e. does not have the status of law).  This third option represents 
a challenge to legal validity.    
For a legal system to exist, it must be possible for subjects to challenge the validity of a law in 
court.  A similar idea was presented by Fuller: ‘the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication 
lies in the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation in the decision, 
that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a decision in his favor.’381  In Kristen 
Rundle’s description, ‘The central thesis of “Forms and Limits” is that adjudication can be 
distinguished from other forms of ordering by the particular mode of participation that it confers 
upon the parties to an adjudicated dispute and decision.’382  In Fuller’s view, adjudication is ‘a 
device which gives formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in 
human affairs. As such it assumes a burden of rationality not borne by any other form of social 
ordering.’383  Accordingly, ‘If, as in adjudication, the only mode of participation consists in the 
opportunity to present proofs and arguments, the purpose of this participation is frustrated, and 
the whole proceeding becomes a farce, should the decision that emerges make no pretense 
whatever to rationality.’384  In Fuller’s ‘Forms and Limits’ the conversation is convened in ‘the 
language of having a chance to put your case, of arguing for a decision in your favour, of 
 
381 Lon Fuller and Kenneth Winston, ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978) Harvard Law 
Review 353, 364.   
 
382 Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate (Hart Publishing 2012) 40.   
 
383 Fuller and Winston (n 381) 366.   
 
384 ibid. at 367. 
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participating in a process with a view to your own ends and, within this, being treated as an end 
in yourself, yet all the while necessarily respecting another’s entitlement to do the same.’385  
Why must subjects be granted, in at least one case, a choice of whether to challenge the validity 
of laws?  To see why, keep in mind that the rule of recognition-- essential for a legal system to 
exist-- is a duty-imposing rule (it imposes a duty on officials to apply the law as determined by 
the rule of recognition).  In Stephen Perry’s words, ‘The normative character of the rule of 
recognition, like all Hartian social rules, is duty- or obligation-imposing.  More particularly, it 
imposes a duty on officials to apply other rules which can, in accordance with criteria set out by 
the rule of recognition, be identified as valid law.’386  Importantly, however, the rule of 
recognition will not be a duty-imposing rule-- and thus will not exist-- if the ‘duty’ it imposes on 
officials ultimately depends on the discretion of officials themselves.  The idea behind this 
conclusion is that a ‘duty’ that can be discarded at the discretion of the person it is imposed on is 
no duty at all.   
Keeping these points in mind, imagine now that a legal system provides subjects with no 
opportunity whatsoever to challenge the validity of its laws.  If subjects have no opportunity to 
challenge the law, then subjects cannot argue in court that a given law is legally invalid due to 
not satisfying the criteria of the rule of recognition.  If subjects cannot argue that laws are legally 
invalid because failing to satisfy the rule of recognition, then challenges to legal validity, on the 
basis of non-fulfillment of the rule of recognition, can come only from officials at their 
discretion.   
Why ‘at their discretion’?  Why can there not be a rule S specifying when officials must 
challenge a law for failing to satisfy the rule of recognition?  Suppose there is such a rule S.  
Here, if subjects have no opportunity whatsoever to challenge the legal validity of rules, then 
officials have discretion to create and abide by rule T, which says that rule S is without force.  
Officials have discretion to create rule T because, given that subjects cannot challenge the 
validity of rule T, it is only officials who can choose whether to challenge the validity of rule T.  
 
385 Rundle (n 382) 42.   
 
386 Stephen Perry, ‘Hart on Social Rules and the Foundations of Law: Liberating the Internal Point of 
View’ (2006-2007) 75 Fordham Law Review 1171, 1172.   
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Because officials can always choose to not challenge the validity of rule T, they can continue to 
abide by rule T at their discretion.  Because officials have discretion to conform with rule T, they 
have discretion to not conform with rule S (as prescribed by rule T).  But, one might ask, what if 
the rule of recognition itself, as part of the duty it imposes, obligates officials to challenge the 
validity of those rules which they reasonably suspect do not satisfy the rule of recognition?  In 
other words, what if the rule of recognition affirms, ‘apply only those rules which satisfy the rule 
of recognition’?387  Here, the situation is the same.  It does not matter where the duty to 
challenge the validity of rules comes from (e.g. whether from rule S or the rule of recognition): 
as long as subjects cannot challenge the validity of laws, subjects cannot argue that officials have 
failed in their duty to challenge the validity of rules they suspect do not satisfy the rule of 
recognition.  These arguments, resultantly, can come only from officials at their discretion. 
To this analysis, one might respond by pointing out that legal systems often exhibit separation of 
powers, which could limit official discretion regarding whether to challenge the validity of laws.  
However, the separation of powers is only a contingent feature of law.  Further, even if a legal 
system exhibits separation of powers, such separation can only constrain officials’ discretion-- it 
does not prevent officials from exercising it to avoid their duties.  Even if there is separation of 
powers, it is still ultimately up to the discretion of officials-- albeit multiple factions of them-- to 
determine whether to challenge the validity of laws (assuming that subjects are unable to 
challenge them).   
Most significantly, where subjects cannot challenge legal validity, rules establishing the 
separation of powers are themselves subject to the discretion of officials, who can choose to 
issue directives altering or circumventing these rules.  Indeed, just because a legal system has 
rules establishing separation of powers, we cannot conclude that an official's ability to alter or 
circumvent these rules (i.e. by creating new laws) is itself subject to a separation of powers.  The 
only way in which this counter-argument could be effective is if there is a rule (e.g. rule A or 
rule B) establishing that a separation of powers applies to any official who attempts to alter or 
circumvent rule A, which establishes a separation of powers.  However, there is no reason why 
 
387 This is how Raz interprets the rule of recognition: ‘The rule of recognition imposes an obligation on 
the law-applying officials to recognize and apply all and only those laws satisfying certain criteria of 
validity spelt out in the rule’ (Raz (n 10) 93).  
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any rule A or B, stating that a separation of powers applies to any official attempting to alter or 
circumvent rule A, is not itself subject to alteration or circumvention by an official acting in his 
discretion.  There must, as a result, be a rule (e.g. rule A or B or C) stating that a separation of 
powers prevents an official from using his discretion to alter or circumvent rule A or B.  And so 
on.  The separation of powers criticism could work, therefore, only if there is an infinite regress 
of separation of powers which is never subject to an official acting pursuant to his own 
discretion.  But such an infinite regress does not obtain.   
To see why, suppose there is an (apparent) infinite regress of separation of powers such that, for 
each separation of powers, there is a rule stating that the rules establishing the separation of 
powers are themselves subject to separation of powers, such that they cannot be altered or 
circumvented by an official acting in his discretion.  This apparent infinite regress of separation 
of powers is not a true infinite regress because it is actually subject to whether an official 
chooses to exercise his discretion: (where subjects cannot challenge legal validity) if an official, 
acting in his discretion, creates a new rule that invalidates each rule establishing a separation of 
powers, and such invalidation is retroactively applied to before the creation of the new rule, then 
such official is legally unconstrained (by the separation of powers) and free to use his discretion 
to create the new rule and thereby alter or circumvent the rules establishing the separation of 
powers. 
In the outcome, if challenges to legal validity, on the basis of non-fulfillment of the rule of 
recognition, cannot come from subjects, then officials have discretion as to whether their 
lawmaking is constrained by a rule of recognition.  And, if officials have discretion as to whether 
their lawmaking is constrained by a rule of recognition, then such ‘rule of recognition’ is not 
duty-imposing: this ‘rule of recognition’ does not impose a duty on officials because the only 
‘duty’ it can impose on officials (i.e. to apply the legally valid law) is one that, being conditional 
on the discretion of officials, is no duty at all.  Given that any true rule of recognition is duty-
imposing, we can on the above grounds infer that a purported legal system, providing subjects 
with no opportunity to challenge the validity of its directives, is not underpinned by a (duty-
imposing) rule of recognition and thus does not exist as a true legal system.  Ultimately, then, a 
legal system exists only if it provides, to some extent, subjects with a choice of whether to 
perform those acts that will be treated by the system as a source of information that is considered 
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(by courts) in determining whether a directive is legally valid in virtue of satisfying the rule of 
recognition (or the chain of validity issuing therefrom).    
This discussion shows that, in any legal system, subjects must have some opportunity to 
challenge legal validity in court on the ground that a purported law does not actually fulfill the 
criteria of a rule of recognition (or the chain of validity emanating therefrom).  This opportunity 
is more significant than may appear at first because it provides considerable leeway to the 
subject: because the subject must have some opportunity to argue that a purported law is invalid 
due to non-fulfillment of the rule of recognition, the nature and identity of the rule of recognition 
(and the chain of validity issuing therefrom) is a live issue.  It is therefore open to the subject to 
make arguments about what the rule of recognition actually is.  This, then, is another choice a 
legal system necessarily grants to certain subjects-- a choice of how to interpret the system’s rule 
of recognition (and the chain of validity issuing therefrom to the particular directive that has 
allegedly been violated).  Furthermore, because the subject can make arguments about what the 
rule of recognition actually is, he has an opportunity to influence the nature of the legal system 
that governs him by influencing how its rule of recognition is interpreted.  This is one way in 
which the legal subject can participate, to some extent, in his own governance.   
We have identified at least four choices that a legal system necessarily provides to some of its 
subjects.  These choices may need to be protected by a right to bodily integrity.  There are two 
relevant scenarios.  First, the subjects of a legal system could be so peaceful that, if their system 
did not provide a right to bodily integrity, they would not interfere with each other exercising the 
choices that must be provided by law.  In these circumstances, the legal system can exist-- in 
virtue of providing the choices388 that must be provided-- without providing a right to bodily 
integrity protecting these choices.  Here, the choices are exercisable-- and thus can be provided 
by law-- even absent a right to bodily integrity.  Second, the subjects of a legal system could be 
not so peaceful that, if their system did not provide a right to bodily integrity, they would not 
interfere with each other exercising the choices provided by law.  It is (only) in the second 
scenario that a legal system exists only if providing to subjects a right to bodily integrity 
protecting these choices.  In sum, I am not arguing that the right to bodily integrity is a necessary 
 
388 The assumption here is that choices are provided by law only if they are exercisable. 
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element of law; the acceptance model does not make this claim because it is possible that 
subjects are so peaceful that-- even absent a right to bodily integrity-- law can provide them with 
the choices it must provide in order to be law.  Given that the right to bodily integrity may be a 
non-essential feature of law,389 the acceptance model does not rely on it to account for legal 
normativity.  The right to bodily integrity is nonetheless a significant part of the acceptance 
model because, I will argue, the right to bodily integrity coupled with the implied point of view 
is sufficient (although unnecessary) to establish legal normativity.  
The right to bodily integrity that may be provided by law protects subjects against interference 
precluding them from choosing certain acts (or non-acts) (e.g. challenging the law in court) that 
their bodies will be used to perform.  For example, where subjects have a choice of whether to 
conform with legal directives, the right to bodily integrity can protect this choice by protecting 
subjects from interferences that would preclude them from freely performing those acts (or non-
acts) which are treated by a legal system as conforming with its directives.   
There is significant overlap between the right to bodily integrity, on the one hand, and Kant’s 
innate right to freedom (as described by Arthur Ripstein), on the other hand.  Describing Kantian 
freedom, Ripstein says: ‘In the first instance, your capacity to set your own purposes just is your 
own person: your ability to conceive of ends, and whatever bodily abilities you have with which 
to pursue them.  You are independent if you are the one who decides which purposes you will 
pursue.’390  Kant’s claim is that ‘you are independent if your body is subject to your choice rather 
than anyone else’s, so that you, alone or in voluntary cooperation with others, are entitled to 
 
389 Of course, it is possible that the right to bodily integrity is an essential feature of law (even if the 
acceptance model does not rely on this being the case).  Hart seems to take this view: ‘The common 
requirements of law and morality consist for the most part not of active services to be rendered but of 
forbearances, which are usually formulated in negative form as prohibitions.  Of these the most important 
for social life are those that restrict the use of violence in killing or inflicting bodily harm.  The basic 
character of such rules may be brought out in a question: If there were not these rules what point could 
there be for beings such as ourselves in having rules of any other kind?  The force of this rhetorical 
question rests on the fact that men are both occasionally prone to, and normally vulnerable to, bodily 
attack.’ (Hart (n 84) 194).  Hart’s rhetorical question suggests that, without a right to bodily integrity, law 
would be pointless.  Inferentially, to the extent that law has a point (whether a modest Hartian point of 
guiding conduct, a more robust Finnisian point of practical reasonableness and flourishing, or a point of 
providing choices), it must provide a right to bodily integrity. 
 
390 Ripstein (n 59) 14.   
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decide what purposes you will pursue.’391  These points apply not only to Kant’s innate right to 
freedom, but also to the right to bodily integrity that is being proposed.   
This rationale for the right to bodily integrity (i.e. as a way of ensuring law provides the choices 
it must provide to be law) means that it does not matter what form (e.g. claim right against the 
state vs a private right etc.) the right takes.  What matters is that subjects’ bodies are protected 
from interference in such a way that subjects can exercise the choices that must be provided by 
law.  Whatever form of right fulfils this role can be considered a ‘right to bodily integrity.’  
 A choice of whether to alter, via property or contract, one’s rights 
For Hart, any legal system necessarily contains a minimum content of natural law, which (among 
other things) allows subjects to vary their rights by way of property392 and contract.393  In 
response to Hart, Raz is quick to point out that, just because a legal system facilitates property 
and contract, does not mean that such system has moral value.394  A similar sentiment is 
described by James Allan: ‘Hart’s minima were any rules that allowed people to live in groups. 
 
391 ibid.  
 
392 ‘It is a merely contingent fact that human beings need food, clothes, and shelter; that these do not exist 
at hand in limitless abundance; but are scarce, have to be grown or won from nature, or have to be 
constructed by human toil.  These facts alone make indispensable some minimal form of the institution of 
property (though not necessarily individual property), and the distinctive kind of rule which requires 
respect for it.’ (Hart (n 84) 196).  
 
393 ‘But the division of labour, which all but the smallest groups must develop to obtain adequate 
supplies, brings with it the need for rules which are dynamic in the sense that they enable individuals to 
create obligations and to vary their incidence.  Among these are rules enabling men to transfer, exchange, 
or sell their products; for these transactions involve the capacity to alter the incidence of those initial 
rights and obligations which define the simplest form of property.  The same inescapable division of 
labour, and perennial need for co-operation, are also factors which make other forms of dynamic or 
obligation-creating rule necessary in social life.  These secure the recognition of promises as a source of 
obligation.’ (ibid. at 196-197).  
 
394 Raz (n 3) 169: ‘H.L.A. Hart, who did more than anyone to clarify the nature and status of the claim 
that there are common elements to the content of all legal systems, regards these arguments as explaining 
whatever truth there is in the natural law approach.  This may be true.  But if it is, more will have to be 
established than that there must be in every legal system some laws regulating the use of force, property, 
voluntary obligations or sex.  One would have to show that these areas of conduct have to be regulated in 
a morally good way.  Cannot the use of force or the institution of property be regulated in a morally 
obnoxious way?  Can it not be regulated to support oppressive slavery, for example?’ 
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Such living did not have to be of a kind ensuring individual justice. It could be awful living. It 
could be of a sort experienced by blacks in Apartheid South Africa, by slaves in ancient Rome, 
by untouchables in India, by women in large parts of the world today.’395  However, I am not 
arguing that law is necessarily moral because it exhibits Hart’s minimum content of natural law.  
Rather, the argument is that, because a legal system exhibits Hart’s minimum content of natural 
law, subjects are provided with choices-- that may be protected by a right to bodily integrity-- 
regarding whether to alter (via property or contract) their rights.  More specifically, the law must 
provide, to some extent, subjects with choices regarding whether to perform those acts that will 
be treated by the legal system as altering, via property or contract, subjects’ rights.  
Of course, this argument works only if Hart’s minimum content of natural law is entailed by a 
legal system’s existence.  Richard Epstein holds this view: ‘In the end, I think that the full 
picture leads to this conclusion, Hart adopted the phrase “minimum content of natural law” to 
show the bare minimums that any legal system has to have in order to survive.’396  However, 
Allan emphasizes that Hart’s minimum content of natural law depends on contingent facts:397  
Hart simply offers a very Humean set of assertions, 
all of them made as empirical generalisations (not 
as a priori truths), about limited altruism, 
vulnerability, approximate equality and limited 
resources. All of Hart’s assertions are open to 
potential challenge. For instance, one need not 
accept that humans are such that their fellow 
feeling, their love of others, is limited [...] The same 
goes for the claim about limited resources, 
approximate equality and all the others. They are all 
open to empirical challenge.398   
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Indeed, ‘If you accept that picture of the world as an accurate empirical generalisation, and only 
if you accept that picture, then given that we are focused only on those who wish to survive and 
that requires group living (a further contestable claim), it follows that we need rules against 
violence, theft and deception.’399   
Allan’s words could be interpreted as implying that, due to the contingency described, a legal 
system does not necessarily exhibit the minimum content of natural law.  Yet, even if the 
minimum content of natural law depends on contingent facts, we cannot without more conclude 
that the minimum content is not entailed by law, given that it is possible that law depends on the 
same contingent facts that the minimum content depends on.  And, it is plausible that the 
contingent facts, regarding our nature and limited resources, that are entailed by the minimum 
content of natural law are also entailed by a legal system.  Would a society of beings whose 
needs are (somehow) entirely satisfied have a legal system?  What use is coordination (such as 
that provided by law) to a group of beings who want for nothing that could be produced thereby?  
And, if such beings have no use for their (purported) legal system, then would they generally 
conform with its directives in facilitating its existence?  Perhaps not-- why bother?  This 
argument assumes that these hypothetical beings are rational; however, such rationality is 
implicit in the hypothetical-- if a group of beings (somehow) want for nothing that could be 
produced by law, then they do not want for legal reason or knowledge, and must therefore be 
highly rational.          
A choice of whether to seek a legal remedy 
I have argued that a legal system exists only if it provides several choices, each of which may be 
protected by a right to bodily integrity.  Where at least one subject has a right to bodily integrity, 
such subject must have a choice of whether to seek a remedy for violations of his right.  This is 
because a subject has a choice of whether to bring to the attention of the legal system (e.g. via a 
lawsuit) any violation of his right.  The assumption is that, if a subject is precluded from bringing 
a violation of his right to the attention of the legal system, then he does not truly have a legal 
right.   
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Interestingly, then, the right to bodily integrity generates its own expansion: where at least one 
subject has a right to bodily integrity, at least one subject has a choice-- of whether to seek a 
legal remedy for violations of his right-- that may be protected by the right to bodily integrity.   
A choice of whether to be governed by a given legal system  
Because law exists only if efficacious, it is always theoretically possible for subjects to eliminate 
(although perhaps only at great cost) a legal system by choosing non-conformity en masse.  A 
legal system’s subjects, as a whole, therefore necessarily have a choice of whether to be subjects 
of their legal system.  Here, the choice is: (1) efficaciously conform with legal directives and be 
governed by a (possibly awful) legal system, or (2) do not efficaciously conform with legal 
directives (and bear any resulting costs) and cease being governed by a particular legal system.  
At least (the initial) six of these seven choices may be protected by a right to bodily integrity.  
The right to bodily integrity may seem quite thin, protecting as it does only against interference 
precluding a subject from exercising any of the six choices.400  At the same time, the right to 
bodily integrity does represent a right to life-- to protect subjects’ capacity to choose, the right to 
bodily integrity must protect subjects’ lives, given that subjects are capable of choosing only if 
alive.  This, of course, does not protect against interference not resulting in an incapacity to 
choose, but it does provide a measure of protection that is objectively valuable.   
4.3 The Implied Point of View 
The acceptance model includes the implied point of view as part of its layered understanding of 
legal normativity.  The acceptance model implies both (1) that the implied point of view, coupled 
with the necessary provision of several choices to officials and certain subjects, is sufficient to 
establish that officials and certain subjects ought to treat as true the proposition that there is a 
prima facie reason to efficaciously conform, and (2) that the necessary provision, by a legal 
system, of several choices to officials and certain subjects is sufficient to establish a prima facie 
reason for officials and certain subjects to efficaciously conform with the directives of that legal 
system.    
 
400 This thinness is arguably necessary, given that legal normativity must be exhibited by even highly 
immoral legal systems.  
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The implied point of view specifies how officials and subjects ‘have’ the reasons, provided by 
law, for efficaciously conforming with legal directives.  More exactly, the implied point of view 
explains how-- from the perspective of an official’s or subject’s own practical reasoning-- an 
official or subject ought to treat as true the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to 
efficaciously conform with legal directives.  An official or subject adopts the implied point of 
view when, in executing his role as official or by acting out a choice provided by law, he 
exercises for any reason his capacity to choose.  By exercising for any reason his capacity to 
choose in execution of his role or by making a choice provided by law, an official or subject 
treats as true the proposition that the legal system provides him with choices with which to 
satisfy reasons.  As a result, officials and certain subjects ought to treat as true the proposition 
that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  The prima facie 
reason to efficaciously conform is to facilitate the legal system, which exists only if efficacious, 
so that it can (1) provide officials with choices entailed by their official roles, and (2) provide 
subjects with several choices (identified above) that may be protected by a right to bodily 
integrity.    
But, readers might ask, why is the implied point of view helpful in explaining legal normativity?  
Why is Hart’s theory, and the internal point of view, insufficient?  I will discuss several critiques 
of Hart and the internal point of view, some (e.g. Simmonds’) more successful than others.401  
Hart’s most famous critic is probably (still) Dworkin.  Dworkin’s strongest critique of Hart, as 
identified by Shapiro, comes in the form of the theoretical disagreement argument.  Dworkin’s 
objection ‘attempts to show that legal positivists are unable to account for a certain type of 
disagreements that legal participants frequently have, namely, those that concern the proper 
method for interpreting the law.’402  The ‘only plausible explanation’ for the possibility of such 
disagreements is that ‘they are moral disputes,’403 which indicates that ‘law does not rest on 
 
401 The scholarship responding to Hart’s theory represents an enormous literature.  The discussion that 
follows is not intended to be a comprehensive treatment or summary of that literature.  Rather, the 
purpose of the discussion is more modest-- to establish the point that there are legitimate concerns 
regarding the adequacy of Hart’s account of legal normativity.  Note that, even if Hart’s theory is sound, 
the acceptance model can still be seen as a helpful supplement.  
   
402 Scott Shapiro, ‘The Hart-Dworkin Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed’ (2007) University of 
Michigan Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series 77, 26-27.  
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social facts alone but is ultimately grounded in considerations of political morality as well as 
institutional legitimacy.’404   
To make his critique, Dworkin distinguishes between ‘propositions of law’ and ‘grounds of 
law.’405  A proposition of law may be true or false, and is a statement about the content of the 
law in a particular legal system.  Whether a proposition of law is true or not depends on the 
grounds of law.  The grounds of law are thus propositions in virtue of which propositions about 
law are true and false.406  Regarding Hart’s theory, the grounds of law would include the rule of 
recognition.407  Dworkin argues that two types of legal disagreements are possible.408  First, an 
empirical disagreement is about whether the grounds of law have obtained as a matter of fact.  
Second, a theoretical disagreement is not about whether the grounds of law obtain, but rather 
involves conflicting claims about what the grounds of law are.  The problem, argues Dworkin, is 
that the ‘plain-fact’ view of law cannot account for theoretical disagreements.   
Plain fact theories affirm that the existence and content of jurisdiction-specific law depend on 
empirical facts (e.g. about the history of a statute).409  The plain-fact view, for Dworkin, consists 
of two claims: (1) that the grounds of law are determined by consensus among officials; and (2) 
the only types of facts that may be grounds of law are those of plain historical fact.410  
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For if, according to its first tenet, legal participants 
must always agree on the grounds of law, then it 
follows that they cannot disagree about the grounds 
of law. Any genuine disagreement about the law 
must involve conflicting claims about the existence 
or nonexistence of plain historical facts. They must, 
in other words, be purely empirical 
disagreements.412  
 
Dworkin’s critique attempts to ‘capitalize on the alleged fact that judges often disagree with one 
another about what the grounds of law are.’413  To the extent that Hart is committed to the plain-
fact view of law,414 he cannot explain theoretical disagreements because the plain-fact view 
holds that the grounds of law are fixed by agreement.415  The relevant question asks: how can 
Hart account for ‘disagreements about the legal bindingness of certain facts whose bindingness, 
by hypothesis, requires the existence of agreement on their bindingness?’416   
In response to Dworkin’s theoretical disagreement critique, Hart denies that his theory is a 
‘plain-fact’ view of law,417 and (following Coleman) treats disagreements about the grounds of 
law as disagreements concerning the application-- and not the content-- of the rule of 
recognition.418  In such a dispute, there can be ‘a fact of the matter over which the disputants are 
disagreeing.  The dispute may be due to the incorporation of moral principles and values into a 
jurisdiction-specific rule of recognition, where it is their application that is disputed.’419  Hart 
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thus claims that legal positivism can ‘account for disagreement about the application, rather than 
the content, of general jurisdiction-specific standards of existence and content of law.’420  
However, this response can account for only some, and not all, of what Dworkin is 
contemplating: ‘Dworkin also claims that the disputes he is interested in are about “pivotal 
cases,” which go to something at “the core” of or “fundamental” to the law,’ and disputes about 
application ‘don’t touch the core of the rule of recognition, since they aren’t about its content.’421  
In the outcome, Hart ‘can’t account for widespread disputes about pivotal cases for the rule of 
recognition; for pivotal case divergence is inconsistent with mutual recognition of the same rule 
of recognition.’422   
Another of Hart’s prominent critics is Raz, who argues that Hart fails to establish legal 
normativity: 
A valid norm can either be practised or not.  It can 
be followed and endorsed by a person or a society 
or it can be disregarded by them.  A norm which is 
not valid can, of course, also be practised.  That a 
norm is practised entails that at least some believe 
that it is valid, but it does in no way entail that the 
norm is valid.  The practice theory of norms is 
mistaken in thinking that by explaining what it is 
for a norm to be practised it explains what a norm 
is.423   
If Raz is correct, then Hart’s internal point of view is insufficient to explain the normativity of 
law; this is because the existence of a norm is independent of whether it is ‘followed and 
endorsed by a person or a society.’  The acceptance model gets around Raz’s critique because, in 
the acceptance model, the implied point of view does not-- and is not meant to-- establish 
reasons for conformity provided by law.  Rather, in the acceptance model, the implied point of 
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view identifies how officials and subjects ‘have’ the defeasible reason that is independently 
provided by law (i.e. the provision of choices).   
Raz makes another criticism of Hart’s internal point of view, arguing that law cannot be 
normative for subjects simply in virtue of officials taking the internal point of view for purely 
prudential reasons.424  Raz’s critique implies that, absent being done in subjects’ self-interest, 
officials’ acceptance of the internal point of view can impose duties on subjects only if, in 
violation of Hart’s legal positivism, officials adopt it for moral reasons (or at least pretend to do 
so).425  As discussed below, the implied point of view avoids this critique of Hart because, unlike 
the internal point of view (which is necessarily adopted only by officials), the implied point of 
view is necessarily adopted by (certain) subjects as well as officials.    
Shapiro presents at least four (somewhat overlapping) criticisms of Hart.  First, Shapiro argues 
that Hart commits a category error by conflating social rules (e.g. the rule of recognition) with 
social practices.  To this end, Shapiro says that ‘for Hart, social rules are social practices.’426  In 
Shapiro’s description, Hart reduces social rules to social practices, such that ‘social practices 
generate rules because these rules are nothing but social practices.’427  Hart’s problem, says 
Shapiro, is that social rules cannot be reduced to social practices because rules and practices 
belong to different metaphysical categories: rules are ‘abstract objects’ rather than ‘entities that 
 
424 ‘For it seems that rules telling other people what they ought to do can only be justified by their self-
interest or by moral considerations. My self-interest cannot explain why they ought to do one thing or 
another except if one assumes that they have a moral duty to protect my interest, or that it is in their 
interest to do so. While a person's self-interest can justify saying that he ought to act in a certain way, it 
cannot justify a duty to act in any way except if one assumes that he has a moral reason to protect this 
interest of his.’ (Joseph Raz, ‘Hart on Moral Rights and Legal Duties’ (1984) 4 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 123, 130).  For a rebuttal of this line of reasoning, see Chapter 4 from Kramer (n 49).  
 
425 ‘it seems to follow that I cannot accept rules imposing duties on other people except, if I am sincere, 
for moral reasons. Judges who accept the rule of recognition accept a rule which requires them to accept 
other rules imposing obligations on other people. They, therefore, accept a rule that can only be accepted 
in good faith for moral reasons. They, therefore, either accept it for moral reasons or at least pretend to do 
so.’ (ibid.). 
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exist within space and time,’ while practices are ‘concrete events’ that ‘take place within the 
natural world and causally interact with other physical events.’428   
Kramer has defended Hart by arguing that, while it is true that social rules cannot be reduced to 
social practices, it is untrue that Hart advocated for such reduction.  Two points support 
Kramer’s conclusion.  First, the few statements made by Hart that could be (ungenerously) 
interpreted as affirming a reduction of social rules to social practices are properly interpreted as 
affirming no such thing.  Second, Hart was aware of the distinction between ‘the regularities of 
social practices and the norms toward which those practices are oriented.’429   
Regarding the first point supporting Kramer’s response to Shapiro, consider the following 
passages from Hart:  
1) ‘if a social rule is to exist[,] some at least must look upon the behaviour in question as a 
general standard to be followed by the group as a whole.’430  
2) ‘How many of the group must...treat the regular mode of behaviour as a standard of 
criticism, and how often and for how long they must do so to warrant the statement that 
the group has a rule, are not definite matters.’431  
3) ‘to refer to the internal aspect of rules seen from [the] internal point of view’ is ‘to bring 
into the account the way in which the group regards its own behaviour.’432  
With respect to the first and second passages, Kramer argues that the term ‘standard’ is 
equivocal, and can refer either ‘(i) to an abstract normative entity toward which some practice is 
oriented or (ii) to the behavioral and attitudinal regularities that make up the practice.’433 
Although Hart at times uses the term ‘standard’ in the latter sense, ‘there are no grounds 
whatsoever for the claim that he collapsed the former sense in to the latter.’434  Similarly, 
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regarding the third passage, although Hart ‘wrote both about the adoption of an internal 
perspective on rules and about the adoption of an internal perspective on the 
behavioral/attitudinal regularities that are oriented toward those rules,’ he does not suggest that 
the rules are ‘nothing more than the regularities.’435   
The second point, supporting the conclusion that Hart did not reduce social rules to social 
practices, is that Hart ‘frequently evinced his awareness of the distinction between the 
regularities of social practices and the norms toward which those practices are oriented.’436 
Kramer notes that Hart adverted to ‘the regularities of observable behaviour in which conformity 
with the rules partly consists.’437  Kramer suggests that, if Hart had taken the position Shapiro 
says he takes, then Hart would ‘not have referred here to conformity with the rules; he would 
instead have written about the regularities of behavior in which the rules themselves partly 
consist.’438  From the fact that Hart does refer here to conformity with the rules, ‘we can rightly 
infer that he did not take the rules to be reducible to the behavioral regularities and associated 
attitudes of which social practices are composed.’439  Another example of Hart’s awareness of 
the distinction is when Hart declares that ‘our social group has… rules which, like that 
concerning baring the head in church, makes [sic] a specific kind of behavior standard.’440  
Kramer argues that, if Hart espoused the reductive position imputed to him by Shapiro, then Hart 
‘would not have written that the rules make certain patterns of behavior standard.  Rather, he 
would have written that the rules are certain standard patterns of behavior.’441    
Regarding his second critique of Hart, Shapiro argues that the internal point of view means that 
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Hart’s theory violates Hume’s law (i.e. derives an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’).442  In response to 
Hume’s challenge, Hart argues that social facts can be approached not only theoretically, but 
practically (i.e. as reasons for action) as well.  On this view, normative judgments are ‘not 
apprehensions of normative facts, but rather commitments to giving descriptive facts certain 
weight in one’s deliberations.’443  Pursuantly, it is possible to ‘take the internal point of view 
toward the social practice of rule recognition and, in so doing, treat it as a standard for guidance 
and evaluation.’444  Next, ‘The normative judgments that are formed through this practical 
engagement with social practice can then be used to derive other normative judgments about 
legal rights, obligations, and validity.’445  In this way, ‘Legal reasoning in a positivistic 
framework does not, therefore, violate Hume’s Law, insofar as legal judgments are derived only 
from other, similarly normative judgments.’446  However, Shapiro argues that, due to the way 
Hart’s theory treats the bad man’s behavior, such theory’s response to Hume’s challenge is 
seriously undermined:447  
Insofar as the bad man is bad, he does not engage 
practically with the regularity among officials.  This 
practice of recognition is merely the object of a 
descriptive judgment, not a normative judgment to 
treat it as a standard of conduct and evaluation.  
Despite the lack of practical engagement, he is able 
to figure out the law of his jurisdiction and 
characterize it using standard legal terminology.  He 
 
442 ‘The problem with Hart’s expressivism is that it cannot account for certain features of legal thought 
and discourse.  Even when people do not accept the law from the internal point of view, it is always 
possible for them to figure out the content of the law and to describe legal rules using the familiar 
normative terminology of ‘obligation,’ ‘rights,’ and ‘validity.’  The fact that even the bad man can engage 
in legal reasoning, despite his alienation from legal practice, strongly suggests that legal judgments can be 
made without taking the internal point of view.  If so, then the bad man will have derived a normative 
judgment from purely descriptive ones, and will have violated Hume’s law in the process.’ (Shapiro (n 2) 
111).  
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is able, in other words, to derive a normative 
judgment from a purely descriptive one.  Since the 
reasoning of the bad man follows the DINO pattern, 
it violates Hume’s Law.448  
Shapiro’s third critique is that Hart’s internal point of view cannot account for the 
redescribability of law.  Shapiro explains what ‘redescribability’ means by explaining that, ‘Even 
when the law is no better than the gunman, it is always possible to accurately redescribe its 
content using normative terminology.  This is so even when the asserter does not take the 
internal point of view toward the secondary rule of the system.’449  Thus, ‘The bad man does not 
accept these norms but can nonetheless truthfully redescribe the law in terms of obligations, 
rights, and legal validity.’450  So, on Hart’s ‘expressivist’ theory, ‘the law can be described as 
imposing obligations, conferring rights, and validating rules only when the asserter accepts the 
system’s rule of recognition.  However, the bad man can redescribe the law using normative 
terminology, even though he takes the external point of view.’451  If Shapiro’s third critique is 
correct, then Hart’s internal point of view is unnecessary to account for the use of normative 
legal language.  
Shapiro’s fourth critique is that Hart’s internal point of view cannot account for the ‘openness’ of 
legal reasoning: ‘The bad man can not only talk the talk; he can think the thought.’452  Even the 
bad man can ‘think like a lawyer.’453  Shapiro concludes that legal reasoning ‘is a remarkably 
open process.  Even those who judge the law morally illegitimate, or reject it for self-interested 
reasons, can figure out what the law demands of them.’454  This is entirely appropriate, suggests 
Shapiro, given that ‘it would be bizarre if the only people who could understand the law were 
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those who accepted it.’455  Unfortunately, says Shapiro, ‘Hart cannot explain either the 
redescribability of the law or the openness of legal reasoning.’456  For Hart, the law can be 
described as normative only when the asserter accepts the system’s rule of recognition.  
However, ‘the bad man can redescribe the law using normative terminology, even though he 
takes the external point of view.’457  The case regarding legal reasoning is similar.458  Like his 
third critique of Hart, Shapiro’s fourth critique implies that the internal point of view is 
unnecessary to account for legal normativity (in the form of normative legal reasoning): if those 
who do not adopt the internal point of view can engage in normative legal reasoning, then the 
internal point of view is unnecessary to explain how individuals can engage in normative legal 
reasoning.  
Kramer, once more, comes to Hart’s defence.  In Kramer’s description, Shapiro insists that Hart 
violates Hume’s law because ‘people can reason about the law and reach legal conclusions even 
if they have not adopted the internal perspective toward the practices of law-ascertainment in 
their jurisdiction. They can derive normative inferences about the law while occupying an 
uncommitted perspective.’459  In Shapiro’s mind, then, Hart fails to explain how an uncommitted 
observer could manage to ‘draw normative conclusions from the non-normative facts of 
officials’ conduct and attitudes.’460  Even though the uncommitted observer ‘does not ascribe 
normative force to the conduct and attitudes,’ he is able to reach conclusions about legal norms 
and obligations.461  Shapiro contends that Hart cannot credibly deny the possibility of an 
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uncommitted observer drawing such conclusions, and yet ‘within the confines of his theory the 
drawing of such conclusions by such an observer is a contravention of Hume’s Law.’462  
However, Kramer responds, there is a dichotomy-- the simulative/internal dichotomy-- that 
shields Hart from Shapiro’s criticism.463   
A person occupying the simulative perspective ‘does not merely attribute normative beliefs to 
officials and some citizens; in addition, he articulates such beliefs as if they were his own,’ such 
that he ‘speaks or writes as if from an internal point of view without actually occupying that 
point of view.’464  A simulative utterance can be compared to a thespian performance.  They are 
similar in that each ‘consists in giving voice to a point of view that is not one’s own,’ but a 
simulative perspective ‘leaves much more latitude for innovation than does the recitation of 
lines.’465  Kramer argues that, ‘By adverting to the as-if role of the simulative perspective, Hart 
could account for the ability of an uncommitted observer to articulate normative conclusions 
about the law in this or that jurisdiction.’466   
To prevent Hart from utilizing such a strategy, Shapiro tries to undermine Raz’s distinction 
between committed and detached statements.  To this end, Shapiro summarizes the distinction as 
follows: ‘According to Raz, committed and detached statements express the same normative 
proposition but have different truth conditions.  Committed statements have normative truth 
conditions, whereas detached statements have exclusively descriptive truth conditions.’467  
Regarding the difference in truth conditions, ‘The usual semantic assumption is that propositions 
are individuated according to their truth conditions.’468  In response to Shapiro, Kramer argues 
that the ‘committed/detached dichotomy is naturally understood (by a philosopher) as a matter of 
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pragmatics rather than as a matter of semantics.’469  More precisely, it is naturally understood as 
a ‘difference between the purposes for which people utter various statements rather than as a 
difference between the meanings which people’s statements bear.’470  Because Raz’s dichotomy 
is a difference of the former sort and not the latter, ‘it does not pertain to any distinction between 
truth-conditions.’471  And, ‘If the content of a simulative utterance is the same as that of an 
internal utterance, then the truth-conditions for the utterances are likewise the same.’472  For 
instance, ‘If a sentence S is uttered simulatively, the truth-conditions for that simulative 
statement are the same as the truth-conditions for an internal statement that consists of the 
utterance of S.’473  If Kramer is right, then Shapiro fails to undermine the distinction which is 
thus available to defend Hart474 against Shapiro’s criticisms.         
Simmonds makes two critiques of Hart, the latter of which is particularly effective.  First, 
Simmonds (like Raz) argues that the internal point of view-- which is necessarily adopted only 
by officials-- cannot account for how law might be normative for its subjects.  Second, 
Simmonds argues that the internal point of view is not necessarily connected to the status of law, 
indicating that the internal point of view cannot render intelligible the invocation by judges of 
the status of law as a justification for sanctions.    
Regarding the first critique, Simmonds points out, ‘It is impossible to understand how any 
official could think that the acceptance of a rule of recognition by himself and his colleagues (for 
what might be entirely non-moral reasons) could without more be offered as a justification for 
the ordering of force against a defendant.’475  In response to Simmonds, Hart might argue that 
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law is not necessarily normative for subjects, and so there is no need to explain how law is 
necessarily normative for subjects.  Simmonds’ first critique, therefore, is effective only if, to 
render intelligible the invocation of the status of law as a justification for sanctions, it is 
necessary to explain how law is normative for its subjects.  It seems clear that explaining how 
law is normative for its subjects would be sufficient to render intelligible the invocation of the 
status of law-- but is such an explanation necessary for intelligibility?  Perhaps not-- perhaps 
there could be reasons for officials to invoke to subjects the status of law as a justification for 
sanctions that do not involve law’s capacity to provide subjects with reasons for conforming.  
For instance, perhaps officials want to achieve some (moral, immoral or amoral) purpose, and 
believe that invoking the status of law as a justification for sanctions will further their purpose by 
furthering subjects’ conformity with the law.476  Simmonds’ first critique, therefore, undermines 
Hart’s internal point of view as an account of legal normativity only if there is a need to explain 
how law is normative for its subjects.     
Simmonds’ second critique of Hart is more daunting:   
On Hart’s account [...] it seems that the justificatory 
force of the rules is entirely a matter of derivability 
from the rule of recognition.  But derivability from 
a rule of recognition qualifies the relevant rules as 
law only if the system as a whole is a legal system.  
Claims about the status of the system as a whole, 
however, form (on Hart’s account) no part of the 
justificatory reasoning.  Consequently, the status of 
the rules as law plays no part in the justificatory 
reasoning, while our settled understandings tell us 
that such status is critical to the justification.477    
 
more, as a justification for the decision?  How then can the judge regard it, without more, as a justification 
for the decision?  The intelligibility of the purported justification is thrown still further into doubt if we 
remember that (according to Hart) the judge may accept the basic rule for purely non-moral reasons, 
including reasons of self-interest.’ (ibid. at 129).  
 
476 Shapiro presents a different view: ‘Hart’s account [...] misconstrues the intended audience of the law.  
Subjects, not officials, are the primary objects of legal guidance and evaluation.  Thus, when officials 
guide and evaluate conduct, they form judgments and make claims about the conduct that subjects should 
perform.  Statements about X’s legal obligation to do A are statements about X’s reasons to do A, not the 
official’s reasons for demanding that X do A.’ (Shapiro (n 2) 115).  
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This second critique is stronger than the first because, even if officials accept the rule of 
recognition for moral reasons, such acceptance ‘might nevertheless be unrelated to the status of 
the rule of recognition, and the system to which it gives rise, as a system of law.’478  This lack of 
relation (to the status of law) is possible because a rule of recognition can underpin non-legal 
systems: ‘Not all systems of rules derived from a basic rule of recognition are systems of laws.  
There could be a basic rule of recognition in certain games, for example, where the game is 
complex and regulated by some official body.’479  If a rule of recognition underpins a non-legal 
system, then (non-technical) acceptance by officials of such rule is an acceptance unrelated to 
the status of law.  Explained differently, given that a rule of recognition can underpin a non-legal 
system, officials’ acceptance of a rule of recognition is not necessarily related to the status of 
law-- the problem here is that ‘in the adjudicative justification of sanctions, the status of the 
relevant rules as law plays a key part.’480  Given that officials’ acceptance of a rule of recognition 
is not necessarily related to the status of law, any normativity generated by such acceptance is 
not necessarily related to the status of law; and, if the normativity specified by Hart is not 
necessarily related to the status of law, then Hart’s account fails to render intelligible officials’ 
invocation of the status of law as a justification for sanctions.   
Here is another way of understanding Simmonds’ second critique of Hart’s internal point of 
view.  Suppose that there is a rule of recognition that underpins a non-legal system, and the 
officials of this non-legal system take the internal point of view towards its rule of recognition.  
Here, there are officials taking the internal point of view towards a rule of recognition, and yet-- 
because the rule of recognition underpins a non-legal system-- there is no legal normativity.  
This demonstrates that officials taking the internal point of view towards a rule of recognition is 
insufficient to establish legal normativity.  Because officials taking the internal point of view 
towards a rule of recognition is insufficient to establish legal normativity, legal normativity 
depends on something other than officials taking the internal point of view towards a rule of 
recognition.  This is significant because, if legal normativity depends on something other than 
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officials taking the internal point of view towards a rule of recognition, then Hart cannot account 
for legal normativity merely by referring to the internal point of view.  And, if Hart’s internal 
point of view (without more) cannot account for legal normativity, then the internal point of view 
(without more) cannot render intelligible the invocation of the status of law as a justification for 
sanctions.  This, says Simmonds, is a problem because (as discussed above) we can explain how 
law is a coherent social practice only if we render this invocation intelligible.  Simmonds’ second 
critique of Hart, then, does not merely threaten Hart’s account of legal normativity; indeed, this 
critique indicates that Hart cannot describe how law is a coherent social practice.  Even if Hart 
rejects the need to explain how law is normative for its subjects, he would admit that an adequate 
(legal positivist) theory must describe how law is a coherent social practice.  If this is correct, 
then one lesson to learn from Simmonds’ critique of Hart is that, to be adequate, an account of 
legal normativity must attach to the status of law.  
The significance of Simmonds’ second critique of Hart’s internal point of view becomes clear in 
light of Shapiro’s argument that Hart intended the internal point of view not to explain legal 
normativity but, rather, to render legal practice intelligible.  Per Shapiro, ‘It is sometimes thought 
that Hart introduced the internal point of view in order to explain how social rules, and in turn 
the law, can give group members reasons for action.’481  This interpretation, however, renders 
Hart’s claims ‘thoroughly perplexing, for he never explains how the internal point of view 
imbues rules with normative force.’482  Shapiro asks, ‘how does the fact that most members of 
the group believe that others have a reason or an obligation to D give them a reason or obligation 
to D?’483  For Shapiro, the internal point of view ‘does not explain the morality or rationality of 
legal activity, but rather its very intelligibility.’484  However, if Simmonds’ second critique is 
correct, then Hart’s internal point of view-- if intended to render legal practice intelligible-- is 
 
481 Scott Shapiro, ‘What is the Internal Point of View?’ (2006-2007) 75 Fordham Law Review 1157, 
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inadequate because it cannot render intelligible the invocation, made by judges, of the status of 
law as a justification for sanctions.  
Raz’s argument, that the internal point of view is inadequate to account for legal normativity, has 
been made by others.485  For Adam Perry, this objection ‘shows the need to supplement Hart’s 
account of the attitude held by participants in the internal aspect of a social rule.’486  Drawing 
upon the work of philosophers of action (such as ME Bratman, L. Jonathan Cohen, and Robert 
Stalnaker), Perry proposes supplementing Hart’s account by adding the idea of (technical) 
acceptance, which involves treating, for some reason, a proposition as true: it is the ‘notion of 
treating as true (taking as given, proceeding on the basis, etc) that is central to acceptance.’487  
While the usual reason for treating a proposition as true is because you believe it is true, you can 
also accept a proposition you do not believe.488  More exactly, ‘acceptance that p in a context 
leads you to treat p as true in that context,’ and ‘what you accept in a context is (i) shaped by 
practical reasons; (ii) context-dependent; and (iii) under your direct, voluntary control.’489  Perry 
proposes that ‘a participant in the internal aspect of a social rule is someone who has an attitude 
of acceptance towards the proposition that is the rule’s content, where that acceptance is held 
independent of any corresponding belief.  The internal aspect of that social rule is then a societal 
or “shared” belief-independent acceptance of that proposition.’490  
 
485 (Adam) Perry summarizes another version of the critique: ‘Hart understood the participants’ attitude in 
terms of its manifestations.  It leads participants in the internal aspect of a social rule to criticize 
deviations from the rule, to acknowledge the legitimacy of like criticisms by others, and to express these 
reactions using normative language.  The problem, as Geoffrey Warnock and others pointed out, is that a 
belief that an action ought to be performed displays itself in the ways Hart described, yet a society does 
not have a rule requiring its members to act in some way merely because they generally act in that way 
and believe they ought to do so.’ (Adam Perry, ‘The Internal Aspect of Social Rules’ (2015) 35(2) Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 283, 283-284).  
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Perry’s proposal is helpful in that it addresses Raz’s critique: because acceptance involves 
treating a proposition as true for some reason, there is always a reason that plays a role in the 
practical reasoning of those engaged in (technical) acceptance.  Just because we believe or 
endorse a proposition does not mean the proposition is true, or that there is a reason for treating 
the proposition as true; however, if we treat the proposition as true for some reason, then there is 
a reason for treating the proposition as true.  If the proposition says, ‘you ought to conform with 
legal directives,’ then acceptance indicates you are for some reason treating it as true that you 
ought to conform with legal directives.  Given its advantages, the idea of technical acceptance is 
adopted by the implied point of view.  However, even if Hart’s internal point of view is 
supplemented as suggested by Perry, there is-- based on the critique of Simmonds-- nonetheless 
reason to doubt that the internal point of view can account for legal normativity.  More 
specifically, even if Hart’s internal point of view is supplemented by the idea of (technical) 
acceptance, what is accepted is still the rule of recognition, and thus this explanation of 
normativity does not necessarily attach to the status of law (given that, as discussed, a rule of 
recognition can underpin a non-legal system).    
Although not denying Hart’s idea of the internal point of view, the acceptance model does not 
rely on this idea to explain legal normativity.  Instead, the acceptance model relies on the implied 
point of view.  The implied point of view plays a similar role in the acceptance model to that 
played in Hart’s theory by the internal point of view-- it is used to explain how law can be 
normative for officials.  Unlike the internal point of view, however, the implied point of view 
can also explain how law is normative for its subjects.  Finally, the implied point of view learns 
lessons from the criticisms of Hart presented above.    
The acceptance model adopts the idea of (technical) acceptance, proposed by Perry, but in a 
modified way meant to get around the critiques levelled at Hart’s internal point of view.  To 
accomplish this task, the acceptance model must (among other things) be connected to the status 
of law.  The acceptance model is connected to the status of law because it is only a legal system 
(and not any non-legal form of governance) that is conditional on providing certain subjects with 
the choices identified above.  This is because only a legal system is conditional on exhibiting, to 
some extent, each of Fuller’s precepts of legality (in addition to the Hartian requirements), such 
exhibition necessarily providing certain subjects with these choices.  The provision of these 
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choices is thus secured by-- because such provision is necessary for-- the existence of a legal 
system.  This does not suggest that a legal system cannot cease to exist-- of course it can.  But a 
measure of constancy is in the nature of a legal system: per Fuller, legal directives are not subject 
to constant change and thus cannot belong to a legal system that comes in and out of existence 
erratically.   
Given that a legal system is conditional on providing subjects with several choices, the fact that a 
legal system is reasonably constant through time indicates that the choices, provided by law, are 
reasonably constant through time.  Because law’s existence is conditional on providing certain 
subjects with several choices, the law itself functions as a sort of security interest-- if these 
subjects are not provided with the choices discussed, then they are no longer subject to law 
(given that the law will have ceased to exist).  These subjects (though not subjects generally) are 
thus bound by legal obligations only if they are provided with the several choices.  Because there 
is no non-legal form of governance that is conditional on providing these choices, there is no 
non-legal form of governance that acts in this way like a security interest for its subjects.   
Remember that to technically accept a proposition, generally speaking, is to treat it as true for 
some reason.  For Bratman, ‘in accepting that p I do not simply behave as if I think that p: I also 
reason on the assumption that p.’491  For Stalnaker, ‘To accept a proposition is to treat it as a true 
proposition in one way or another-- to ignore, for the moment at least, the possibility that it is 
false.  One may do this for different reasons, more or less tentatively, more or less self-
consciously, with more or less justification, and with more or less feeling of commitment.’492  In 
Cohen’s words:  
to accept the proposition or rule of inference that p 
is to treat it as given that p. More precisely, to 
accept that p is to have or adopt a policy of 
deeming, positing, or postulating that p—i.e. of 
including that proposition or rule among one's 
premisses for deciding what to do or think in a 
 
491 ME Bratman, ‘Practical Reasoning and Acceptance in a Context’ (1992) 101(401) Mind 1, 9.  
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particular context, whether or not one feels it to be 
true that p.493  
 
Acceptance may be tacit-- it can, but need not, be reflected in how one speaks or behaves.494  
Acceptance ‘implies commitment to a pattern, system, or policy-- whether long or short term-- of 
premissing that p as a basis for a decision.’495  At bottom, acceptance ‘executes a choice-- the 
accepter’s choice of which propositions to take as his premisses.’496  Pursuantly, ‘Acceptance, in 
contrast with belief, occurs at will, whether by an immediate decision or through a gradually 
formed intention.’497  Consequently, ‘We may conclude [...] that people are held responsible and 
accountable for what they accept or fail to accept, not for what they believe or fail to believe.’498 
For Cohen, acceptance is ‘subjectively closed under deducibility.’499  To introduce the idea of 
being subjectively closed under deducibility, Cohen explains that:    
It is tempting to say that, while the explicit, direct 
act of acceptance involves a conscious adoption of a 
policy about premisses or rules of inference, a 
person also accepts indirectly or unconsciously all 
the deductive consequences of each of the 
propositions that he accepts explicitly, and of any of 
their conjunctions, whether or not he is himself 
aware of those consequences or able or disposed to 
work them out.500  
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However, ‘although it is tempting to analyse acceptance in this way, there is a serious difficulty 
that the analysis encounters. If acceptance is thus closed under the relationship of deducibility, 
then a good deal of what a person may accept is either controversial or perhaps even 
unknown.’501  Controversy obtains because of the competing theories that exist about 
deducibility,502 and ‘a good deal of what you accept may even be unknown, if there is still some 
progress to be made in the logic or mathematics of deducibility.’503  Yet these problems can be 
resolved   
if acceptance is instead regarded as merely being 
subjectively closed under deducibility. Your 
acceptance then reaches no further than the rule of 
modus ponendo ponens will carry you. If you 
accept both p and the deducibility of q from p, then 
you at least unintentionally, if not in fact 
intentionally, accept q. Of course, where q is 
deducible from p and you accept p, you ought 
always to accept q. But whether you actually do so 
or not depends on whether you also accept that q is 
deducible from p.504  
The point (relevant to the acceptance model) is that, if an official or subject accepts a 
proposition, then such official or subject ought to accept every subsequent proposition that is 
entailed thereby.  Those who adopt the implied point of view ought to accept the proposition that 
there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  The proposition-- 
that such prima facie reason exists-- ought to be accepted whenever an official or subject 
exercises for any reason his capacity to choose in executing his role as official or when making a 
choice provided by law.  Accordingly, one reason the proposition ought to be treated as true is 
whatever (moral or pragmatic) reason an official or subject has for exercising his capacity to 
choose in executing his role or making a choice provided by law.   
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To establish the conclusion that, by exercising for any reason his capacity to choose (in 
execution of his role), an official ought to accept the proposition that there is a prima facie reason 
to efficaciously conform with legal directives, I will argue that (1) an official accepts a 
proposition (i.e. that his official role provides him with choices with which he can satisfy 
reasons) that (2) entails the proposition that such prima facie reason exists.  Here is the relevant 
line of reasoning.  If an official exercises for any reason his capacity to choose in executing his 
official duty, then he accepts the proposition that his official role provides him with choices that 
allow him to satisfy reasons.  The proposition that an official’s role provides him with choices 
with which to satisfy reasons entails the proposition that there is a prima facie reason for him to 
efficaciously conform with legal directives-- the reason to efficaciously conform is to facilitate 
the legal system (which exists only if efficacious) so that it can provide the official with such 
choices.  
With respect to officials, the acceptance model gets around Simmonds’ second critique of the 
internal point of view because the source of normativity specified obtains only in a legal system: 
it is only in virtue of being an official of a legal system that an official is granted certain choices 
(e.g. regarding how to administer or interpret the law).  Similarly, it is only a legal system (and 
not a state of non-law) that necessarily provides to certain subjects several choices that may be 
protected by a right to bodily integrity.  Further, because officials and subjects ought to accept 
the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives, it 
is at least intelligible for officials to invoke (to subjects) the status of law as a justification for 
sanctions following non-conformity.   
Note that I am not arguing that, once officials or subjects have adopted the implied point of view, 
they ought to treat as true the proposition that a legal system provides them with undefeated 
reasons for conforming (such that, all things considered, they ought to conform).  The argument, 
rather, is that once officials or subjects have adopted the implied point of view, they ought to 
treat as true the proposition that the legal system provides them with a prima facie reason for 
efficaciously conforming.  Given that the reason in question is prima facie, there is no 
contradiction in saying that an official or subject has taken the implied point of view towards a 
legal system that, overall, he ought not generally conform with.  Here, an official or subject takes 
the implied point of view by exercising, for any reason, his capacity to choose in executing his 
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role or by making a choice provided by law; however, this official or subject ought not generally 
conform with the legal system because the balance of reasons or an exclusionary reason favours 
non-conformity.  
I explained above how officials adopt the implied point of view.  I will now describe how a 
conforming subject does the same.  When a subject chooses, for any reason, to conform with 
legal directives (or to exercise any of the choices provided by law), he treats as true the 
proposition that the legal system provides him with choices with which to satisfy reasons (i.e. 
whatever reasons he has for conforming with directives or exercising any of these choices).  This 
is the proposition that is accepted, and-- because a legal system exists only if efficacious-- this 
proposition entails the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform 
with legal directives.  The prima facie reason to efficaciously conform is to facilitate the legal 
system, which exists only if efficacious, so that it can provide subjects with several choices with 
which to satisfy reasons.   
There is also a broader version of the implied point of view.  When an official or subject 
exercises for any reason his capacity to choose in executing his role or making a choice provided 
by law, he treats as true the proposition that choices provided by law can be used to satisfy 
reasons; if choices provided by law can be used to satisfy reasons, then a legal system-- because 
providing choices-- is a means of satisfying reasons.  If a legal system is a means of satisfying 
reasons, then there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform-- the reason to efficaciously 
conform is to facilitate the legal system, which exists only if efficacious, so that it can provide 
choices and thus be a means of satisfying reasons.  So, if an official or subject exercises for any 
reason his capacity to choose in executing his role or making a choice provided by law, he ought 
to accept the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal 
directives.  
Where a legal system also provides a right to bodily integrity (protecting the choices that must be 
provided by law), there is an additional normativity, which results from the following line of 
reasoning.  When a subject, in conforming with legal directives (or exercising any choices 
provided by law), chooses for any reason to use (or not) his body, he accepts that securing his 
bodily integrity has value (after all, he does not want to be interfered with so as to preclude him 
from acting, or not, in satisfaction of reasons), and thus ought to accept that there is a prima facie 
139 
reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives, given that a legal system-- which is 
conditional on efficacy-- provides him with a right to bodily integrity.  
The implied point of view is, in some respects, quite similar to Noam Gur’s dispositional model.  
Gur describes the dispositional model this way:  
[...] the fact of there being a legal system in place 
which meets certain competence and quality 
prerequisites-- namely, a system whose substantive 
laws, procedures, and design generally exhibit a 
reasonable level of conformity with morality as well 
as with principles of legality (also known as the rule 
of law), and are in general reasonably apt to secure 
valuable goods-- is a reason for its subjects to adopt 
an attitude which I will refer to as a law-abiding 
attitude.505  
 
For Gur, ‘the conative (or behavioural) component of this attitude is a disposition, a standing 
inclination, to comply with legal requirements,’ such that ‘those who adopt a law-abiding 
attitude [...] thereby adopt a disposition to comply with the law.’506  The implied point of view is 
similar to the dispositional model because both involve reasons for treating law as something that 
ought to be complied with.  There is, however, a significant difference between Gur’s 
dispositional model and the acceptance model-- Gur’s dispositional model does not (and is not 
intended to) account for legal normativity.  This is because Gur’s law-abiding attitude obtains 
only where a legal system satisfies certain moral prerequisites.507  Indeed, Gur does not intend 
his dispositional model to answer the question of legal normativity: the focal purpose of Gur’s 
book is to ‘inquire into a modal aspect of the relationship between law and practical reasons, 
rather than to search or establish a theory about the justificatory underpinnings of legal 
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507 ‘the dispositional model does not endorse a law-abiding attitude under any legal system, but only 
under a legal system that meets certain prerequisites of competence and quality: the system’s laws, 
procedures, and design must generally exhibit an at least reasonable (as distinct from perfect or ideal) 
level of conformity with relevant moral standards, as part of which they must be at least reasonably just 
and fair.’ (ibid. at 138).   
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legitimacy.’508  In contrast, the acceptance model can explain legal normativity because the 
prima facie reason specified by the model (albeit provided only to officials and certain subjects) 
is provided by any legal system-- including immoral ones not satisfying Gur’s moral 
prerequisites.   
The implied point of view learns lessons arising from the discussion of critiques of Hart’s 
internal point of view.  According to these lessons:  
1) (Arguably) an adequate account of legal normativity explains how law is normative for 
its subjects;  
2) An adequate account of legal normativity will not violate Hume’s law (i.e. will not derive 
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’);  
3) An adequate account of legal normativity will explain how the bad man can redescribe 
the law using normative language and engage in legal reasoning;  
4) An adequate account of legal normativity attaches to the status of law.  
 
First, the implied point of view explains how law is normative for (some of) its subjects because 
the implied point of view, unlike Hart’s internal point of view, is necessarily adopted by (certain) 
subjects509 as well as by officials.   
Second, the acceptance model and the implied point of view do not violate Hume’s law.  The 
acceptance model follows the permitted NINO pattern rather than the forbidden DINO pattern: 
the normative input manifests as (1) a legal system providing several choices to officials and 
subjects, which is a prima facie reason for efficaciously conforming with legal directives, and (2) 
whatever reason an official or subject has for exercising, in executing his role or making a choice 
provided by law, his capacity to choose (in adopting the implied point of view).  The normativity 
specified by the acceptance model is not established merely by the fact that an official or subject 
has exercised his capacity to choose; rather, the normativity specified by the acceptance model is 
established by this normative input.  The purpose of the implied point of view is not to generate 
legal normativity; rather, the purpose of the implied point of view is to explain how legal 
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normativity figures in the practical reasoning of officials and subjects.  It is from the perspective 
of an official’s or subject’s own practical reasoning that he ought to treat as true the proposition 
that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  More precisely, 
it is due to the official’s or subject’s decision, to exercise his capacity to choose for any reason in 
executing his role as official or making a choice provided by law, that he ought to treat as true 
the proposition that such prima facie reason obtains.  It is not, then, merely from the point of 
view of the law that the official or subject has reason to conform with legal directives; rather, it 
is additionally from the (implicit) point of view of the official’s or subject’s own practical 
reasoning that he has reason to efficaciously conform.   
Third, the bad man can redescribe the law using normative language and engage in legal 
reasoning because (1) nothing in the acceptance model precludes the bad man from doing so,510 
and (2) even if the redescribability of law and engaging in legal reasoning were confined to those 
taking the implied point of view, the bad man could still engage in such redescribability or legal 
reasoning because even the bad man can take the implied point of view.  Even the bad man (i.e. 
the subject who does not accept the legitimacy of law) can take the implied point of view 
because the bad man can be a conforming subject and can make choices provided by law. 
Fourth, the normativity specified by the acceptance model attaches to the status of law because it 
obtains where a system necessarily provides the choices discussed-- and only a legal system 
necessarily provides these choices.   
There is a final lesson to be learned.  Bring to mind Raz’s critique of natural law theories.  Raz 
argued that natural law theories cannot account for legal normativity because they cannot 
account for the use of normative language, and they cannot account for the use of normative 
language because they fail to identify a source of normativity that is generally known to officials 
 
510 For instance, nothing in the acceptance model indicates that only those who adopt the implied point of 
view can use normative language or engage in legal reasoning-- this is why legal theorists outside the 
jurisdiction of a legal system can use normative language and engage in legal reasoning despite not 
adopting the implied point of view towards such legal system.  Adopting the implied point of view is 
sufficient to account for legal normativity; I am not claiming that adopting the implied point of view is 
necessary to engage in normative language or normative legal reasoning. 
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and subjects.511  The acceptance model avoids Raz’s critique because officials and subjects 
generally know that law is a means of satisfying reasons (e.g. subjects know that the legal system 
can be used to sue people for money), and thus the normativity specified by the acceptance 
model is generally known to officials and subjects.  Because the normativity specified by the 
acceptance model is generally known to officials and subjects, it can account for their use of 
normative language.512  
Under the acceptance model, is law normative only for those subjects who are necessarily 
granted several choices (i.e. only those subjects who must have such choices in order for law to 
exist), or is it normative also for those subjects who are contingently granted such choices?  The 
short answer is that, under the acceptance model, law is normative for those subjects who are 
necessarily or contingently granted these (indeed, any) choices; however, the normativity 
identified is unique to law only for those subjects who are necessarily granted the several choices 
discussed.   
In response to Simmonds’ second critique of Hart, I noted above that the normativity specified 
by the acceptance model attaches to the status of law, in the sense that it is exhibited only by a 
legal system (given that only a legal system necessarily provides several choices that may be 
protected by a right to bodily integrity).  Expanding on this, the normativity specified by the 
acceptance model is unique to law only for those subjects who necessarily have the choices 
identified, but this does not mean that law is not normative (as specified) for those subjects who 
contingently have these choices.  On the contrary, the implied point of view obtains even for 
those subjects who contingently have these choices, and so law is normative for these subjects as 
 
511 ‘if natural law theories are to explain the use of normative language in such contexts they must show 
not only that all law is morally valid but also that this is generally known and thus accounts for the 
application of normative value to the law.  Since this assumption is false, natural law cannot explain the 
normativity of law.’ (Raz (n 3) 170).   
 
512 A possible criticism of the acceptance model is that the normativity it specifies is just too obvious to 
be insightful.  To this criticism, I would respond that whatever is responsible for legal normativity would 
likely be something fairly obvious, because (as pointed out by Raz) it must be something that is generally 
known to officials and subjects.  The obviousness of the right to bodily integrity, or choices provided by 
law, is consistent with a correct account of legal normativity.   
 
143 
well (it is, however, a normativity that is not unique to law, given that non-legal systems could 
also contingently provide any of these choices).   
For subjects, then, legal normativity (as specified by the acceptance model) operates (or not) on 
three levels: first, for those513 to whom the law necessarily grants several choices, legal 
normativity obtains and is also distinct (from non-legal normativity); second, for those to whom 
the law contingently grants such choices, legal normativity obtains but is not necessarily distinct; 
and third, for those without any choices provided by a legal system, law is not normative as 
specified.514  
4.4 Possible Counter-Arguments 
There are several possible counter-arguments that could be made in response to the claims 
presented above.  Regarding the first possible counter-argument: in response to the acceptance 
model, it might be said that the proposition that is accepted by officials and subjects (i.e. that the 
legal system provides choices with which to satisfy reasons) does not entail the proposition that 
there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  This is because the 
proposition that is accepted specifies several choices that can be (contingently) provided to 
subjects even absent a legal system, and thus without subjects efficaciously conforming with 
legal directives.  If the choices provided by a legal system can be equally provided by a non-legal 
system, then officials and subjects accepting the proposition that a legal system provides them 
with choices with which to satisfy reasons does not entail the proposition that there is a prima 
facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  Indeed, if there is a non-legal system 
that provides the same choices (as provided by a legal system), then normativity is achieved (via 
the non-legal system) regardless of whether a legal system exists, and thus regardless of whether 
subjects efficaciously conform with legal directives.  
However, this counter-argument works only if we assume that a non-legal system, providing the 
same choices as a legal system, can exist (1) as something other than the legal system itself, and 
 
513 It is these subjects for whom the law functions, as described above, like a security interest.  This 
functioning is unique to law.   
   
514 Which is not to suggest (or deny) that law is not normative in other ways for these subjects-- keep in 
mind that the acceptance model does not purport to include every essential element of law.  
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(2) even if subjects fail to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  If this second assumption 
does not hold, and such a non-legal system’s existence is conditional on subjects efficaciously 
conforming with legal directives, then any reason to facilitate the existence of the non-legal 
system would also be a reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  Yet, (assuming a 
non-legal system exists only if efficacious) where the exact same choices (e.g. regarding 
conformity) are provided by a legal system and a competing non-legal system, subjects 
efficaciously conform with the non-legal system (in facilitating its existence) only if they also 
efficaciously conform with the legal system.  Thus, such a competing non-legal system exists 
only if subjects efficaciously conform with legal directives, and so the second assumption, on 
which this counter-argument depends, cannot be relied on.   
And, note that it is not possible for a competing non-legal system to provide the same, and also 
more, choices than a legal system.  This is not possible because, if a choice is provided by a non-
legal system but not provided by a legal system, then a subject of the legal system is prohibited 
from acting out that choice (given that a subject is obligated to follow a legal system before non-
legal directives).  If subjects are prohibited from acting out a choice, then such choice is not 
exercisable and therefore not provided by a non-legal system.  
The second possible counter-argument claims that the (present) choices that are exercised in 
adopting the implied point of view are not the same as the (future) choices that are facilitated by 
efficaciously conforming with legal directives.  This difference seems to break the flow of 
normativity from the exercise of the present choices provided by law to the justification for 
efficaciously conforming with legal directives.  There are two reasons why this counter-
argument does not trouble the acceptance model.  The first reason is because the counter-
argument is wrong in what it asserts.  The second reason is because, even if we assume the 
counter-argument is correct, it is not effective against the broader version of the implied point of 
view.    
First, the counter-argument is wrong in what it asserts because a choice of whether to [X] is the 
same choice regardless of whether it is provided in the present or the future (assuming that 'X' 
has the same meaning in the present and the future).  For instance, a choice of whether to 
challenge legal validity in court is the same choice regardless of whether it is provided in 2010 or 
2020-- it is at each time a choice of whether to perform those acts which will be treated by the 
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legal system as a source of information to be considered (by a court) in determining whether a 
directive is legally valid.  Consequently, if a subject exercises, for any reason, a (present) choice 
of whether to [X], then he ought to accept the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to 
efficaciously conform with legal directives-- the reason is to facilitate the legal system, which 
exists only if efficacious, so that it can provide (in the future) a choice of whether to [X]. 
But, one might respond, even if the (future) choice is in substance the same, it is still a different 
instance of the same substantial choice and, just because one chooses a present instance of [X], 
does not mean that one does, or ought to, accept every future instance of [X].  For example, if A 
consents to have sex with B (at some point) in 2010, this does not mean that A consents (or 
ought to consent) to have sex with B in 2020.  However, this is a false analogy: the relevant 
(analogous) question is not whether A's consent to have sex with B in 2010 indicates that A 
consents (or ought to consent) to sex with B in 2020; this is not the question because I am not 
arguing that exercising a (present) choice indicates willingness or commitment to exercise the 
same choice in the future.  Rather, I am arguing that exercising, for any reason, a present choice 
indicates one ought to accept the proposition that there is a prima facie reason to do what is 
necessary to facilitate the provision of the same choice in the future. 
 
In light of this, the apt question would be whether A's (reasonable) consent to sex with B in 2010 
indicates that A ought to accept there is a prima facie reason to do what is necessary to facilitate 
the provision of a choice of whether to consent to sex with B in 2020.  Given that A always has a 
choice of whether to consent to sex, A does not have to do anything to facilitate the provision of 
such choice.  We are left with the following as the appropriate analysis, for this e.g., that is 
implied by the reasoning of the acceptance model: if A consents to sex (for any reason) with B in 
2010, then A ought to accept that there is a prima facie reason to do nothing at all in order to 
facilitate the same choice in the future.  There is nothing suspicious about this analysis, which 
does not undermine the acceptance model.  Furthermore, even if A (somehow) did not always 
have a choice of whether to consent to sex, nothing in the acceptance model implies that A 
consenting to sex with B in 2010 indicates A's consent to sex with B in 2020.  All that would be 
implied is that A consenting to sex (for any reason) with B in 2010 indicates that A ought to 
accept there is a prima facie reason to do what is necessary to ensure the provision, in 2020, of a 
choice of whether to consent. 
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Second, even if we assume this counter-argument is correct in what it asserts, it is nonetheless 
ineffective against the broader version of the implied point of view.  Here, again, is the broader 
version of the implied point of view.  When an official or subject exercises for any reason his 
capacity to choose in executing his role or making a choice provided by law, he treats as true the 
proposition that choices provided by law can be used to satisfy reasons; if choices provided by 
law can be used to satisfy reasons, then a legal system-- as a provider of choices-- is a means of 
satisfying reasons.  If a legal system is a means of satisfying reasons, then there is a prima facie 
reason to efficaciously conform-- the reason to efficaciously conform is to facilitate the legal 
system, which exists only if efficacious, so that it can provide choices and thus be a means of 
satisfying reasons.  In this way, if an official or subject exercises for any reason his capacity to 
choose in executing his role or making a choice provided by law, he ought to accept the 
proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives.  
Notice that in the broader version of the implied point of view, legal normativity does not depend 
on the provision of any particular choice but, rather, depends on the fact that the legal system 
provides choices and is therefore a means of satisfying reasons.  The legal system is a means of 
satisfying reasons even if the (present) choices that are exercised by subjects are different than 
the (future) choices that are facilitated by efficaciously conforming with legal directives-- this is 
because both sets of choices are means of satisfying reasons.  In other words, what is accepted 
here is not merely that a legal system provides a particular choice with which to satisfy reasons, 
but also that a legal system-- as a provider of choices-- is a means of satisfying reasons. 
A third possible objection to the acceptance model is that the prima facie reason it identifies is 
too weak to count as a genuine reason.   
The reasons for an action are ‘considerations which count in favour of that action.  Other things 
being equal, they are sufficient grounds for taking the action, and, barring reasonable ignorance 
or other excuses, grounds for finding fault with the actor’s conduct, if he fails to take the 
action.’515  We can think of these grounds as the ‘fact statements of which form the premises of a 
sound inference to the conclusion that, other things being equal, the agent ought to perform the 
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action.’516  Considerations establishing that an action also has disadvantages ‘do not in the least 
show that the reasons do not exist, nor do they show that they are subject to an ‘exception’’.517  
Indeed, the ‘original reasons are still there.  The inference from them to the conclusion that, other 
things being equal, the act ought to be done is still sound.’518  These conflicting considerations 
‘merely show that there are conflicting reasons, i.e. that there is also a sound inference to the 
conclusion that, other things being equal, the act ought not to be done.’519  The ‘other things 
being equal’ premise needed to sustain a conclusion regarding what ought to be done ‘excludes 
defeating considerations of any kind,’ including (but not limited to) conflicting reasons, which 
are ‘essentially independent considerations which point to the desirability of the non-
performance of that action.’520  
The issue raised by this counter-argument, then, is whether the provision of several choices by a 
legal system is a consideration that, other things being equal, is sufficient grounds for officials 
and certain subjects to efficaciously conform.  To the extent that the choices necessarily granted 
by law are valuable but obtained only through efficacious conformity, certain subjects-- other 
things being equal-- ought to efficaciously conform in order to obtain these choices.  For 
example, suppose that a subject is granted the several choices identified only if he efficaciously 
conforms, which (in this hypothetical) means that he must respect the right of bodily integrity 
provided to each subject.  Here, other things being equal, the subject ought to respect others’ 
right of bodily integrity so that he can obtain the choices identified by the acceptance model.  
The assumption is that the choices are sufficiently valuable to justify the inaction involved in 
respecting others’ right to bodily integrity.  Notice that the hypothetical does not work if 
efficacious conformity requires violating others’ bodily integrity-- because violating bodily 
integrity is immoral, we cannot say that there are no defeating considerations (and thus cannot 
say that ‘other things are equal’). 
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I am assuming, then, only that the choices provided by law have sufficient value such that-- all 
other things being equal-- certain subjects ought to efficaciously conform in order to obtain 
them.  If-- other things being equal-- the provision of choices is sufficient for subjects to ought to 
efficaciously conform, then this provision is a prima facie reason for efficacious conformity.  
Note that I make no comment on the exact strength of the prima facie reason, such that we could 
identify with precision which conflicting reasons would equal or outweigh the prima facie 
reason; my interest is limited to whether the provision of choices has sufficient strength to exist 
as a prima facie reason.     
The discussion of ‘other things being equal’ also explains how a legal system, by necessarily 
providing choices to officials and certain subjects, contingently provides a conclusive reason for 
officials and certain subjects to efficaciously conform.  The contingent circumstances arise 
where other things are equal (i.e. excluding defeating considerations of any kind).  Where other 
things are equal, the prima facie reason, necessarily provided by law, becomes a conclusive 
reason for officials and certain subjects to efficaciously conform.    
The fourth possible counter-argument might be called the anarchist’s challenge.  My argument is 
that each legal system necessarily provides officials and certain subjects (i.e. those granted 
several choices) with a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives, and 
contingently (i.e. where other things are equal) provides them with a conclusive reason to 
efficaciously conform.  In response to this argument, an anarchist might argue that although law 
necessarily provides several choices, it also necessarily deprives subjects of other choices that 
would be available in a state of non-law.   
The anarchist challenge does not undermine the acceptance model because, even if we assume 
that law necessarily deprives subjects of other choices, such deprivation would not represent a 
condition that cancels the prima facie reason established by the provision of choices; rather, such 
deprivation would represent only a conflicting reason.  Using different words, even if law 
necessarily deprives subjects of other choices, it is nonetheless true that there is-- due to the 
necessary provision of choices-- a prima facie reason for officials and certain subjects to 
efficaciously conform.   
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Raz is careful to distinguish between a reason which is overridden (by a conflicting reason) and a 
reason which is cancelled by a cancelling condition.521  Conflicting reasons, unlike cancelling 
conditions, do not render reasons non-existent-- they merely conflict with them.522   Regarding 
cancelling conditions, Raz says:  
Once a reason for an action is cancelled it stops 
being a ground for the action, or for faulting or 
regretting its non-performance.  But the cancelling 
circumstance is not itself [...] a reason for any other 
action.  The cancelling facts show how the act will 
no longer achieve its desired result [...] or that the 
result is no longer desirable.523   
In contrast, conflicting reasons are ‘essentially independent considerations which point to the 
desirability of the non-performance of that action,’ and conflicts of reasons ‘occur when the 
agent has reason both to perform and not to perform a certain act.’524  Indeed, a reason can be 
‘overridden only by a fact which is itself a reason for contradictory action.’525  
If the provision of several choices is a reason in favour of efficacious conformity, and the 
deprivation of other choices (as proposed by our hypothetical anarchist) is a reason against 
efficacious conformity, then the deprivation of these other choices represents a conflicting 
reason, and not a cancelling condition, in relation to the prima facie reason to efficaciously 
conform established by the provision of several choices.  We can see that such a deprivation of 
choices is not a cancelling condition because this deprivation is itself a reason for non-
conformity (which may entail action), while cancelling conditions are not reasons ‘for any other 
action’ but rather ‘relate to the reasons that they cancel.’526  
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A fifth possible counter-argument is similar to the anarchist’s challenge, and involves evil legal 
systems.  The analysis of the anarchist challenge is instructive to the analysis of evil legal 
systems.  Regarding evil legal systems, we are tempted to conclude that-- due to the immorality 
of the system-- it is not the case that there is a prima facie reason for conformity which is 
overridden by a conflicting reason but, rather, that there is no prima facie reason for conforming 
at all.   
The relevant issue is whether the immorality of an evil legal system is a cancelling condition or a 
conflicting reason.  Recall that a cancelling condition is not itself a reason for any other action; 
rather, the cancelling condition shows how an act will no longer achieve its desired result, or that 
the result is no longer desirable.   A conflicting reason, in contrast, points to the desirability of 
the non-performance of the action supported by the reason it conflicts with.  It seems clear 
enough that the immorality of a legal system supports the conclusion that one ought not conform 
with its (immoral) directives-- a conclusion against efficacious conformity.  This would make 
such immorality a conflicting reason.  Furthermore, the immorality of a legal system does 
nothing to undermine the effectiveness or purpose of the provision of several choices as a prima 
facie reason for officials and certain subjects to efficaciously conform, suggesting that the 
immorality of an evil legal system is not a cancelling condition regarding the prima facie reason 
established by the provision of choices.  
A sixth possible counter-argument asks: what if efficacious conformity is achieved by subjects 
who are not granted the choices identified?  If efficacious conformity is achieved by subjects not 
granted choices, then why should subjects who are granted choices bother to efficaciously 
conform?   
This sixth counter-argument is misleading, because subjects who efficaciously conform are 
necessarily subjects who are granted choices, given that (as discussed above) one of the choices 
granted by law is the choice of whether to conform with legal directives.  In other words, by 
efficaciously conforming with legal directives, subjects are exercising one of the choices granted 
to them by law.   
But, one might respond, what if the subjects who achieve efficacious conformity are granted the 
first choice (i.e. whether to conform), but none of the other choices?  This scenario seems 
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implausible.  If the several choices are necessarily granted by law, then a legal system-- to exist-- 
cannot effectively prohibit subjects from exercising these choices.  And, if the legal system 
cannot effectively prohibit subjects from exercising these choices, then such choices must be 
either explicitly or implicitly tolerated by the system.  If these several choices are tolerated by 
the system, then we ought to consider them included within the choice of whether to conform 



















Chapter 5: A Return to Kant?  
 
In Chapter 1, we began our examination of anti-positivism by looking at Kant’s theory of law, 
which, I argued, is inadequate as an account of legal normativity.  Kant’s theory is inadequate 
because it cannot account for the existence of an immoral legal system, and thus cannot account 
for how an immoral legal system is normative.  There is an affinity between Kant’s anti-
positivism and the acceptance model-- the right to bodily integrity specified by the model 
significantly overlaps (as described in Chapter 4) with Kant’s innate right to freedom, which is 
the right to ‘Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it 
can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law,’ and ‘is the only 
original right belonging to every human being by virtue of his humanity.’527  
At the same time, there are several differences between the acceptance model and Kant’s theory.  
One difference is that Kant’s theory, but not the acceptance model, depends on a relational 
conception of freedom.  There are passages in Ripstein that suggest Kant’s theory is inconsistent 
with the idea, implied by the acceptance model, that a right to bodily integrity (akin to Kant’s 
innate right) could belong to only one person.528  The point-- that the innate right to freedom 
cannot belong to a single person alone-- follows for Ripstein because Kant’s theory specifies a 
relational conception of freedom: ‘The normative analysis of innate right that I propose is 
entirely relational,’ such that ‘The universal principle of right guarantees the coexistence of 
choice between a plurality of persons.’529  Because the acceptance model is not premised on a 
relational conception of freedom, the right to bodily integrity that it describes is not precluded (in 
theory) from belonging to a single subject only.  
A second difference between Kant’s legal theory and the acceptance model is that Kant, but not 
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the acceptance model, claims that realizing freedom (in the form of the innate right) entails law.  
For Ripstein’s Kant, the ‘idea of independence carries the justificatory burden of the entire 
argument, from the prohibition of personal injury, through the minutiae of property and contract 
law, on to the details of the constitutional separation of powers.’530  These ‘norms and 
institutions’ provide ‘the only possible way in which a plurality of persons can interact on terms 
of equal freedom.’531  In contrast, the acceptance model does not claim that the right to bodily 
integrity entails a legal system.  Rather, the claim made by the acceptance model is that a legal 
system entails the provision of several choices that may be protected by a right to bodily 
integrity.  
The third and most significant difference, between the acceptance model and Kant’s theory, is 
that only Kant argues that there is a political obligation.  Green identifies three similar, but 
distinct, questions.  The first question relates to the normativity of law-- how should we 
understand ‘the pervasive use of normative terms, including “obligation” and “duty,” in stating 
and describing the law’?532  The second question relates to the legitimacy of law-- ‘what might 
justify [law’s] rule, including its ultimate use of coercive force?’533  The third question relates to 
political obligation-- ‘should the law’s subjects take its requirements as morally binding?’534  As 
argued by (Stephen) Perry, the second question is distinct from the third question because of the 
‘reverse entailment problem’: ‘although it is true that legitimate political authority (in the sense 
of a moral power) entails the existence of a general obligation to obey the law, the existence of a 
general obligation to obey the law does not, in and of itself, entail legitimate political 
authority.’535  The discussion thus far has been concerned with the first of these questions.  Now, 
I want to turn attention to the third question. 
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Per the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘To have a political obligation is to have a moral 
duty to obey the laws of one's country or state.’536  What are the elements of a political 
obligation?  Green specifies five conditions.537  These conditions are ‘derived simply by 
considering what it would take to establish the conclusion in question: that every citizen has a 
duty to obey all the laws of his or her own state.’538  For Green, there is, within a given legal 
system, a general obligation to obey the law only if there is (1) a moral reason for action; (2) a 
content-independent reason for action; (3) a binding or mandatory reason for action; (4) a 
particular reason for action (meaning a reason that applies only to the subjects of a legal system, 
and not to those outside its jurisdiction); and (5) a universal reason for action that binds all the 
legal system’s subjects to all of its directives.  
Regarding (1) morality, Green says that a political obligation is a ‘moral reason for action’ and 
therefore ‘has whatever formal and material features a requirement must have in order to be 
moral.’539  Green adopts the commonplace view that the first requirement demands ‘something 
more than direct prudential reasoning,’ and so ‘excludes arguments to the effect that certain 
threats, offers, or considerations of self-interest mandate compliance.’540  
What about (2) content-independence?  Here, the core idea is that ‘the fact that some action is 
legally required must itself count in the practical reasoning of the citizens, independently of the 
nature and merits of that action.’541  One who believes in political obligation does not merely 
accept that ‘In political life as elsewhere we have at least those general duties which bind 
irrespective of social and political institutions’; rather, he or she also accepts that ‘the fact that 
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the state requires something of us itself changes our moral position by giving us further duties or 
giving existing ones a new source of validity.’542  This requirement is consistent with the law 
having only prima facie force, but ‘it must at least in principle be capable of making some 
difference to our moral reasoning, a difference which does not depend on the nature of the action 
prescribed.’543  The idea of content-independence is a ‘coherent and necessary one in any 
argument purporting to establish the existence of a political obligation’-- it ‘serves to rule out 
any arguments which cannot show how politics makes a difference to what people ought to 
do.’544  Perry replaces Green’s content-independent condition with a ‘directive-as-ground’ 
(DAG) condition, formulated as follows:  
In the case of any legal directive which attempts to 
impose a requirement on someone to do X, any 
argument demonstrating that there is a moral duty to 
obey the directive which arises by virtue of the 
directive’s status as law must take the existence of 
the directive as the ground or part of the ground of 
the duty, but must not make essential reference to 
the independent merits of doing X.545   
Why substitute the DAG condition?  Perry notes that Green’s content-independence condition 
actually expresses both a negative and positive constraint.  The negative constraint is that the 
‘nature and merits’ of a legally required action ‘must not count in the practical reasoning of 
citizens as they decide whether or not they are obligated by the relevant legal directive.’546  The 
positive constraint is that ‘the fact that some action is legally required must itself count in the 
practical reasoning of the citizens.’547  The problem is that both the negative and positive 
constraints are ‘formulated in terms of the actual practical reasoning that is supposedly required 
of persons to ensure that what they are doing counts as obeying the law,’ when it is preferable to 
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‘simply look to what is required for the existence of the obligation.’548  The DAG condition 
formulates the negative and positive constraints ‘not as constraints on anyone’s practical 
reasoning, but rather as constraints on what can count as an argument that is capable of 
establishing that there is a (moral) obligation to obey a legal directive, such that the obligation 
can be said to arise by virtue of the directive’s status as law.’549  
Together with the requirement of (2) content-independence, the requirement of (3) bindingness 
‘specifies more narrowly what sort of moral reason is expected.’550  The bindingness condition:  
aims to capture the common view that some actions 
are obligatory which do not, however, seem to be of 
special weight and importance.  According to 
[bindingness], they are special because they exclude 
from consideration certain otherwise valid reasons 
for non-performance of the action-- usually, and at a 
minimum, weak considerations of ordinary self-
interest or convenience.551  
 
The requirements of content-independence and bindingness ‘pick out a subset of all the possible 
reasons for complying with the law as being of special interest’; these two requirements ‘offer a 
partial analysis of what it is to have an obligation.’552  Note, however, that while these two 
requirements are severally necessary, they are not jointly sufficient to establish a moral 
obligation because ‘they specify this in purely formal terms: some things satisfying [the two 
requirements] are not moral reasons of any sort.’553  
The (4) particularity requirement seeks to ‘capture the directionality common to political 
obligation and other special obligations’: ‘Just as promising creates duties to particular persons 
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only and not to the world at large, political obligations bind them to certain states only.’554  
Typically, this means the state of which one is a citizen.555  The particularity requirement has 
significant implications, because ‘most ordinary moral reasons do not respect the boundaries of 
states in the appropriate way.’556  While such reasons ‘might be able to explain duties to 
humanity in general, they can make little sense of narrower, more particular bonds.’557  Note, 
however, that Green is not claiming that ‘it is paradoxical or impossible for individuals to owe 
duties to more than one country.’558  So, while the particularity requirement ‘need not be 
understood as excluding plural obligations, it does exclude general ones.’559  Political obligation 
is ‘not just some general duty to humanity which requires compliance with governments, but 
rather a special moral relationship between a citizen and a state.’560  
The (5) universality requirement is ‘doubly universal’ in that political obligation ‘purports to 
bind all citizens to all laws.’561  The question, then, is whether ‘it is true of all citizens that they 
are bound to obey all their laws.’562  The universality requirement is related to the content-
independence requirement: ‘if law has content-independent force, then it has it qua law, and that 
will underwrite the obligation to obey all the laws.’563  While there are cases in which one is 
entitled not to obey certain valid laws, the state purports to regulate these exceptions as well.564  
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Resultantly, like a universal law of nature, ‘the thesis of political obligation cannot withstand a 
single counterexample’: ‘In a just state, there can be no valid laws which are morally inert.  To 
support otherwise is just to concede that there is no obligation to obey the law as such.’565  The 
universality condition rules out ‘any arguments which are merely based on the systematic 
character of law, for example, on the fact that a legal system being in force provides certain 
goods of social co-operation.’566  These benefits result from the general effects of the legal 
system as a whole; because the source of such benefits is systematic, ‘they are threatened only by 
disobedience which threatens the existence of the legal system or which substantially weakens 
it.’567  However, it is ‘just false to think that there are no laws whose disobedience the system can 
survive, and false to think that there are no people whose compliance is unnecessary.’568  The 
universality condition is the most difficult to satisfy: ‘As an empirical matter, argue Green and 
many others, it is never true that, for any given legal system, each and every legal directive gives 
rise to a moral obligation to obey that directive which holds for each and every person who falls 
within the directive’s scope.’569    
The acceptance model does not purport to establish a political obligation.  Just because officials 
and certain subjects ought, as described by the acceptance model, to treat as true the proposition 
that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform with legal directives does not mean 
that there is a political obligation.  To assert otherwise is to rely on a non-sequitur.  There are at 
least two reasons why this is a non-sequitur.  First, it is only subjects who are granted the several 
choices discussed that ought, as specified by the acceptance model, to treat as true the 
proposition that there is a prima facie reason to efficaciously conform.  Because not every 
subject is necessarily granted these choices, not every subject necessarily ought to treat this 
proposition as true.  Second, even for those subjects who are granted these choices, the prima 
facie reason to conform with directives applies only where such conformity is necessary to 
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establish the efficacy of the legal system (and thereby facilitate its existence), and so does not 
necessarily apply to all legal directives.  These reasons show that Green’s universality condition 
is unsatisfied by the acceptance model.   
In contrast to the acceptance model, Ripstein’s Kant does purport to establish a political 
obligation.  For Kant, the question of political obligation is closely connected to the concept of 
freedom.  According to Robert Paul Wolff, ‘The fundamental assumption of moral philosophy is 
that men are responsible for their actions.  From this assumption it follows necessarily, as Kant 
pointed out, that men are metaphysically free, which is to say that in some sense they are capable 
of choosing how they shall act.’570  Further, ‘so long as we recognize our responsibility for our 
actions, and acknowledge the power of reason within us, we must acknowledge as well the 
continuing obligation to make ourselves the authors of such commands as we may obey.’571  
There is, says Wolff, a conflict between authority and autonomy:  
The defining mark of the state is authority, the right 
to rule.  The primary obligation of man is 
autonomy, the refusal to be ruled.  It would seem, 
then, that there can be no resolution to the conflict 
between the autonomy of the individual and the 
putative authority of the state.  Insofar as a man 
fulfills his obligation to make himself the author of 
his decisions, he will resist the state’s claim to have 
authority over him.  That is to say, he will deny that 
he has a duty to obey the laws of the state simply 
because they are the laws.572  
Raz to some extent agrees with Wolff, stating that  ‘... it is true that accepting authority 
inevitably involves giving up one’s right to act on one’s judgment on the balance of reasons,’573 
and that ‘[Wolff] sees correctly that legitimate authority involves a denial of one’s right to act on 
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the merits of the case.’574  As the title of Ripstein’s book suggests, Kant is emphatically 
concerned with the interplay between coercion (force) and freedom: ‘States claim authority - the 
entitlement to tell people what to do - and coercive power - the right to force them to do as they 
are told. How can these powers be consistent with each human being's entitlement to be his or 
her own master?’575   
Kant’s argument for a political obligation is ingenious (which is not to suggest it is necessarily 
correct).  Because each person’s innate right to freedom can be fully realized only in a rightful 
condition exhibiting an omnilateral will, we have an obligation to exit the state of nature by 
founding a state.  Given that we have an obligation to establish a state, we have an obligation to 
obey the laws of existing states.576  Described summarily, ‘if each person has an innate right to 
freedom, then we have an obligation to found the state, obey its authority, and make it look as 
Kant describes.’577  Establishing a state and obeying state authority is required because ‘the set of 
enforceable rights that we have in the state of nature is radically inadequate,’ and state authority 
is justified in virtue of the state’s ‘ability to place us in a “rightful condition,” a condition in 
which we have the set of enforceable rights required to secure independence.’578  More exactly, 
we have a right to equal freedom because each person is entitled to complete independence from 
others.579  Independence means that ‘each person gets to set her ends for herself, and may not 
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have the purposes of others imposed on her.’580  While ‘One person's independence may be less 
valuable than another's, in that the first person's independence may provide him with fewer 
opportunities for welfare than the second's,’ it is nonetheless true that the two are ‘equal in their 
freedom in that each is fully independent of the other.’581  
So, Ripstein’s Kant believes that ‘a rational agent’s external freedom-- her ability to set and 
pursue ends for herself without being subject to the choices of others-- can justifiably be 
restricted only for the sake of external freedom itself.’582  Kant’s argument for political 
obligation can be broken down into two premises: first, that human beings living side by side are 
free only if they enjoy certain rights against one another (including the innate right to freedom); 
and second, that these rights can be enjoyed only in a civil condition, given that they are either 
provisional or imperfectly realized in a state of nature.583  To be clear, however, it should be 
mentioned that Kant does not affirm that there is a political obligation regarding just any 
authority.  If ‘an actual state fails to establish the proper republican public institutional 
framework, then it is not a civil society, and the people living subject to its power are under an 
enforceable duty to establish civil society.’584  As a result, Kant’s conception of political 
legitimacy is ‘not a conception according to which any systematic and powerful use of might is 
seen as yielding political obligations (absolutism), since there are institutional requirements on 
the political authority.’585  Not just any powerful coercive structure qualifies as civil society: the 
just state is a ‘representative, republican system of public right composed of a tripartite public 
authority with a monopoly on uses of coercion, which is reconciled with each subject’s innate 
right to freedom through securing private right for all, the provision of conditions of equal 
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systemic freedom regarding land, the economy and finances, and through the institutional 
guarantee of unconditional poverty relief.’586  These are the institutional conditions that must be 
met before political obligations exist.587  
But, one might ask: why, pursuant to Kant, can the innate right to freedom be realized only in a 
state of law?  The answer can be most easily understood by looking at property rights, which-- as 
a form of acquired right-- represent an extension of the innate right to freedom.  In a state of non-
law, C acquires through his own choosing a property right (or what would be a property right in 
a state of law) over a previously unowned object only by placing D under a corresponding 
obligation of non-interference with the object.  But, given that D has an innate right to freedom, 
on what authority can C unilaterally place D under such obligation?  In Ripstein’s words, ‘Kant’s 
point is that the theory of property raises a deeper problem of how one person’s act can place 
another person under a new obligation. How can an act done entirely of your own initiative, to 
which others are not parties, have binding effects on them?’588  For Kant, C has no authority to 
unilaterally place D under an obligation of non-interference.  Rather, the only authority that can 
place D under such an obligation is not the result of a unilateral will, but is instead the result of 
an omnilateral will, because it is only an omnilateral will that is consistent with equal freedom.  
And, an omnilateral will is possible only in a state of law.  Here is how Katrin Flikschuh 
describes the process:  
Property claims and their effects are systemic. In 
taking any (unowned) external object of my choice 
into my possession I unintentionally change not 
only your normative situation but also that of 
everyone else. You and everyone else do likewise. 
You, too, along with me and everyone else, claim 
particular objects of your choice, changing my and 
everyone else’s normative situation relative to that 
object. So we all unintentionally and unavoidably 
change one another’s normative situation. Yet none 
of us have a natural authority to put others under a 
coercible obligation. Only an ‘omnilateral’ or public 
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will can have this sort of authority.589  
 
Resultantly, ‘the claim to freedom of choice and action, hence to property, is vindicable only in 
the civil condition.’590   
One implication of Kant’s argument is that it limits the considerations that are relevant to legal 
normativity.  As described by Ripstein,  
Although architectonic and methodological factors 
shape Kant’s presentation of his arguments, his 
grounds for rejecting empirical and anthropological 
starting points in political philosophy rest on the 
simple but compelling normative idea that, as a 
matter of right, each person is entitled to be his or 
her own master, not in the sense of enjoying some 
form of special self-relation, but in the contrastive 
sense of not being subordinated to the choice of any 
other person.591  
 
This normative starting point for political philosophy ‘leads Kant to reject anthropological and 
empirical factors in general, and benefits and burdens in particular.’592  This framing of the 
issues ‘limits the ways in which benefits and burdens can be relevant to either the formulation or 
the application of any basic normative principle.’593  Accordingly, ‘Your right to be your own 
master entails that no other person is entitled to decide for you that the benefits you will receive 
from some arrangement are sufficient to force you to participate in it.’594  Indeed, ‘You alone are 
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entitled to decide whether a benefit to you is worth the burdens it brings.’595  Similarly, others 
cannot ‘justify authority over you, or use force against you, on the ground that the restrictions 
thereby placed on you will generate greater benefits for others.’596  This same fundamental idea 
‘blocks the appeal to the sort of value pluralism according to which competing political values 
rather than interests must be “balanced” against one another.’597  This is because ‘The authority 
of any person or institution’s mandate to balance competing values must itself be reconciled with 
each person’s right to be his or her own master.’598  Now, none of this means that, for Ripstein’s 
Kant, ‘political authority or justified coercion is impossible, or even that institutions are never 
competent to balance competing values’;599 rather, what is implied is that, for Ripstein’s Kant, 
‘the authority to make or enforce decisions needs to be established by showing it to be consistent 
with each person’s right to freedom before competing interests or value can be considered.’600  
Ripstein is concerned to exclude interests from his conception of rights because he ‘views it as 
problematic that one person can be subordinated to others and their choices.’601  The worry is 
that ‘if the state, or non-state actors, were permitted to take interests into account in shaping the 
obligations of others, some people would be co-opted in the service of others.’602  But, says 
Victor Tadros, ‘Ripstein’s reaction to the problem that it is wrong to force some people to act for 
the sake of others is extreme.’603  It is extreme because ‘it is not obvious that forcing some to act 
for the interests of others permits the latter to make the former subject to their choices.’604  
 
595 ibid.  
 
596 ibid.  
 
597 ibid.  
 
598 ibid.  
 
599 ibid. at 5-6. 
 
600 ibid. at 6. 
 
601 Tadros (n 578) 198.  
 
602 ibid.  
 
603 ibid.  
 
604 ibid.  
 
165 
Indeed, ‘My interests are not simply determined by my preferences or my choices,’ such that 
‘The fact that I choose v as my end does not make it in my interests that I v.’605  For Tadros, 
then, ‘Ripstein’s implied account of interests tends to exaggerate the extent to which an interest-
based account of rights permits one person to impose his will on others.’606      
Miriam Ronzoni argues that the concept of freedom as independence can provide a foundation 
for a full-blown account of political justice only if a richer interpretation of it, than that presented 
by Ripstein’s Kant, is provided.607  More exactly, ‘we must be willing to make controversial and 
empirically informed claims about what counts as a threat to our freedom as independence under 
specific circumstances.’608  What is required is a more embedded account of freedom as 
independence, one that ‘engages with the contingencies of politics and of the human 
condition.’609  The goal of providing a richer interpretation of freedom as independence cannot 
be achieved without engaging in ‘those empirical and anthropological starting points which Kant 
intends to eschew.’610  In particular, the general and highly abstract concept of freedom as 
independence must be embedded in ‘an account of human nature and a conception of the 
person,’ a ‘general but suitably rich account of which powers and protections human agents need 
to enjoy in order to be their own masters,’ and ‘an anthropologically and empirically informed 
account of which kinds of human vulnerability, forms of interaction, and social dynamics and 
structures, can threaten our [...] capacity to be our own masters.’611  These specifics can be 
crucial to providing plausible interpretations of what counts as freedom as independence, and of 
what constitutes important threats to it.612  It is only in this way that we can ‘derive a rich and 
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sufficiently concrete package of rights, duties, and institutional recommendations from the right 
to freedom.’613  In short, freedom as independence must be embedded in concrete practices for us 
to be able to give meaning to it.614  Without this embedding, the concept of freedom ‘not only 
has little guidance, but can be used, rhetorically if not even ideologically, to justify opposing 
views, policies and institutions.’615   
Ronzoni is not arguing that Ripstein’s Kant is committed to the view that ‘everything that 
matters politically can be logically deduced from the concept of freedom as independence, 
without relying on any empirical and anthropological insights’; indeed, Ripstein affirms that 
principles are necessarily abstract, and thus can be applied only with the help of careful exercises 
of judgment.616  However, we cannot simply relegate important decisions and crucial areas of 
disagreements to the ‘realm of mere application of principles through the exercise of 
judgment.’617  There are two reasons for this.  First, such a stark separation between principles 
and judgment ‘might obscure how much disagreement actually happens at the level of judgment, 
and thus induce us to rest too quickly.’618  Second, if the exercise of judgment is considered 
external to political philosophy-- as a mere problem of application-- then ‘the very concept of 
freedom as independence becomes too malleable, and can be interpreted in this or that direction 
in order to fit in with pre-existing political agendas and sets of interests.’619  In Ronzoni’s view, 
then, there is an essential intermediate step-- consisting of interpretations of freedom-- that must 
be taken for us to move from the concept of freedom to a theory of justice.620   
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Given the significant differences between the acceptance model and Kant’s theory, there are 
certain criticisms that have been made of Kant that do not undermine the acceptance model.  I 
will discuss the following criticisms of Kant: (1) the allegation that Kant’s theory of law is 
circular; (2) the claim that an omnilateral will can obtain absent monopolistic state law, and thus 
that the requirement for an omnilateral will fails to justify a monopolistic state legal system; and 
(3) the charge that Ripstein’s Kant struggles to justify a duty, to enter into a rightful condition, 
premised on the innate right (as opposed to acquired right).   
Charge of Circularity  
 
Andrea Sangiovanni has charged that Kant’s legal philosophy, as described by Ripstein, is 
circular because it presupposes a conception of morality:  
what are the criteria for determining which uses of 
one’s means (including one’s body) count as 
subjecting others’ choices, and which ones count as 
merely affecting them? [...]  At the crucial point 
where Ripstein introduces the innate right to 
freedom under universal law, he analyses the notion 
of subjection in terms of actions that either usurp or 
destroy your powers to set ends. [...] The trouble is 
that ‘usurp’ is a moralized concept: to usurp means 
to illegitimately take over a power or jurisdiction, 
or, alternatively, to take over a power or jurisdiction 
that is rightfully someone else’s.621  
Laura Valentini has similarly argued that Kant’s innate right to freedom, as characterized by 
Ripstein, is circular because it both grounds all other rights and presupposes a conception of 
rights.622  Valentini thus argues that ‘there is a vicious circularity in Ripstein’s definition of the 
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right to freedom, which prevents it from grounding all other rights.’623  On the one hand, 
‘individual rights are said to derive from the right to freedom,’ while on the other hand, ‘freedom 
itself is defined by reference to individual rights.’624  More specifically, ‘To be unfree/dependent 
on others is to have one’s own means or resources used by others for their, rather than one’s 
own, purposes. But in order to know what qualifies as one’s own, we need a prior account of a 
person’s rights (i.e., a theory of justice), which is precisely what freedom is meant to deliver.’625  
Valentini uses an example to make her point (that we cannot determine what our means are 
without a prior conception of rights or justice): ‘To be sure, when policemen stop a thief, they 
prevent him from using his (positive, as opposed to normative) powers for his (positive) 
purposes, yet we would hardly regard such an intervention as unjust, as a violation of the thief’s 
right to freedom.’626  When the police stop a thief, ‘This is paradigmatically a legitimate 
intervention, aimed at “hindering a hindrance to freedom” (i.e., the freedom of the victim, whose 
means would serve someone else’s, the thief’s, purposes).’627  And yet ‘The freedom referred to 
in the expression “hindering a hindrance to freedom” cannot be any freedom, but must be the 
freedom one is entitled to on grounds of justice.’628  Accordingly, ‘Until we have an independent 
account of justice [...] we cannot know whether someone is free or unfree.’629  This example 
shows that ‘Unless we know what is ours, we cannot know whether constraints on our de facto 
agency are violations of our independence or consistent with it. Rather than grounding all rights 
and entitlements, Ripstein’s Kantian notion of freedom is derivative of them (i.e., it presupposes 
them).’630    
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Ripstein has responded to Valentini’s charge of circularity, arguing that Valentini ignores the 
sequenced nature of the Kantian argument, and confuses indeterminacy for circularity.631 
Overlooking the sequenced development of Kant’s argument misrepresents Kant in two ways.  
First, such overlooking misrepresents Kant as ‘some sort of libertarian, with respect to politics, 
unwilling to permit redistributive taxation.’632  Second, Kant is misrepresented as introducing ‘an 
unargued premise about the moral value of markets.’633  Valentini not only ‘distorts’ Kant’s 
position as presented by Ripstein, but also ‘misrepresents the Universal Principle of Right not as 
the starting point of Kant’s argument, but instead, as a principle that is supposed to be sufficient 
to determine exhaustively what is and is not permissible.’634  Ripstein, following Ronzoni, argues 
further that Valentini’s critique does not show that Kant’s argument is circular but, rather, only 
indeterminate (which is unproblematic for Kant).635  Moreover, not only do Valentini and 
Sangiovanni misrepresent the place of the universal principle of right in the Kantian argument, 
but each also misrepresents the universal principle of right itself:636   
Valentini urges that there cannot be a right to 
freedom by drawing attention to the way in which 
freedoms might come into conflict with each other. 
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Yet the universal principle of right does not say that 
each person has a right to freedom; so understood, 
freedoms would not form a consistent set, and so 
could not be subject to a right.637   
 
This is a misrepresentation because ‘Kant’s claim is that each person has a right to freedom 
consistent with the same freedom for others.’638  In light of Kant’s claim,  
the question of whether something falls within a 
person’s right to freedom cannot be answered 
except in terms of whether everyone else could 
enjoy the same freedom. The universal principle of 
right asks how one person’s exercise of choice can 
be independent of each other person’s exercise of 
choice.639   
However, by overlooking this ‘element of systematicity,’ Valentini presents Kant’s view ‘as 
though he is claiming that two wrongs make a right: if an interference with freedom is bad, then 
interfering with freedom to prevent an interference with freedom must also be bad.’640  This 
presentation is misleading-- ‘While talk about wrongdoing in terms of goods and bads is at home 
in Bentham’s philosophy, it has no place in Kant’s.’641 
The arguments of both Valentini and Sangiovanni ‘share Bentham’s conception of what it would 
be to give a philosophically adequate account, as both suppose that the concept of a right must 
either be grounded in something that can be expressed without any reference to the concept of a 
right, or else must fail because circular.’642  In contrast, Kant’s project ‘works out the 
implications of a set of interrelated and irreducible moral ideas.’643  Admittedly, ‘By Benthamite 
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standards, such an approach must seem circular, because the concept of right is never eliminated 
in favour of something empirical.’644  But Benthamite standards are not Kantian standards-- ‘the 
rights that we have are explained in terms of their place in a larger system of right, as developed 
through the sequenced stages of Kant’s argument.  So understood, no issue of circularity or 
emptiness arises.’645  
Regardless of whether the charges of circularity apply to Ripstein’s Kant, such charges do not 
apply to the acceptance model.  Valentini argues that Kant’s innate right to freedom is circular 
because it both underlies and presupposes a conception of rights and justice; however, this 
charge of circularity does not apply to the acceptance model because the right to bodily integrity-
- if provided-- is grounded in legality, which does not presuppose a theory of rights or justice.  
So, the acceptance model’s right to bodily integrity does not presuppose that one’s means are 
those things that one has a right to.  Rather, the right to bodily integrity arises where one’s body 
must be protected so that law can provide the choices that it must provide in order to exist as 
law.646  The means (i.e. one’s body) covered by the right to bodily integrity are not protected 
because one has a prior right to them (although perhaps one does); rather, these means are 
protected because in certain circumstances, absent such protection, subjects could be interfered 
with in preclusion of them exercising any of the choices necessarily provided by law.  To the 
extent that choices are provided by law only if they are exercisable, the argument (made by the 
acceptance model) that law exists only if providing certain choices indicates that, in certain 
circumstances, law exists only if subjects’ bodies are protected, via the right to bodily integrity, 
from interference precluding them from exercising any of the choices provided.   
Thus, the charge of circularity does not apply to the acceptance model’s right to bodily integrity 
because the right to bodily integrity is not grounded in a prior conception of rights or justice; 
rather, the right to bodily integrity is grounded in legality and, more specifically, in the need for 
law to provide particular choices.  A subject’s body is protected, via the right to bodily integrity, 
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simply in virtue of the fact that-- in certain circumstances (i.e. where subjects are not so peaceful 
that they will on their own allow each other to exercise the choices identified)-- such protection 
is necessary for law to provide to subjects the choices it must provide in order to exist as law.   
Fisher 
Talia Fisher argues that Kant’s conception of freedom cannot justify the ‘concrete, 
interventionist’ state that Ripstein endorses, a state that ‘wields the authority to aid the 
disadvantaged by taxing the excess means of the wealthy.’647  Pursuantly, even if we accept that 
Kantian equal freedom can obtain only if public legal institutions are established, there is without 
more no justification for the Kantian welfare state.648  More significantly, Fisher goes further and 
argues that Ripstein fails to offer a solid justification for a state legal system; specifically, that 
‘Kantian premises regarding the requirement of omnilateral authorization not only do not support 
the interventionist Kantian state, but cannot even justify the minimal night-watchman state, 
endorsed by libertarian thinkers.’649  Fisher’s argument is that the innate right to freedom does 
not, in virtue of entailing an omnilateral will, require or entail a monopolistic state legal system: 
‘There is room to claim that the assumptions regarding freedom, as articulated in Force and 
Freedom, do not offer solid justification for any type of state "force" per se, and cannot justify 
even the minimal night-watchman state, functioning as the embodiment of "Law".’650  This is 
because the innate right to freedom, says Fisher, can obtain in circumstances where there are 
polycentric legal institutions.   
Fisher’s argument consists of a counterexample showing that the innate right to freedom can 
obtain even absent a monopolistic state legal system.  The innate right can obtain absent a 
monopolistic state legal system because the innate right can obtain if there are polycentric legal 
institutions.  In Fisher’s words,  
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Law is a network industry, characterized by such 
demand-side returns to scale. The more people join 
a legal network to which one belongs, i.e., abide by 
the rules one is subjected to-the larger the group of 
people with whom one's transaction costs are lower. 
The greater the scope of the legal network and its 
number of members, the more far-reaching the 
potential legal interactions between those members 
will be. Each consumer of legislation and 
adjudication services confers network benefits upon 
other members of her legal network, by virtue of her 
mere affiliation with the network.651  
‘Network industries’ are ‘good and services which generate demand-side returns to scale- 
namely, greater value to their consumers as the number of users who consume them 
proliferates.’652  Roughly speaking, ‘network industries can be categorized as those industries 
whose goal is to serve as a platform for interaction between consumers, and that feature 
characteristics that enable their consumers to share information and standards.’653  Law is no 
different:  
the network features of law will push toward 
standardization and compatibility between private 
legal agencies and individual wills even without 
central planning. The network structure creates 
mutual dependence among individuals as well as 
among competing legal agencies: legal agencies 
must adapt to the network's prevailing norms and 
institute a framework for arranging inter-agency 
disputes, if they are to survive. They can only 
perform by coordinating with competing agencies 
and by providing network-conforming legal rules 
with shared basic features.654  
 
This analysis is significant because ‘Such polycentric legal networks can be viewed as a form of 
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"rightful condition," and as an authorization of omnilateral will.’655  Resultantly, ‘The 
omnilateral authorization requirement can thus be met without resort to a monolithic state law, 
but rather also under a polycentric legal regime, in which a plurality of legal communities 
operate in a single geo-political unit.’656  Fisher concludes that ‘a centralistic state law model 
does not constitute the only possible venue in which a plurality of individuals can interact on 
terms of equal freedom, for the omnilateral authorization requirement can also be met within the 
framework of a polycentric legal regime.’657   
Fisher’s critique, however, is inapplicable to the acceptance model because, unlike Kant, the 
acceptance model does not affirm that a legal system is normative because it is entailed by the 
innate right to freedom or the right to bodily integrity protecting subjects’ capacity to choose; 
rather, the acceptance model affirms that a legal system is normative because it entails the 
provision of several choices that may be protected by a right to bodily integrity.  In other words, 
it does not matter to the (correctness of the) acceptance model whether the right to bodily 
integrity can obtain in a state of non-law (or in circumstances involving polycentric legal 
institutions rather than a monopolistic state legal system); what matters is that a legal system is 
sufficient to provide several choices, which may be protected by a right to bodily integrity, 
because a legal system’s existence is conditional on providing these choices.  
Flikschuh 
I described above how, for Ripstein’s Kant, the need for property establishes a need for an 
omnilateral will, and thus establishes an obligation to enter a civil condition characterized by 
such omnilateral will.  For Flikschuh, however, there is one right that cannot establish an 
obligation to enter a civil condition-- the innate right to freedom.  This is because, for Ripstein’s 
Kant, the innate right to freedom is self-enforceable in a state of non-law (i.e. a pre-civil 
condition).  Flikschuh asks: ‘as self-enforcer of my innate right to freedom, what reason do I 
have for entrance into the civil condition with regard to that right?’658  If the innate right is 
 
655 ibid. at 400. 
 
656 ibid. at 400-401. 
 
657 ibid. at 401. 
 
658 Flikschuh (n 589) 301-302.  
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‘conclusively enforceable by yourself in the pre-civil condition,’ then ‘the reasons for entering 
into the civil condition on the grounds of innate right [...] appear to be prudential reasons, have to 
do with problems of subjective interpretation and lack of assurance.’659  This, however, takes us 
away from a Kantian justification and moves very close to ‘Lockean natural rights thinking 
where entrance into the civil condition is ultimately based on considerations of greater 
convenience.’660   
Flikschuh’s critique, though appealing with respect to Kant, is inapplicable to the acceptance 
model.  Given that the acceptance model does not propose a political obligation or an obligation 
to enter a civil condition, there is no justification for such a proposal that can be undermined by 
Flikschuh’s reasoning.  A legal system’s provision of several choices to subjects does not, and is 
not meant to, establish an obligation to enter a civil condition.   
We can see that, although the acceptance model is less ambitious than Kant’s theory of law, its 
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